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Abstract 
 
The decision to have a child is normally considered a private matter 
between consenting adults. The state only intervenes if individuals require 
medical treatment to conceive. The ability to choose if, and indeed when, to have 
children is recognised as an important human right. In contrast, prisoners inhabit a 
public space where all decisions regarding procreation are subject to public 
scrutiny. 
 In the USA, prisoners are completely prohibited from procreating, unless 
they are granted the privilege of private visits. In contrast, in Dickson, the 
European Court of Human Rights recognised that prisoners retain all of their 
convention rights, including the right to a private and family life. Rights can only 
be restricted if necessary and the restriction must be proportionate to the objective 
that the state is trying to achieve.  
 This thesis will examine the question of whether prisoners should retain a 
right to procreate and whether restricting prisoners from procreating should form 
a part of their punishment. Many characteristics of the Victorian penal regime 
including isolation from family members and the concept of ‘less-eligibility’ 
continue to affect how prisoners in England and Wales and the USA are treated.  
Prohibiting prisoners from procreating is often justified as part of a prisoner’s 
punishment. Many argue that it is a direct consequence of imprisonment. 
Alternatively, if one accepts the premise that prisoners retain all of their human 
rights apart from the right to freedom, then there appears to be little justification 
for removing their right to procreate in most cases. Removing the right to 
procreate is in effect an additional method of punishing the offender that is not 
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explicitly stated as part of the prisoner’s sentence and is normally given very little 
consideration by prison officials or by government authorities.  
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Chapter One: Introduction to the Thesis  
Within England and Wales, and the United States of America (USA), the 
vast majority of prisoners are prevented from procreating whilst in prison by 
highly restrictive policies. In England and Wales, prisoners are unable to have 
sexual intercourse with their partners. In the USA, only three states: New York, 
Washington, and California allow private visits between prisoners and their adult 
partners for a few selected prisoners as a privilege.1 This thesis aims to explore 
why such restrictions exist, by considering the origins of this approach, as well as 
the reasons that are given by state authorities to maintain the current restrictive 
policies.  
 The overarching research question that I seek to examine within this thesis 
is: ‘Do prisoners have a fundamental right to procreate?’  If one assumes that 
prisoners do retain a fundamental right to procreate, this leads to questions such 
as ‘is it ever acceptable to punish prisoners by removing their right to procreate?’ 
One also needs to examine whether it is ever acceptable to prohibit prisoners from 
procreating for reasons other than to punish the offender, such as when it is 
judged to be in the best interests of the putative child? If it can be argued that 
there is no fundamental right to procreate, then this raises the alternative view that 
procreation itself is seen as a privilege. In this case, questions can be then asked 
about how these decisions should be made, and what criteria should be used to 
decide which prisoners are allowed to procreate. 
                                                
1 For general information regarding conjugal visits see Rachel Wyatt, ‘Male Rape in US Prisons: 
Are Conjugal Visits the Answer?’ 37 (2005) Case W Res Int’l L 576, 600. The State of 
Connecticut also allows conjugal relations between prisoners and their partners, but the partner is 
required to bring the child of the prisoner to the visit, as enhanced family relations are the main 
purpose.  State of Connecticut Department of Corrections, ‘Directive 10.6 Inmate Visits’ (State of 
Connecticut Department of Corrections) sF <http://www.ct.gov/doc/lib/doc/PDF/ad/ad1006.pdf>    
accessed 18 November 2015. 
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The cases of Mellor and Dickson provided the initial starting point for this 
thesis. From a preliminary search on ‘prisoner procreation’ case law, I identified 
another three cases from the USA: Goodwin, Percy and Gerber all of which had 
similar facts.2 On first appearances, it seems accepted fact that losing certain 
family rights, including the right to procreate is simply part of the punishment of 
imprisonment. Some of the judges argued that prisoners did not possess any 
procreative rights.3 Within this thesis, I aimed to challenge the assumptions that 
are made about prisoners procreating. I have done this by taking each of the 
justifications given for prohibiting prisoners in turn and testing whether they stand 
up to scrutiny. 
The thesis will examine the literature surrounding human rights and 
eugenics in Chapter Two: Literature Review. This will be followed by an 
examination of the development of prisons in Chapter Three. Chapters Four and 
Five will consider the case law from England and Wales and the USA 
respectively. Chapter Six undertakes a comparative analysis of the case law from 
each jurisdiction. Chapter Seven considers punishment in more detail and how 
procreative restrictions fit with justifications of punishment. Chapter Eight 
considers procreation and parenting in ‘free society.’ This is contrasted in Chapter 
Nine with parenting in prison. Chapter Ten concludes the thesis, evaluating the 
findings of this research and makes suggestions for future reform.  
This introduction will now turn to the methodology utilised, in order to 
explain the scope of the thesis and the reasons for choosing a comparative 
approach.  
                                                
2 Goodwin v Turner 908 F2d 1395 (1990); Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 543, 545 
(1995); Gerber v Hickman 273 F3d 843 (2001); Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617 (2002).  
3 Gerber v Hickman 291 F.3d 617, 621 (2002) (Silverman J); R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 (Lord Phillips MR) para 43. 
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Methodology 
This section will firstly discuss the initial process of establishing the 
parameters of the research, including the identification of relevant case law, 
statutes and treaties, as well as the secondary literature related to prisoner 
procreation. The initial doctrinal analysis and literature review established the 
boundaries of the research. Discussion will then turn to the reasons for adopting a 
comparative approach, between the chosen jurisdictions of England and Wales, 
the Federal criminal jurisdiction of the USA and the US states of New Jersey and 
California. The comparative approach will be discussed in relation to case law, 
statute law and international treaties. Rather than taking a purely doctrinal 
approach to the analysis of prisoner procreation, it is imperative to consider the 
effects of culture and society on the way the law is operated. This is important in 
order to appreciate the legal culture of the jurisdiction. As Cotterell states ‘To 
remove a focus on legal doctrine from sociological inquiry would ‘prevent legal 
sociology from integrating, rather than merely juxtaposing, its studies with other 
kinds of legal analysis.’4 
Defining the Question: Do prisoners have a fundamental right to 
procreate whilst in prison?  
The overarching question posed by all of the case law and literature that I 
examined was do prisoners have a fundamental right to procreate? This is the one 
question that the cases returned to time and time again. The one reason it is 
necessary to explore this question in more depth is that case law and government 
policy from both England and Wales and from the USA lack any detailed 
                                                
4 Rodger Cotterell, ‘Why Must Legal Ideas be Interpreted Sociologically?’ (1998) 25 JL & Soc 
171, 172. 
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examination of this point.5 The literature and cases have largely focussed on the 
specific right of male prisoners to procreate via AI rather than a more general 
investigation as to why prisoners in general continue to be punished by the 
removal of their right to procreate.6 Within the historical context of punishment 
and the prison, the development of a prohibition against procreation in prison was 
a fairly recent development.7 Prior to the Victorian reforms of the prisons, 
procreation would have been possible for many prisoners, such as debtors, who 
kept their families with them whilst incarcerated.  
 From reading the case law and reviewing the literature, it can be seen that 
most judicial and state actors view prohibition of procreation is a part of the 
natural consequences of imprisonment.8 This raises a secondary question of 
whether removing the right to procreate is a legitimate part of the punishment 
given to prisoners. Further questions follow, such as: what justifications are given 
by those in authority to remove the right of prisoners to become parents? Do these 
justifications stand up to scrutiny?  
                                                
5 Domestic cases from England and Wales fail to consider female prisoners: R v Secretary of State 
for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472; Dickson and Dickson v 
Premier Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for the Home Department  [2004] EWCA Civ 
1477. 
6 Some authors state that prisoners do have a right to procreate, especially from the perspective of 
male prisoners procreating via AI, due to the minimal burdens placed upon the prison service. 
Helen Codd, ‘The Slippery Slope to Sperm Smuggling: Prisoners, Artificial Insemination and 
Human Rights’ (2007) Med L R 220; Emily Jackson, ‘Case Commentary: Prisoners, Their 
Partners and the Right to Family Life’ (2007) 19 Child Fam L Q 239; John Williams, ‘The Queen 
on the Application of Mellor v Secretary of State for the Home Department. Prisoners and 
artificial insemination- have the courts got it right?’ (2002) 14 Child & Fam L Q 217 
7 See footnote 217. 
8 In Goodwin v Turner, 980 F2d 1395, 1396 (1990) it was accepted by the majority judgment that 
prisoners retain the right to procreate but that this right does not survive incarceration. In Gerber v 
Hickman 264 F3d 882, 890 (2001) the majority judgment stated that the right to procreate 
survived incarceration, albeit in an attenuated form due to legitimate penological interest. The en-
banc reversal completely changed this judgment stating that the right to procreate is inconsistent 
with incarceration, thus avoiding the direct question of whether prisoners retain the right to 
procreate Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 619 (2002). In both Mellor and Dickson, the domestic 
courts stated that prisoners do not retain the right to procreate. Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 para 54 Dickson and Dickson v Premier 
Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 
10. 
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The Literature Review: Identifying the Issues and Doctrinal Research  
In order to research the basis of the thesis, it was important to firstly 
identify the available literature surrounding prisoner procreation. My initial 
starting point was interest arising from the Dickson case.9 This case and 
subsequent discussions of prisoners having children appear to illicit strong 
reactions in the media.10 After first reading the ruling from the Grand Chamber of 
the ECtHR, which appeared to dispute the accepted approach that prisoners 
automatically lose the right to procreate, I returned to the domestic cases of 
Dickson and Mellor, using these as a springboard to find further information. 
From these two cases, I was then able to search for similar cases in both England 
and Wales and in other jurisdictions. 
Whilst this thesis takes a socio-legal approach to the question of prisoner 
procreation, it was first necessary to take a doctrinal approach to identify the 
relevant case and statute law. Hutchinson claims that most, if not all legal projects 
commence with a doctrinal approach, even if the project later builds upon this 
work with either an empirical study or another methodological approach.11 I 
initially used both Google and Google Scholar to identify relevant cases 
worldwide, finding cases in England and Wales, the USA, Spain and Australia.12  
                                                
9Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41. 
10 Anonymous, ‘Killer in prison wins right to father a child by artificial insemination’ (Evening 
Standard, 5 December 2007) <http://www.standard.co.uk/news/killer-in-prison-wins-right-to-
father-a-child-by-artificial-insemination-6681501.html> accessed 18 February 2015; Jack Doyle 
‘Prisoner allowed to father a child from jail because of ‘human right to a family life”’ (Daily Mail, 
1 June 2011) http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-1392885/Prisoner-allowed-father-child-jail-
human-right-family-life.html accessed 18 February 2015. 
11 Terry Hutchinson ‘Doctrinal Research: Researching the Jury’ in Dawn Watkins, Mandy Burton, 
(eds) Research Methods in Law (Routledge, 2013) 7. See also Susan Bartie, ‘The lingering core of 
legal scholarship’ (2010) 30 Legal Studies 345, 350. 
12 Within the search field I searched for the following terms ‘Prisoner IVF’, ‘Prisoner AI’, 
‘Prisoner Artificial Insemination’, ‘Prisoner Invitro Fertilisation/ Fertilization’, and ‘Prisoner 
Procreation.’ I found these relevant cases: ELH and PBH v United Kingdom (1997) 91A DR 61; 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472; Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, Ex parte Dickson; [2004] EWCA Civ 147; Dickson v United 
Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 21; (2008) 46 EHRR 41; Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 
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After I had identified case names and background literature, I then used 
specialised law databases Westlaw and Lexis Library in order to find cases from 
England and Wales, the USA, and the ECtHR. To identify other cases such as 
Castles, I used the World Lii database resource. Once I had identified relevant 
cases, I then grouped them into jurisdictional and then ‘country’ areas to make 
them more manageable. I chose to concentrate on England and Wales, as this is 
the jurisdiction of my home country and the legal system with which I am most 
familiar. To compare with the cases from England and Wales, I then selected 
cases from the USA, as they provided the greatest number of cases with similar 
facts. Both countries used common law systems, which would make it more 
straightforward to make meaningful comparisons. Potential case law from Spain 
was rejected because my language skills are not sufficiently fluent enough to read 
the cases and relevant statutes.13 The Australian case of Castles was also rejected 
in order to maintain the number of jurisdictions covered at a manageable level.  
Once I had identified the relevant cases that would form the basis of the 
research, I began a more detailed analysis of the law within the context of how it 
is applied. Van Gestel and Micklitz establish some of the core features across 
both common and civil law jurisdictions. These are legal arguments that originate 
from authoritative sources, such as existing legal rules, such as statutes, case law, 
precedents, principles and academic publications.14 To identify the relevant law, I 
                                                                                                                                
543 (1995); Goodwin v Turner, 980 F2d 1395 (1990); Gerber v Hickman 264 F3d 882 (2001); 
Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617 (2002); Castles v Secretary to the Department of Justice & Ors 
[2010] VSC 310 (9 July 2010) (Victoria Supreme Court, Australia), Graham Keeley, ‘Eta killers 
given IVF treatment in prison’ The Times (London, October 2 2010) 49. 
13 Anonymous ‘Anger at IVF treatment for jailed terrorist couple’ (The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 
2 October 2010)  http://www.dailytelegraph.com.au/anger-at-ivf-treatment-for-jailed-terrorist-
couple/story-e6freuz9-1225933221553 accessed 18 February 2015. 
14 Rob van Gestel, Hans W Micklitz, ‘Revitalizing Doctrinal Legal Research in Europe: What 
About Methodology?’ (European University Institute, EUI Working Paper LAW 2011/05, 2011) 
26. 
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examined all of the cases, including all of the relevant statutory and treaty 
provisions in order to establish what the legal basis was for allowing or denying 
prisoners the right to procreate. This primary analysis formed the basis for the 
structure that the thesis would take, and for the formulation of the answer to the 
research question.  
To provide greater context for the main thesis question, I then undertook a 
literature review, which I expanded to relevant non-legal sources. The wider 
questions raised by the case law and academic commentary covered issues such 
as who should be allowed to procreate and parent, as well as the purpose of 
punishment and questions about limiting the fertility of population groups within 
society. These in turn raise interesting and occasionally controversial questions 
about eugenics, the historical development of penal punishment and the history of 
restricting prisoner’s rights, parental and children’s rights, as well as a more 
general examination of human rights. Answers and insights to these questions can 
be provided by relevant criminological, sociological, philosophical and historical 
sources.  
I attempted to firstly identify the actual law governing prisoner 
procreation and analyse this (which could be described as an internal approach). 
After this had been completed, I then took an ‘external’ approach, to examine 
how the law applied within the context of the different cultural and political 
contexts of the USA and the UK.15 McCrudden acknowledges that most legal 
research is a mixture of both of these approaches.16 The initial doctrinal analysis 
is therefore built upon in subsequent chapters, to highlight how the law itself is 
                                                
15 For an explanation of ‘internal’ and ‘external’ examinations of the law and doctrinal analysis, 
see Christopher McCrudden, ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’ (2006) LQR 632, 634-635. 
16 ibid 364. 
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expressed in theory and how it is operated in practice. The initial information 
gathering and subsequent data analysis also aimed to be inductive, rather than 
deductive, through the analysis of the qualitative data: the relevant case law, 
statutes and treaties that govern the treatment of prisoners.17  
Categories, Coding and Data Analysis 
Due to the small sample size of cases available, I decided to undertake a 
qualitative analysis to examine the cases.18 A qualitative analysis can however 
allow for a deeper analysis of the case law in order to assess the reasons behind 
prisoners being denied the right to procreate, as well as encapsulate the nature of 
the cases.19  I analysed each case in detail manually in order to identify commonly 
occurring themes. These themes are ‘induced’ from reading the text and gaining 
some familiarity with the subject.20 The categories I decided to use are explained 
next. 
Rights of prisoners to privacy and family life 
This category includes any references made in the case law and statutory 
materials to prisoners having a right to privacy, references to prisoners planning 
to become parents, as well as any provisions designed either to promote or inhibit 
access to their existing children and families. 
                                                
17 Graham Gibbs, Analyzing Qualitative Data (Sage, 2007) 4. 
18 Benoît Rihoux, ‘Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) and Related Systematic Comparative 
Methods: Recent Advances and Remaining Challenges for Social Science Research’ (2006) 21 
Intl Sociology 679, 682. 
19 ibid 680. 
20 Gery W Ryan, H Russell Bernard, ‘Techniques to Identify Themes’ (2003) 15 Field Methods 
85, 88. 
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Right of prisoners’ families to a private and family life 
This category refers to the ability of the prisoner’s family and partner to 
maintain and develop a relationship with their imprisoned relative or partner.  
Punishment and what constitutes the punishment of imprisonment. 
This category is concerned with punishment and whether prohibition of 
procreation is a valid part of the punishment of a prison sentence. It is also 
concerned with more general references to punishment and its justifications.  
Judgments about the nature of prisoners, criminality and their families. 
This category includes references to prisoners and their families having 
different lifestyles, different values and deviant behaviour, especially when the 
data makes reference to them becoming parents.  
Welfare of the Child Concerns. 
This category refers to direct consideration of the putative child that would 
be produced by prisoners procreating. This may make reference to the putative 
parents and their suitability to parent the child, provide for the child, as well as the 
stability of their relationship.  
Legitimate penological aims and government policies 
This category refers to the aims of imprisonment: such as incapacitation of 
the offender, deterrence, rehabilitation, and protection of the public and 
punishment of the offender. These can be both legitimate penological aims, (the 
more general aims of the prison system), as well as separate government aims. 
These aims can diverge from one another and cause conflict, such as the need to 
punish and the desire to reform. 
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 Once I had defined these categories from a preliminary reading of the 
cases and literature, I returned to the cases in detail, to look within the text for 
references that fell within these different categories. This allowed me to 
systematically analyse the commentary contained within the case law itself. 
Comparative Analysis 
Within this thesis, I have utilised a comparative analysis approach due to 
the small number of cases within my ‘home’ jurisdiction of England and Wales. 
The intention, rather than being purely doctrinal, is to explore some of the wider 
normative issues surrounding prisoner procreation. It is hoped that that comparing 
England and Wales with other jurisdictions would allow for more relevant cases 
to be selected and analysed. In turn, this should provide a fuller explanation of 
why these particular jurisdictions are reluctant to allow prisoners to procreate. 
More generally, it will allow examination of whether prohibition of procreation is 
a justified part of punishment.  
The jurisdictions that were selected for comparison were chosen for practical 
reasons. The majority of the relevant cases are from jurisdictions within the USA. 
All of the jurisdictions studied are based upon the common law system, with 
English as the first language. One of the main functions of the comparative 
analysis is to ensure that the explanation has to ‘not only [to] be faithful to the 
system which it explains, it has to be understandable in the system to which that 
foreign system is explained.’21  Each legal term may have a slightly different 
meaning within each jurisdiction, but through analysing the statutes, cases and 
political background to each of the jurisdictions, I aim to express how the law 
                                                
21 John Bell, ‘Legal Research and the Distinctiveness of Comparative Law’ in Mark Van Hoecke 
(ed) Methodologies of Legal Research: Which Kind of Method for What Kind of Discipline (Hart 
Publishing, 2011) 172. 
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stands in each jurisdiction. As well as the differences between each jurisdiction, 
there is also the further interaction between State and Federal law to be 
considered within the analysis.  
 I compared each of the cases in turn, which I then used as a starting point 
to identify and analyse the case law, as well as statute provisions that govern 
prisoner procreation. It was imperative to ensure that the scope of analysis of the 
statute law was wide enough to encompass everything that may be relevant. Once 
the law was identified, I was able to find common features between the legal 
provisions, the so-called ‘common-core’ of the law. Using the categories that I 
selected for the analysis of the case law as a starting point, I was able to pick up 
the common themes running through each of the cases. Once this was complete, I 
then took a step back to analyse whether the arguments used by the courts to 
justify prohibition of procreation as punishment had any basis within the 
theoretical explanations of punishment. The law surrounding prisoner procreation 
exists within the social and cultural contexts of each jurisdiction and cannot be 
examined in isolation from these influences.22  
                                                
22 Michael Bogdan, Concise Introduction to Comparative Law (Europa Law Publishing, 2013) 39. 
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Summary  
The main question that this thesis aims to answer is: do prisoners retain a 
right to procreate whilst incarcerated, and whether removal of the ability to 
procreate is justified as a part of their punishment. The initial starting point for the 
thesis originated with the cases of Mellor and Dickson. 
 In order to answer the research question fully, I took a comparative 
approach to analyse the relevant legal and ethical issues. I firstly identified the 
relevant cases from case law databases, and was able to find cases that showed 
some similarity in their facts to Mellor and Dickson. Selecting cases from English 
speaking common law jurisdictions, helped to reduce some of the problems 
associated with attempting to compare common law and civil law jurisdictions. 
Each case was then manually analysed in turn using identified codes. This 
allowed the cases to be explored for justifications for either the removal of the 
right to procreate or support for the existence of a right for prisoners to procreate. 
Once this was complete, the relevant statute law could then be examined to see 
whether there was any statutory guidance or support in these cases for the 
decisions made. I then widened the examination to non-legal materials which 
could shed light on the context and the background of prisoners wanting to have 
children, looking at socio-legal research related to imprisonment, punishment, 
criminology and parenting.    
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Chapter Two: Literature Review 
Introduction 
Reproduction is usually a private issue that is not regulated by law. For 
many people, their choice of partner, and the decision to have children are 
intertwined issues, related to their self-expression and the desire to create a 
family.23 These decisions are often undertaken with a great deal of thought, and 
are imbued with cultural importance. For others, having a child is not a conscious 
decision, but an unplanned occurrence. So long as the child is conceived naturally, 
the manner of conception is considered private and is not generally regulated by 
the state.24 Modern technology, along with advances in contraception and fertility 
treatment have allowed for sexual intercourse and human reproduction to be 
successfully separated. Medical treatment for infertility, including artificial 
insemination (AI), in vitro fertilisation (IVF), and intra-uterine insemination (IUI) 
allows reproduction to take place without sexual intercourse.25 This has created 
new possibilities for those who would otherwise be infertile and also allows 
prisoners that are prevented from having sexual intercourse to have children.26  
 Male prisoners in both England and Wales and the USA have litigated 
their right to procreate within the last 20 years. All of the cases have turned on 
similar facts. The claimants were convicted of serious offences and given long 
                                                
23 David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (2 edn, Routledge, 2004, 2010 reprint) 139. 
24 Nikolas Rose, Governing the Soul: The Shaping of the Personal Self (2 edn, Free Association 
Books, 1999) 127. Rose argues that the state itself dictates what it considers private, and then 
refuses to intervene in these areas because they are private.  
25 For a general guide to the treatments available, see Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority, ‘your fertility treatment options’ (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 5 
August 2014) http://www.hfea.gov.uk/fertility-treatment-options.html accessed 3 July 2015. 
26. It is also acceptable for the state to maintain a blanket ban on conjugal visits, even when a 
couple wish to conceive and their religion prevents them from using AI. ELH and PBH v United 
Kingdom (1997) 91A DR 61.  
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sentences ranging from fourteen years in the case of Steven Goodwin to 100 years 
to life plus 11 years in the case of William Gerber.27 The other claimant from the 
USA, Robert Percy, and the two litigants from England and Wales, were both 
sentenced to life in prison for murder, although were due to be released on licence 
after serving the ‘punishment’ part of their tariff.28 All of the cases concerned 
heterosexual prisoners who each wanted to have a child with their wife outside of 
prison. Because sexual intercourse was denied to each of the prisoners, they had 
no other option than to apply for permission to produce a semen sample, which 
would then be taken to inseminate their partner outside of prison. Each of the 
cases raises the same questions about the nature of the right to procreate, 
including whether procreation restrictions should form part of the punishment of a 
prison sentence. Each of the cases also raises the issue of the prisoner’s partner 
and the extent that prison policy restricts their choices. In turn, questions are 
raised about how justified the courts are in preventing prisoners from having 
children in order to protect the putative child from being raised by a single parent 
mother and a prisoner father. 
 Considering the overall picture of prisoners’ rights, having children might 
be seen as a minor point of interest, in comparison with debates over prisoner 
enfranchisement, the need to reduce overcrowding and improve prison regimes. 
The numbers of prisoners affected by life or long-term imprisonment is small 
                                                
27 Steven Goodwin was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment for drugs offences. William Robbins, 
‘Court to Decide Missouri Prisoner's Right to Father a Child’ (New York Times, 20 February 1990) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/1990/02/20/us/court-to-decide-missouri-prisoner-s-right-to-father-a-
child.html> accessed 10 July 2015. William Gerber was sentenced under the three-strikes-and-
your-out rule for discharging a firearm, use of narcotics and making terrorist threats. Gerber v 
Hickman 264 F3d 884 (2001).  
28 Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 543, 545 (1995); R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department Ex parte Mellor [2000] EWHC Admin 385; [2000] H.R.L.R. 846 para 9; Dickson and 
Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1477 para 2. 
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when compared with the overall prison population.29 However, prisoner 
procreation has the potential to become increasingly important as more prisoners 
are sentenced to longer periods in prison and so may litigate over the right to 
procreate.  
 There has been a considerable amount of academic literature on the 
subject of ‘prisoner procreation’ cases, although interest has been mostly 
concentrated on the US cases of Goodwin and Gerber. Much of this literature 
concentrates upon the legal regulation of procreation, mainly from the perspective 
of male prisoners claiming the right to procreate via AI.30 Some articles have 
examined the legal perspective of the right of prisoners in England and Wales to 
procreate, in some cases comparing England and Wales to US jurisdictions.31 A 
                                                
29  The overall prison population for England and Wales stands at 86,164 week ending 3 July 
2015. Howard League for Penal Reform, ‘Weekly Prison Watch: Week Ending Friday July 3 
2015’ (Howard League for Penal Reform, 3 July 2015) <http://www.howardleague.org/weekly-
prison-watch/>accessed 4 July 2015. In England and Wales, the prison population rose 1% 
between January to December 2014. 6% more prisoners were serving sentences longer than four 
years due to the Extended Determinate Sentence (EDS), which replaces the Indeterminate 
Sentence for Public Protection (IPP). As of 31 March 2015 1,742 prisoners were serving an EDS. 
The number of people serving an IPP sentence was down 3% to 12,203. Ministry of Justice, 
Offender management statistics bulletin England And Wales Quarterly October to December 
2014 Annual January to December 2014 (Ministry of Justice, 2015) 3, 5-6. 12% of the total prison 
population in England and Wales is serving a life or indeterminate sentence. Ministry of Justice, 
Story of the Prison Population: 1993 – 2012 England and Wales (Ministry of Justice, 2013) 15. In 
the USA in 2012, 159,520 people were serving a life sentence, including 49,081 people serving 
whole-life without parole sentences. The Sentencing Project ‘Fact Sheet: Trends in US 
Corrections’ (The Sentencing Project, November 2015)  
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_Fact_sheet.pdf accessed 
5 January 2015. The USA, at the end of 2013 also held 2,979 prisoners under sentence of death. 
Tracy L. Snell, Bureau of Justice Statistics Statistical Table: Capital Punishment 2013- Statistical 
Tables (US Department of Justice, 2014) 1. 
30 Tammi Michele Kipp, ‘Should the Right to Procreate be Imprisoned?: The Debate of Gerber v 
Hickman’ (2003) 29 New Eng J Crim & Civ Confinement 125; Rachel Michael Kirkley, 
‘Prisoners and Procreation: What Happened Between Goodwin and Gerber?’ (2003) 30 
Pepperdine L Rev 93; Richard Guidice Jr, ‘Procreation and the Prisoner: Does the Right to 
Procreate Survive Incarceration and do Legitimate Penological Interests Justify Restrictions on the 
Exercise of the Right’ (2002) 29 Fordham Urb LJ 2277.  
31 Helen Codd, ‘Policing Procreation: Prisoners, Artificial Insemination and the Law’ (2006) 2 
Genomics, Society & Policy 110 
<http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fss/journals/gsp/docs/vol2no1/HCGSPVol2No12006.pdf >accessed 1 
May 2015; Helen Codd, ‘Regulating reproduction: prisoners' families, artificial insemination and 
human rights’ (2006) 6 EHRLR 39; Helen Codd, ‘The Slippery Slope to Sperm Smuggling: 
Prisoners, Artificial Insemination and Human Rights’ (2007) Med L R 220; Emily Jackson, ‘Case 
Commentary: Prisoners, Their Partners and the Right to Family Life’ (2007) 19 Child Fam L Q 
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few of these articles explored the legal and practical effects of extending this right 
to women prisoners.32 Others raise the question of the legacy of eugenics, 
touching on the point of Skinner, of whether denying prisoners the chance to 
become parents is akin to sterilisation.33 This thesis will attempt to bridge the gap 
between the legal analysis of the cases and how the historical context of 
imprisonment, punishment and eugenics has affected how the law has developed 
in this area.   
The main justification given by the courts for preventing prisoners from 
having children is that it forms part of the punishment of imprisonment. The 
ruling from the Grand Chamber in Dickson confirms that prisoners do not lose all 
of their rights when incarcerated, at least within the member states of the ECHR.34 
In both England and Wales and the USA, it is accepted that prisoners retain all of 
those rights that are not removed by or incompatible with incarceration.35 The 
cases appear to contradict this basic premise by denying male prisoners the ability 
to become fathers. The answer for this reluctance may lie within the very 
foundations of the modern penal system and how it has evolved from its 
beginnings of austerity and less-eligibility. It may stem from ideas of punitiveness, 
the need to make prison an unpleasant and isolating place. Restrictions on 
                                                                                                                                
239; PollyBeth Proctor, ‘Procreating from Prison: Evaluating British Prisoner’s Right to 
Artificially Inseminate Their Wives Under the United Kingdom’s New Human Rights Act and the 
2001 Mellor Case’ (2003) 31 GA J Int’l & Comp L 459; John Williams, ‘The Queen on the 
Application of Mellor v Secretary of State for the Home Department Prisoners and artificial 
insemination- have the courts got it right?’ (2002) 14 Child & Fam L Q 217. 
32 Jerri Munsterman, ‘Procreation from Prison Via Fedex and the Extension of the Right to 
Imprisoned Women’ (2002) 70 UMKC L Rev 733; Rachel Roth, ‘No New Babies? Gender 
Inequality in Prison Systems (2004) 12 Am UJ Gender Soc Pol’y & L 391, 
33 Elaine E Sutherland, ‘Procreative Freedom and Convicted Criminals in the United States and 
the United Kingdom: Is Child Welfare Becoming the New Eugenics?’ (2003) 82 Or L Rev 1033; 
John Williams, ‘The Queen on the Application of Mellor v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department. Prisoners and artificial insemination- have the courts got it right?’ (2002) 14 Child & 
Fam L Q 217, 228. 
34 Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 para 68. 
35 Wolff v McDonnell 418 US 539 (1974); Raymond v Honey [1983] 1 AC 1. 
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procreation may also be influenced by ideas of punishment. From this viewpoint, 
imprisonment is more than just the removal of freedom. It is also the removal of 
personhood and autonomy from the prisoner and thus the ability to procreate. 
Finally, the dark past of eugenics may still cast a faint shadow over the present, 
leading those who make decisions about prisoners’ access to AI facilities to shy 
away from allowing prisoners to procreate. 
 The ability to procreate is one of a range of human rights. Human rights 
are the rights one possesses for being human.36 Some human rights, such as the 
right to be free of torture or degrading treatment are absolute rights.37 Other rights, 
such as the right to procreate, are rights that can arguably be limited or interfered 
with, should exceptional circumstances justify it. Historically, there have been 
attempts to limit the fertility of ‘undesirable’ people who were considered to be 
‘outside’ of society. One example of this is the US Supreme Court case of Skinner. 
The Court examined the legality of Oklahoma’s Habitual Criminal Sterilization 
Act 1935, which mandated that offenders be forcibly sterilised after their third 
conviction for an offence of ‘moral turpitude’.38 This was held to be 
unconstitutional, as removal of the right to marry and procreate was the removal 
of an essential liberty. In the recent past, several countries in Europe have been 
responsible for the sterilisation of hundreds of people with learning disabilities.39 
Although, there is no currently known programme to sterilise offenders in either 
England and Wales or the USA, it has been argued that preventing prisoners from 
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2015) 1. 
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having children is akin to the eugenic control and sterilisation of prisoners.40 
Restrictions upon reproductive ability must be carefully navigated, and any 
reasons for restricting the ability of others to bear or produce children must to be 
made upon a robust foundation. 
 Understanding the historical basis for the current punishment of prisoners 
can highlight why prison authorities and governments are so reluctant to allow 
prisoners to procreate, especially when compared to more liberal penal regimes in 
Europe. The concept of ‘less-eligibility’ gained prominence in the Victorian era. 
It was thought that because of their crimes, prisoners were ‘less eligible’ or less 
deserving of the equivalent minimum standards of living than those in free 
society.41 This same standard was also used to ensure that the workhouse became 
a place of last resort to the destitute poor, so that throughout the nineteenth 
century both the workhouse and prison as an institution developed in tandem in 
England and Wales.42 The Victorian ideal of the prison was clean, ordered and 
uniform, but Spartan and devoid of any physical comforts.43 In a similar way to 
how the workhouses operated, prison was designed to be as unattractive as 
possible to act as a deterrent to the potential criminal.44 Standards of incarceration 
in prisons in both England and Wales and the USA continue to operate using the 
concept of less eligibility as a basis for standards, which in turn is exacerbated by 
high levels of overcrowding and poor accommodation due to declining funding 
                                                
40. John Williams, ‘Have the Courts Got it Right?--The Queen on the Application of Mellor v. 
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and longer sentences being handed to prisoners.45 The relationship between living 
standards in free society and the resources allotted to prisoners is summed up by 
Sieh in this quotation: ‘With decreasing prosperity among the poor it is possible 
to spend even fewer resources on prisons if one is to adhere to the basic precepts 
of less eligibility.’46 In conjunction with notions of ‘less-eligibility’ is the 
development of the prison as discrete, cut off from society. Prior to reforms in the 
eighteenth century prisons could house entire families, mainly debtors.47 With 
ordered Victorian regimes isolated prisoners from their families. Access to 
prisoner’s family members became a privilege and not a right. Prisoners existed in 
a separate social space, a total institution, as highlighted by Goffman.48  
 Becoming a parent is extremely difficult for prisoners in both England and 
Wales and the USA. Prisoners in England and Wales are prohibited from having 
sexual intercourse with their partners. They can however request permission to 
access artificial insemination (AI) facilities, to enable them to become parents 
without the need to have sexual intercourse, which may be granted in a few 
                                                
45 Her Majesty's Chief Inspector of Prisons has noted how poor some prison conditions continue 
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limited circumstances.49 Prohibiting prisoners from having sexual intercourse 
makes them reliant upon the assistance of the state to conceive. Within the USA, 
access to conjugal or private visits depends upon whether they are in a state jail or 
a federal prison. Access to private visits between partners is restricted to the three 
states that currently allow this as a privilege for selected prisoners.50 Federal 
prisoners are not permitted private visits.51 Access to AI treatment was eventually 
denied to the prisoners in Goodwin, Percy and Gerber. The prohibition on AI 
does not appear as restrictive as these cases would suggest however. Last year, 
Gerardo Hernandez, a Cuban spy incarcerated within the US federal prison 
system was granted permission to provide a semen sample so that his wife 
Adriana Perez, still resident in Cuba could become pregnant.52 It appears that the 
request was allowed because of petitioning from US diplomats and because it was 
part of a larger political deal to release Cuban prisoners from the US in exchange 
for US prisoners.53 For much less high profile and politically important prisoners 
however, the current case law and the restrictive Prison Litigation Reform Act, 
approval for AI is still highly unlikely.54 
 Central to this thesis, and to the cases is the scope and purpose of 
punishment and more specifically, the punishment of imprisonment. Punishment 
is given to individual offenders because they have committed a crime. The 
                                                
49 Freedom of Information Request Reply to Author from the Ministry of Justice (29 July 2011) 
(Appendix). The Howard League for Penal Reform found in their Commission on Sex In Prison 
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offender receives an appropriate punishment to redress the balance.55 The 
institution of punishment itself is justified for many reasons, to exact retribution 
for the crime and to deter potential offenders.56 Imprisonment remains the most 
serious of a range of available punishments at the disposal of the courts in 
England and Wales and one of the most serious in most states of the USA. The 
purpose of a prison sentence is therefore to deter and punish, but also has the 
associated aims of protecting the public and rehabilitating the offender. These are 
not justifications for punishment in general, but are justifications for the specific 
use of imprisonment as a method of punishment. The thesis will examine whether 
there is any basis for the restriction of access to AI facilities, to explain why it is 
seen as a part of the punishment of prisoners in England and Wales and the USA 
but not in other countries. Public perception of punishment and the need to be 
seen to be punishing effectively was considered of great importance by the court 
in Mellor and Dickson.57 This ties in with ideas of public punitiveness and may 
provide some explanation over why imprisonment often means far more 
restrictions than just the removal of liberty. The effects of increased public 
punitiveness on prisoner’s rights are relevant to prisoners having children, as 
these attitudes affect the conditions in which prisoners are kept and whether they 
are allowed by the authorities to start a family. Any increase in rights given to 
prisoners has the potential to be controversial, and is seen as a politically 
unpopular move.58 Public punitiveness taps into what Garland terms the 
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‘criminology of the other.’ Some criminals are seen by society as so intrinsically 
evil that they cannot be defined or understood:  
‘Being intrinsically evil or wicked, some offenders are not like us. They 
are dangerous others...The appropriate reaction for society is one of self-
defence: we should defend ourselves against these dangerous enemies 
rather than concern ourselves with their welfare and prospects for 
rehabilitation.’59 
If prisoners are viewed as ‘other’ and irredeemable, then attempting to 
rehabilitate the offender is seen as pointless. Imprisonment becomes a method of 
warehousing and containment of those who are to be separated from society, with 
the potential to humiliate and degrade the offender. In contrast with this, is 
another approach that views the main punishment of imprisonment as the removal 
of liberty. Any interference with the rights of prisoners should be justified and 
done on a case-by-case basis.60 In a similar vein, Richardson argues for a 
minimalist approach to imprisonment.61 Regardless of the aims of imprisonment, 
the imprisonment itself justifies ‘only the removal of those rights necessarily 
affected by the need to segregate, or more specifically by the need to maintain 
security and control.’62 It should be enough to punish the offender simply by 
removing them from society. This is the approach of the Swedish penal system, 
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which states that the removal of liberty is the actual punishment, coercive and 
punitive measures are the minimum necessary to achieve penal aims and maintain 
good order.63 
 Allowing prisoners to have children can be seen as a balancing act 
between several different competing factors. The ability to have a child is central 
to an individual’s right to self-determination and autonomy.64 Interference with 
the ability to have a child can impinge greatly upon a person’s quality of life.65 
There are also the rights of the putative child to consider and whether the 
potential lower quality of life experienced by the children of offenders would 
justify a general restriction of the ability to procreate. There is a large literature on 
prisoners and the effects of imprisonment on their ability to parent.66 Whereas the 
privacy and autonomy afforded to individuals in free society is high, prisoners 
have to subject the normally private decision of when to become a parent to 
public scrutiny. Prisons in both the USA and England and Wales also vary greatly 
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in what provision is given to prisoners who are already pregnant and who are 
already parents. Prison and government officials make assumptions about how 
male and female prisoners should be given access to their families. Prisoners’ 
access to their families is often used a tool to control their behaviour through 
incentive schemes.67 Gendered notions about the importance of the maternal and 
unimportance of the paternal relationships are also evident in penal policy in both 
England and Wales and the USA. The provision of Mother and Baby Unit (MBU) 
places in England and Wales and in some US prisons is seen as vital as 
developing a bond between mother and infant is thought to reduce offending on 
release and promote proper infant attachment.68 On the other hand, access to 
enhanced family visits is seen as a privilege to be earned by male prisoners, and 
no such unit exists which allows a prisoner’s children to live with their father, 
even if he was the sole carer prior to imprisonment.69 In contrast to this, Sweden 
allows both male and female prisoners to have their babies with them in prison, so 
long as it is in the best interest of the child.70 Imprisonment does not have to be a 
barrier to parenthood. Whilst prison undoubtedly affects the children of offenders 
greatly, many measures can be taken to ameliorate the negative effects of 
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imprisonment. Schemes that are used to help existing prisoner parents to maintain 
a relationship with their children could also be extended to those who wish to 
become parents, which in turn would foster better relationships with their families 
and may reduce reoffending.71  
                                                
71 Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘Evidenced-based Programs for Children of Prisoners’ 
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Human Rights  
The legal framework that governs prisoners’ access to procreation is 
centred on the concept of human rights. Donnelly states that human rights are 
‘literally the rights one has simply because one is a human being.’72 Some rights, 
such as the right to life are inalienable and absolute. No qualifications can be 
placed upon honouring them. In contrast, some authors would argue that the right 
to reproduce is a qualified right, which could be subject to limitations if 
necessary.73 
 Human rights are seen as moral rights, which have later become 
recognised as legal rights both nationally and internationally. A general ‘liberal’ 
approach to rights is one taken by authors such as Dworkin, Rawls and Fenwick.74 
The basis of the liberal approach to rights is the social contract, which exists 
between the individual and the state.75 One of the first authors to conceive of an 
actual social contract was Locke, who argued that humankind originally existed in 
a state of total liberty, but that life was precarious and dangerous.76 To protect the 
interests of the majority, citizens handed over certain powers of theirs to the state 
(such as the power to coerce) in return for state protection of their interests. The 
concept of a ‘social contract’ existing between the state and the individual has 
been adopted by both Rawls and Dworkin, with some differences. In Rawls’ view, 
                                                
72 Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory & Practice (2 edn, Cornell University Press, 
2003) 7. 
73 The right to a private and family life protected by Article 8(1) of the ECHR is a qualified right 
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the social contract is a hypothetical one, not an actual one. Each citizen makes 
decisions behind ‘a veil of ignorance.’ Therefore, because the hypothetical citizen 
has no conception of what their future role will be in society they taken an 
approach of tolerance. This leads to the first principle, which is that ‘each person 
is to have an equal right to the most extensive, total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all.’77 Dworkin, on the other hand, 
adopts the view that the contract between the state and the individual is an actual 
contract, in which the interests of the majority are protected by the state.78 
Dworkin does not feel that majority interests have to be protected by being 
labelled as ‘rights’, as the democratic process should protect the interests of the 
majority. What is of more importance is that minority rights are protected, which 
would not otherwise be protected by any democratic process. This protection 
arises from the standpoint that states are under an obligation to treat each citizen 
‘with equal concern and respect’.79 As such, the validity of rights is therefore not 
tested democratically as this could lead to them being undermined and thus 
minority interests would not be adequately protected.  
 Under this liberal definition of rights, one must be considered to be a 
citizen to have full recognition of their rights. Who is accepted as a citizen is 
often a contested point: some countries view those without the right to hold a 
passport of that country as a ‘non-citizen’.80  The minority groups that Dworkin is 
concerned about protecting are considered full citizens. These are often not 
democratically represented. Prisoners, as a vulnerable minority group should be 
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79 ibid. See also Helen Fenwick, Civil Liberties and Human Rights (4 edn, Routledge Cavendish, 
2007) 7. 
80 Davis Weissbrodt, The Human Rights of Non-citizens (E-book, Oxford University Press, 2009) 
20. 
 
 
46 
included in this definition. This ‘social contractarian’ approach also implies the 
imposition of obligations, like any contract.81 The terms and conditions of the 
social contract create an obligation upon the state to respect all citizens equally 
and to look after the interests of all citizens. Through the organs of the state, the 
individual is supposed to be protected from unjust interference and harm from 
other individuals. In return for this protection, the individual cedes their coercive 
power to the state, which is exercised on their behalf by the criminal justice 
system and legal processes. The individual is obliged to adhere to the laws of the 
state and respect the authority of the state, or face the judicial consequences.  
Positive and Negative Rights 
Human rights can be classified as either ‘negative’ or ‘positive’.82 
Whether a right is ‘negative’ or ‘positive’ has a bearing on the obligations that the 
state has regarding that right. How far that responsibility extends also depends 
upon the individual right in question, and how ‘fundamental’ the right in question 
is within the overall hierarchy of rights. To take one example, under the ECHR 
framework, Article 2, the right to life, and Article 3, the right to remain free of 
inhuman and degrading treatment, are fundamental rights. The state is under a 
positive obligation to ensure that they are respected under all circumstances.83 
This means that the state has to intervene and positively assist in preventing any 
individuals suffering from the loss of a positive right. Other rights may be seen as 
‘negative’ in the sense that the state does not have to positively promote a 
particular right for the individual, but rather has to ensure that they do not unjustly 
interfere with that right. The right to a private and family life as well as the right 
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to found a family have been identified as a ‘negative rights’ in the sense that the 
state is not under a positive duty to provide people with the means to have 
children. The state must refrain from interfering with an individual’s ability to 
either have children or get married unless they have a justified reason.84 For 
example, a person may claim that their rights have been infringed unjustly if they 
are forcibly sterilised against their will and so are unable to have children. If a law 
prevented couples from marrying because they both had the same hair colour, for 
example, then that couple could claim their right to marry and found a family had 
been unjustly interfered with by the state. This does not however impose a 
positive obligation upon a state to provide free fertility treatment to anyone who 
wants a child. In the case of prisoners, this distinction becomes extremely 
problematic. Prisoners are dependants of the state who require assistance to 
procreate because of the blanket prohibition on sexual relationships. Some authors 
argue that the line between positive and negative rights is far from clear. Donnelly, 
citing Shue, states that the distinction between negative and positive rights ‘is of 
little moral significance and in any case fails to correspond to the distinction 
between civil and political rights and economic and social rights.’85 One example 
is the prohibition on states torturing their subjects. Whilst this is characterised as a 
negative right, Donnelly argues that this particular right requires a great deal of 
state intervention, and so is in fact a positive duty.86 However, it is inaccurate to 
state that in practice this distinction is irrelevant. In the case of prisoners, it makes 
a significant difference in the provision of reproductive rights. If a prisoner in 
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England and Wales wants to have children then they require some positive action 
on the part of the state, whether it is the provision of a quiet room for a male 
prisoner to produce a sperm sample, or access to medical facilities to allow a 
female prisoner to become pregnant. It is far simpler to characterise the right to 
beget children as a negative right if prisoners are given the opportunity to have 
sexual intercourse with a partner of their choice. In this situation, all the 
authorities would be required to do is refrain from enforcing compulsory 
contraception and ensure that conjugal visits were not excessively restricted to 
certain times, in order that prisoners could time their intercourse with ovulation. 
No positive assistance would be required from the prison services. Arguably they 
would not be required to provide fertility treatment to prisoners either.87  
Autonomy, Privacy and Human Rights 
Human rights are not enforced passively. They assume a level of agency 
and autonomy in the rights holder, which is especially important when 
considering prisoners, who are often subject to regimes that seek to reduce their 
individual autonomy and agency.88 As Donnelly argues, a human right creates a 
special type of claim which in turn creates a ‘right-holder’ known as A and a 
‘duty-bearer’ known as B.89 So, if A is entitled to a right, and B violates A’s 
entitlement to the right, a human-rights framework provides for a way of A to 
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enforce that right, to make B fulfil his duties. However, A is required to enforce 
her rights actively. Human rights ‘empower, not just benefit.’  Rights are 
generally only recognised and discussed when they are in jeopardy, and active 
enforcement is required.90 A liberal approach to rights, such that set out by 
Dworkin, has a strong political tradition of respecting individual autonomy. The 
individual is respected as being the best placed to make decisions about their own 
life, although this right is subject to some limits to ensure equal respect for others 
autonomy.91 
Eugenics: Control of Offender’s Fertility and Modern 
Biological Criminology. 
The term ‘eugenics’ was first coined by Francis Galton in the late 
nineteenth century to describe the ‘scientific’ development which aimed to 
improve the qualities of future generations of human populations through the use 
of policies which encouraged those with desirable qualities to have more children, 
whilst preventing those who were seen to ‘weaken’ the race from procreating.92 
These ideas, abhorrent to most modern sensibilities, were taken to their deadly 
extreme in Nazi Germany, where millions of people deemed racially inferior were 
murdered in state controlled and state organised genocide. Thousands of people 
with mental or physical abnormalities were also sterilised, murdered and 
experimented on.93 Prisoners incarcerated in regular prisons were also sterilised, 
although this was justified as a punishment rather than for entirely eugenic 
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reasons.94 Those prisoners who were deemed ‘criminally insane’ were killed in 
the ‘euthanasia’ programme T4 started in 1939.95 Prior to the atrocities committed 
in Nazi Germany, many leading politicians and thinkers of the time saw eugenics 
policies as a legitimate aim. As Kevles states ‘Eugenics was not therefore unique 
to the Nazis. It could, and did, happen everywhere.’96 Eugenic sterilisation 
programmes spread to the USA, Britain, Canada and Scandinavia, and were 
generally targeted at those who had learning disabilities, so-called ‘feebleminded’ 
individuals.97 Dikötter argues that ‘eugenics was a fundamental aspect of some of 
the most important cultural and social movements of the twentieth century.’  It 
had widespread appeal to many individuals in the first part of the twentieth 
century. Eugenics continues to have an influence in other parts of the world. In 
1994, China passed a law that allows doctors to counsel a mother who is pregnant 
to have an abortion at any gestational age if it is identified as carrying a physical 
defect, or if the mother herself is mentally or physically disabled.98 If a person 
with a mental illness, learning disability or physical problem wishes to get 
married, then they are ‘encouraged’ by doctors to be sterilised.99 In other 
countries, eugenics theory and biological criminology continues to have a minor 
influence in the development of genetic approaches to criminology.100 In the 
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following sections, the historical context and influence of eugenics will be 
explored in relation to England and Wales and the USA, and how the conception 
of the criminal ‘other’ continues to be played out in current debates surrounding 
prisoner procreation. 
Development of the Eugenics Movement in the UK  
As well as the writings of Galton, other authors such as Rentoul and 
Chappel also wrote about what they perceived to be the great ‘social problem’ of 
the deterioration of the British race.101 Data for these claims came from the Army 
Medical Department, the Commissioners in Lunacy, and the Prison Commission, 
as well as family case studies.102 Eugenics married two different fields of study, 
the study of the ‘genetic’ transmission of human characteristics from one 
generation to the next, and a ‘biometric method’ of studying phenomena that 
occurs in nature and biology, which is analysed using statistical methods.103 
Eugenics theory itself has two components, ‘positive eugenics’, where those of 
‘superior stock’ are encouraged to reproduce, and ‘negative eugenics’ where those 
who have ‘inferior racial qualities’ are prevented from procreating.104 Galton and 
others were concerned about the degeneration of urban society because of the 
perceived uncontrolled fertility of the unproductive criminal and pauper 
classes.105  Rather than being a marginal interest group, the Eugenics Education 
Society, which was formed in 1907, had 1,047 members by 1914. 106 Paul also 
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notes that eugenics was supported by all political persuasions; both the political 
left as well as the more conservative right wing were supporters. Eugenists 
adopted the idea of ‘Social Darwinism’ a theory that emphasised leaving society 
to its natural devices to ensure the ‘strongest’ members of society win out over 
the ‘weaker’ members.107 Under this approach, welfare would not be provided to 
those unable to work. Instead, they would starve leaving ‘ineffective’ and weaker 
members of society to naturally die out. One key implication noted by eugenists 
was the inherent futility of trying to treat or rehabilitate those who were classed as 
mentally defective. This was in contrast to psychiatrists and criminologists, both 
of whom saw rehabilitation as important.108 Eugenists such as Leonard Darwin 
were convinced that some individuals had an inherited disposition to 
criminality.109 He refers to them as ‘weak, stupid or otherwise worthless’ and 
stated that they should be prevented from having children.110  
 Unlike the USA, England and Wales did not pass any formal legislation 
requiring the sterilisation of prisoners, the learning disabled or mentally ill. There 
were attempts to put eugenic measures within the Mental Deficiency Act 1913. 
Some supporters of the Mental Deficiency Act wanted powers to sterilise anyone 
certified by two doctors as ‘mentally defective.’111 Whilst the Act did not mandate 
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forcible sterilisation, it did provide for individuals to be forcibly confined for life 
or placed under the care of a guardian.112 This effectively prevented them from 
associating freely with others and thus prevented them from procreating. As well 
as those who were considered mentally defective, there was another category of 
interest, that of the ‘moral imbecile’ who were defined as those who ‘display 
some permanent mental defect coupled with strong vicious or criminal 
propensities on which punishment has had little or no deterrent effect.’113 
Walmsley states that women in particular were policed by this system and the 
legislation was used to control women’s sexual behaviour.114 Women who had 
illegitimate children in some cases were classified as mentally defective and 
placed in institutions.115 The law itself remained in place until 1959.116  
The Development of the Eugenics Movement in the USA  
‘The direct effect of industrial training is to curb licentiousness… In this way the 
log huts and hovels which now form hot-beds where human maggots are spawned, 
will disappear.’117 
In nineteenth century America, many viewed poverty as the result of 
personal weakness. The ‘feckless poor’ did not possess the virtues of sexual 
restraint, economy, and thrift, which resulted in them producing more children 
than they could cope with. If these ‘human maggots’ survived their brutal 
childhoods, they themselves would then give birth to more children in dire 
poverty. Eugenic ideals thrived in this climate of ‘alarm about the spread of 
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poverty’.118 Dugdale, and his supporters, including Josephine Shaw Lowell, 
recommended the indefinite incarceration and industrial training of the ‘feeble-
minded’ criminal.119 By incarcerating those who were deemed ‘inferior stock’ and 
preventing them from procreating, it was thought that the birth of future 
generations of ‘imbeciles’ and ‘feeble-minded’ state dependants could be 
prevented.120 Some eugenists saw feeble-minded individuals as possessing an 
excessive sexuality, others saw them as merely lacking the necessary inhibition to 
act as a rein on excessive lust.121 As well as controlling the ability of ‘undesirable’ 
people to reproduce, sterilisation of these individuals was mistakenly seen as a 
cure for excessive sexual urges.122 Rafter states that Lowell instigated one of the 
first American eugenics campaigns of the late nineteenth century. 123 
Incarceration of feeble-minded women became a ‘fashionable cause’ in late 
nineteenth century.124 The publication of books such as Darwin’s The Origin of 
Species in 1859 created interest in selective breeding. Science was beginning to 
provide answers to public health problems and people sought answers in science 
to the social problems of poverty and crime.125 Eugenics and the 
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professionalisation of those caring for the learning disabled became part of a 
‘scientific custodialism’: the incarceration of the mentally disabled to ensure that 
they could not reproduce.126 Lowell and others primarily targeted women, 
criminalising their body and status as ‘feeble-minded’ women, not their 
actions.127 Differentiation was used by the eugenists to justify their position of 
authority, an authority over those deemed ‘feeble-minded’ and ‘idiotic’. They 
portrayed themselves as altruistic and at the service of society.128 The learning 
disabled were not separated from the ‘born criminal’ in this analysis, but were 
part of a larger category of degenerates.129 
 Over time, these eugenic theories took hold, and were used to develop 
laws and policies relating to the treatment of both criminals and those with 
learning disabilities. Twenty-nine US states passed laws permitting the 
sterilisation of those who were deemed mentally deficient, epileptics, and some 
criminals.130 The sterilisation of criminals was only ruled unconstitutional in 1942 
in Skinner v Oklahoma.131 As Lombardo states: ‘The most powerful vehicle of the 
eugenic ideology was the law.’132 There were over 100 pieces of legislation 
drafted and passed at the state level in the USA between 1900 and 1970.133 
Between 1927 and 1967, the Supreme Court adjudicated the legality of three 
statutes based on eugenic principles.134  The case of Buck v Bell confirmed the 
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legality of sterilising learning disabled people against their will.135   Skinner v 
Oklahoma stated that it was illegal to sterilise habitual offenders against their 
will.136  The case of Loving v Virginia overturned state anti-miscegenation 
laws.137  
Of these three cases, Buck v Bell demonstrated the legal and political 
rationale behind the enactment of laws such as the Virginia Sterilization Act of 
1924.138 Initially, the Colony Board (based at the Colony of Epileptics and Feeble 
Minded, in Virginia) approved patients selected for sterilisation without any 
formal legal processes. Mainly women were selected for sterilisation prior to their 
release in the community, often to work in domestic service.139 They were 
subjected to a bilateral salpingectomy, which is removal of both fallopian tubes, 
rendering the woman infertile. On occasion, men were sterilised by vasectomy, 
and in some instances they were castrated.140 These surgical operations continued 
unchecked until the case of Mallory v Priddy in 1916.141 Following the arrest of 
Willie Mallory and her two eldest daughters, they were removed to the Colony 
where Willie and her daughter Jessie were sterilised.142  Mr Mallory submitted a 
claim for damages on behalf of Willie Mallory, for being deprived of her liberty 
against her will, for being sterilised against her wishes and for being forced to 
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work for no pay. Dr Priddy denied all of these charges, in turn claiming that Mrs 
Mallory was deficient and immoral.143 The jury accepted that Dr Priddy operated 
under ‘therapeutic necessity’, but the judge warned Priddy that legal authority 
would be required for further operations.144 Thus, once the sterilisation of Carrie 
Buck was approved in court, following the later case of Buck v Bell, legal 
sanctioning for the sterilisation of the learning disabled and mentally ill was 
confirmed.145  Mr. Justice Holmes stated that Carrie Buck would potentially have 
‘socially inadequate offspring’ and thus ‘she may be sexually sterilized without 
general detriment to her general health and that her welfare and that of society 
will be promoted by her sterilization.’146  His judgement shows the extreme 
bigotry of the time, and the generally held view that sterilisation was a justifiable 
procedure to prevent future criminality and thus future state dependents from 
being born. This was confirmed in the final part of the short judgment: ‘It is better 
for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate offspring for 
crime...society can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their 
kind...Three generations of imbeciles are enough.’147  
 The most directly relevant case law relating to prisoner procreation and 
eugenics is Skinner v Oklahoma.148 Under the broad terms of the Sterilization of 
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the Insane Act 1931, those with learning disabilities or those in mental institutions 
could be sterilised.149 This Act was strengthened in 1935 with the passage of the 
Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which also specified that offenders could be 
sterilised.150 The Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act allowed for habitual 
criminals to be permanently sterilised if they were convicted more than three 
times of a crime of ‘moral turpitude.’151 ‘White collar’ crimes such as ‘violation 
of prohibitary laws, revenue acts, embezzlement or political offenses’ were 
excluded.152 Skinner was used as a test case for the new legislation.153 He had 
been convicted of stealing six chickens at the age of 19, and was imprisoned twice 
for armed robbery, for the last time in 1934.154  In each instance, he pleaded guilty 
to the crimes, stating that it was to provide food for his wife and family. It was 
decided that Skinner’s criminal record meant that he fulfilled the legal criteria for 
being defined as a ‘habitual criminal.’ When Oklahoma’s Supreme Court 
affirmed the decision of the lower court, Skinner appealed to the Supreme Court 
of the USA, and was successful.155 Lombardo highlights an important point about 
this case. It did not fail because it was a eugenic measure against a vulnerable 
group of prisoners, but because it did not apply to all habitual criminals. By 
excluding ‘white collar’ crimes, it failed the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution.156 Justice Douglas devised the 
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‘strict scrutiny’ test under which the contested law was analysed to ensure that it 
did not discriminate against a certain group of people, whether that discrimination 
was intended or not.157 The other Justices, agreed with Skinner’s appeal, but for 
different reasons. Chief Justice Stone disapproved of the law because it asked an 
extremely narrow question of jurors at the trial to decide whether Skinner should 
be sterilised. They were asked merely whether the defendant was a habitual 
criminal within the meaning of the statute. There were no opportunities for the 
defendant to demonstrate whether or not he possessed the qualities of a hereditary 
criminal, which Chief Justice Stone contended failed the demands of due 
process.158 
Although the judgment of Skinner may be seen of limited relevance to 
modern jurisprudence, Lombardo makes the claim that currently accepted case 
law is based upon the eugenically based cases of Skinner, Loving and Buck.159 
The Supreme Court case of Grimswold v Connecticut struck down state laws that 
prohibited distribution of birth control.160 The Court based its ruling on the 
finding in Skinner that marriage and procreation are fundamental rights. The 
measure of these rights, the strict scrutiny test, was confirmed in Griswold.161 The 
iconic case of Roe v Wade, used the cases of Skinner, Loving and Buck to define 
and ‘qualify’ the decision made in Roe.162 Skinner and Loving were both used to 
demonstrate that the right to privacy also included marriage and having children. 
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The spectre of Buck continued to be raised however, and was used as a 
justification to place limits on the right of privacy, and was used to justify limits 
upon privacy and some state interference in reproductive rights.163 
Biological Criminology and the Legacy of Eugenics 
Eugenics may be seen to have just a marginal influence on penal policy 
and prisoner procreation today. Prisoners, like those in free society, have a right 
to bodily integrity, and cannot be operated on against their will.164 Sterilisation of 
people with learning disabilities has to be justified by being in their best interests, 
free from utilitarian concerns regarding the state support of potential offspring.165 
Nonetheless, there are similarities between the arguments that had been used to 
justify eugenics and some of the arguments that are now used to justify restricting 
prisoner procreation.  
 Whilst prisoners are generally no longer sterilised in prison, barriers are 
placed in the way of prisoners actively conceiving, often with the justification that 
it is in the best interests of a child to not have a prisoner as a parent.166 In England 
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and Wales, prisoners have to satisfy the authorities that their relationship is 
sufficiently stable and strong enough to support a child and that they will make 
‘good parents’.167 These justifications, cloaked in the language of child welfare, 
sound quite similar to Victorian arguments that society should not have to support 
the offspring of the dysgenic.168  In a concurring opinion from the ECtHR, Judge 
Bonillo shows how deeply entrenched this idea is:  
‘I am far from persuaded that kick-starting into life a child in the meanest 
circumstances, could be viewed as an exercise in promoting its finest 
interests. The debut of life in a one-parent family, deprived of the presence 
of the father and a father-figure, offspring of a life prisoner convicted for 
the most serious crime of violence, would not quite appear to be the best 
way of giving a child-to-be a headstart in life.’169 
Although the judgment is devoid of the overtly offensive language that 
characterises the quotation about the Jukes, Justice Bonillo echoes the same 
concern over criminals having children in the ‘meanest circumstances.’170 Both 
the Jukes and the Dickson’s were judged by the same barometers of criminality 
and poverty. Measures to prevent them from procreating were justified in the 
same terms.  
 One of the enduring legacies of eugenics is the development of biological 
criminology and positivist criminology. Many elements of positivist criminology, 
such as the importance of long prison sentences to rehabilitate offenders (as 
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opposed to using prison in order to merely ‘manage’ their criminal tendencies) 
have gone out of favour. The idea that criminality is innate and derives from 
within the individual, continues to have some influence over theories of penality 
today. Lombroso is credited as one of the first individuals involved with the 
development positivist criminology.171 Simon highlights that his identification of 
a ‘criminal other’ is largely forgotten in modern interpretations of positivist 
criminology. However, in the USA at least, it continues to exert an important 
influence:  
‘At the heart of this project is the conviction-which American penal 
policies continue to reflect-that crimes are committed by a distinguishable 
group of persons with a proclivity toward law-breaking and that crime 
control policies should seek to isolate and repress these dangerous 
classes’172  
Prisoners are considered ‘other’, somehow different to those outside of prison 
by political elites and the mass media, ‘alien’ and ‘dangerous.’173 Garland argues 
that offenders are treated as ‘a different species’ that prison has ‘taken out of 
circulation’ for the public good.174 Hallsworth argues that the punitive turn taken 
by state authorities shows that proportionality and utility in punishment is no 
longer considered the most important reason to punish. This almost leads to the 
point that there is no longer any rational reason to punish other than to be 
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punitive.175 Given such views, it is unsurprising that the UK Government and 
prison authorities in Percy, Goodwin and Gerber were so unwilling to 
contemplate allowing prisoners to procreate.  
One of the underlying reasons for the distaste at prisoners procreating could 
be due to the notion that they will ‘infect’ the next generation with inherited 
criminality. Lombroso is most often remembered for his theory of the ‘born 
criminal.’ The ‘born criminal’ was an individual that Lombroso stated had 
reverted to an earlier stage of evolution and could not be rehabilitated.176 Whilst 
there is little credibility for a theory of innate criminality in a modern context, 
there are groups within society that recognised to be so dangerous to others that 
they are incarcerated indefinitely.177 Incarceration within this context is not based 
upon purely punitive reasons, but instead upon utility, that it is in the best 
interests for the majority of society that someone who is deemed dangerous 
should be incapacitated in order to protect the public.  
 Although it is extremely unlikely, should a gene be discovered that 
predisposes an individual to criminal tendencies, this would raise real ethical 
dilemmas as to how people who possess the gene should be treated, and would 
have genuine relevance for prisoner procreation. Rose states the potential for 
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genetic discrimination would be high, and could even lead to preventative 
detention.178 There is also the possibility of those found guilty of a crime being 
held to not have criminal responsibility as they are genetically programmed to 
become criminal and are therefore incapable of controlling their behaviour.179  
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Summary 
The foundation of the prisoner’s claim to procreate is based upon the 
premise that all individuals, including prisoners retain all of their human rights 
that are not obviously removed by imprisonment. Whilst the courts in both the 
USA and England and Wales have argued that the right to procreate is ‘placed on 
hold’ by imprisonment, there is nothing that supports this stance in statute law. 
Human rights can be categorised as either positive or negative, which can alter the 
obligations placed upon states to either protect, or positively promote those rights. 
Procreative rights are generally characterised as negative rights, in that whilst the 
state will not interfere with an individual or couple procreating, they are not under 
a positive obligation to provide assistance with fertility. However, in the case of 
prisoners who are not allowed to have sexual intercourse, this would create a 
dependency on the state to provide positive assistance to any prisoner who wants 
to have children. 
 One of the severest ways in which the state could interfere with an 
individual’s human rights is to sterilise them in the name of eugenics. Until the 
advent of the Holocaust in the Second World War, support for eugenics was a 
mainstream political concern. In Britain, the Eugenics Education Society had 
several supporters, and continues to exist today as the Galton Institute.180 The 
campaigning of the Eugenics Education Society and others led to the passage of 
the 1913 Mental Deficiency Act. This Act fell short of compulsorily sterilising 
those deemed to be ‘imbeciles’ but did place them under residential care, thus 
preventing them in practice from procreating.  
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In the USA, support for eugenics crystallised in the form of the Virginia 
Sterilization Act 1924 and the test case of Buck v Bell.181 Once the sterilisation of 
Carrie Buck had been approved, this led to the sterilisation of many other learning 
disabled individuals. The case of Skinner v Oklahoma reinforced the idea that 
some state legislators thought that sterilisation was a good way of preventing 
future criminality.182 The US Supreme Court struck down the Habitual Criminal 
Sterilization Act because it failed to apply to all offenders and provide the 
offender with adequate opportunity to argue his case in court. The legislation was 
not explicitly struck down because it was considered inherently wrong to remove 
a prisoner’s ability to procreate.183 Many countries in Europe sterilised thousands 
of individuals, including some offenders.184  
 For most people, having children is undertaken in private, with very little 
interference from the state. The autonomy of the individual is respected to such a 
degree that any person, regardless of any addiction to harmful substances, can 
procreate and beget a child without restriction, save for paying heed to laws on 
consent and consanguinity. A woman bearing a child, whilst subject to a 
significant number of moral and social pressures, is not subject to many specific 
legal restrictions regulating her behaviour. She is prohibited from aborting her 
foetus after a certain gestation in most circumstances, but she is free to smoke, 
drink and engage in risky behaviour even if it may damage her foetus. The 
autonomy of the competent woman is respected to such a degree that she may not 
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be operated on against her will, even if this will lead to the death of her foetus. 
Strong protection of the woman’s autonomy is justified. Subjecting a pregnant 
woman to legal restrictions would place her interests below those of a foetus that 
has no legal rights or existence separate from the pregnant woman. The right to 
procreate is a negative right, in the sense that no state can be forced to provide the 
infertile with medical treatment, but this distinction becomes blurred in the penal 
complex. Prisoners are dependent upon the state to provide positive assistance to 
allow them to procreate. Their autonomy is not protected in the same way as those 
in free society. Procreation for prisoner is seen as a discretionary privilege. 
The reasons for prohibiting or restricting prisoners from reproducing can 
be said to stem from their categorisation as ‘other’, a contagion in society that 
must be contained and prevented from reproducing. This idea of ‘other’ derives 
from a number of different sources, the historical legacy of the development of 
the prison where the isolation of the prisoner was perfected, in the hope of 
reforming a damaging individual. Foucault identifies also the creation of the 
criminal as other, an easily identified person whom could be monitored, 
controlled and punished efficiently by modern society. The shadow cast by 
eugenics continues to have some influence, the notion of the ‘born’ criminal has 
been recast as the violent repeat offender who cannot be reformed. The prisoner 
parent is seen as someone who will pass on their criminality to the next 
generation, to produce children born into poverty, who will themselves become 
criminals.  
 The next chapter will turn to consider the prison and the development of 
imprisonment as one of the gravest method of punishment a society can inflict. 
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The historical context of imprisonment will be shown to have a large impact on 
modern conceptions of prisons and the prisoners held within them.   
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Chapter Three: The Prison 
Introduction 
To enable an understanding of how preventing procreation may be 
considered a punishment of the prisoner, an examination of the development of 
the prison as the main form of punishment is necessary. The prison is shown in 
the context of its development from a holding place for felons and for the 
containment of debtors to becoming a punishment in its own right. This is linked 
to an exploration of the purpose and intention of imprisonment. Next, the 
limitations of incarceration as a punishment will be considered in reference to the 
concept of populist punitiveness and legitimate penological aims. 
 Imprisonment itself causes psychological pains, which Sykes argues can 
be as equally damaging as earlier physical methods of punishment.185 Crewe 
revisited these pains of imprisonment, stating that modern penality also creates 
the additional pains of indeterminacy and uncertainty for life-sentenced prisoners 
and those imprisoned for public protection.186 In addition to this, Crewe details 
the pain that psychological assessment and self-government causes prisoners.187 
These pains of imprisonment will be considered in relation to how they could 
affect prisoners who wish to procreate. 
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Punishment and the Historical Context of Imprisonment 
‘In earlier eras imprisonment was mainly a period in limbo, a way-station in the 
legal process where the suspected offender looked forward to the hangman’s 
noose or the lash.’188  
 As the main method of punishment, prisons are a relatively recent 
historical development. Originally, prisons were designed to hold the criminal, in 
order for them to await their fate. Those who were suspected of a crime were 
sometimes tortured in custody prior to confession.189 Corporal punishment in 
early modern Europe entailed an element of public humiliation and infliction of 
pain and damage to the body of the offender.190 Spierenburg stated that the 
punishments the offender was subjected to had both a public element and a 
physical element, which often overlapped. The public element shamed the 
offender in front of the local population, whilst the physical punishment that the 
offender was subjected to demonstrated the power of the state. It showed the 
offender the power that the sovereign held over their body. For the most heinous 
crime, treason, male offenders in England and Wales could be punished by being 
hung, drawn and quartered.191 Foucault argues that the punishment and torture 
was required to be ‘spectacular’, so that the public can see the consequences of 
the crime. When a criminal was being punished, it was their task to ‘bear openly 
his condemnation and the truth of the crime that he had committed. His body, 
displayed, exhibited in procession, tortured...in him, on him, the sentence had to 
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be legible for all.’192 Spierenburg argues that this focus upon the body of the 
offender, and the lack of respect for bodily integrity reflected a society that relied 
upon and accepted, physical punishment in other areas. Questions of prisoners’ 
rights were not pertinent to the authorities prior to the beginning of prison reform 
in the eighteenth century.193  
One reason for the rise in the use of imprisonment was the result of a 
political need to control the increase in property crime, as ‘blood’ crime levels 
reduced.194 The apparatus of criminal justice was in France at least, rearranged to 
ensure that it evenly distributed. This allowed punishment to be used more 
efficiently and to punish more crimes, which under the Ancien Régime: ‘not to 
punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps, 
but in order to punish with more universality and necessity.’195 
With the increase in wealth due to industrialisation, there was a required 
change in legal regulation and penality that would protect the interests of those 
with money and property. The organisation of the state into a system of laws and 
surveillance that can punish those who offend produces what Foucault calls a 
‘terrible super-power’ that requires ‘a principle of moderation for the power of 
punishment.’ Punishment itself becomes a calculation, designed to prevent the 
crime from being repeated. Deterrence is therefore also an important 
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consideration when considering what punishment to give in response to a certain 
crime.196  
Other authors however, demonstrate that the evolution of a system of 
punishment, and what is deemed acceptable punishment is a more complex 
question. Garland states that modern society thinks of punishment in terms of a 
means to an end, which is in purely administrative terms.197 However, what are 
considered acceptable forms of punishment will depend upon what people view as 
‘emotionally tolerable.’198 Garland argues that there is little discussion about 
moral questions when deciding what types of punishment are acceptable because 
limits have already been set about what forms of punishment are considered 
acceptable.199 This is certainly true when one considers what punishments are 
considered acceptable for domestic crimes. Imprisonment is considered 
acceptable and just for certain types of crime, or in the face of repeat offences, but 
whipping prisoners, or depriving them of an adequate diet is not considered an 
acceptable form of punishment. These boundaries may appear fixed, cornerstones 
of acceptable behaviour which are not open to challenge, but the wider debates on 
the acceptability of the use of torture on suspected terrorists as well as other 
debates shows how this is untrue.200   
Spierenburg argued that imprisonment and public forms of punishment 
continued in conjunction for some time. In England and Wales this continued 
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until 1870 when executions were removed to the privacy of the prison.201 The use 
of imprisonment, along with other sentencing options such as fines or banishment 
grew out of gradual changes in the previous centuries, and the removal of 
punishment to the privacy of the prison.202 Speirenburg, used the thesis from 
Elias’s seminal work, The Civilizing Process to explain why punishment and 
repression have become privatised, hidden away from public view.203 An increase 
in mutual interest increases and the physical power of punishment and revenge is 
shifted to a state authority.204 The decrease in the use of physically punitive 
methods of punishment and execution was due to individuals in a society 
collectively inhibiting their primary wants and urges, and behaving in ways that 
were more refined.205 A change in sensibilities is not only affected by political 
decision-making, but that it is also caused by a psychic element.206 Open 
aggression against fellow people is suppressed. Speirenburg argued that there was 
a ‘repugnance’ to physical punishment being viewed in public. Punishment itself 
has become shameful and so remains hidden away within the prison, away from 
view.207 
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Punishment and Penitence: the Development of the 
Modern Prison 
The ‘Prison’ Before Reform 
Prisons have not always been strict and orderly places. Prior to Victorian 
reforms that had their roots in the eighteenth century, they were chaotic, 
disorganised and noisy places. As McGowan writes: ‘The jail appeared to be a 
peculiar kind of lodging house with a mixed clientele.’208 The idea of a ‘peculiar 
lodging house’ sums up some of the defining features of the prison prior to the 
work of prison reformers such as Howard and Fry. Many of the features of 
modern prison, such as the categorisation and segregation of prisoners by sex, 
offence and age did not exist. Incarceration for punishment purposes was 
relatively rare, and was used for minor offences.209 The system of imprisonment 
was organised at a local level, and there was often confusion between the two 
types of ‘prison’, the house of correction and the jail. The house of correction was 
supposed to take offenders for short terms of imprisonment following sentencing. 
The jail was supposed to take those awaiting trial, awaiting execution of a 
sentence, and debtors. However, many institutions had blurred distinctions 
between the different types of prisoners, and kept them all together.210 Prisons 
themselves varied in size, with some being small cells or cellars, along with larger 
prisons in cities such London and Warwick and were controlled locally.211 One 
problem that presented itself was the presence of debtors within the jails. Those 
who owed a debt were not felons, and as such authorities could do very little to 
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control their behaviour.212 Debtors were expected to pay an entrance fee to the 
other prisoners, called a ‘garnish.’213 The local community did not finance prisons, 
and those that ran and worked in the prisons were not paid. John Howard notes 
that felons were often provided with food, but debtors were not.214 The prison 
warders were not paid for their work, so many charged their prisoners for food, 
lodgings and other services.215 Many jails had their own ‘taproom’ and sold beer, 
and gambling was common.216 Most debtors were also incarcerated with their 
families, and many female prisoners were also imprisoned with their children.217 
One such inspection by John Howard in 1776 found a total of 242 debtors in Fleet 
prison along with 475 wives and children.218 These institutions were porous, into 
which free people would enter to drink in the taproom and mix with those who 
were detained.219 As families were not excluded from the prison, it is likely that 
prisoners did become pregnant or became fathers whilst in prison. This is in sharp 
contrast to the prisons of today, which are highly regulated, restricting the ability 
of prisoners to associate with their families, let alone live together.  
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The disorder and chaos that Howard found prompted him to press for penal 
reform and so the Penitentiary Act 1779 was passed.220 The Act intended to create 
a ‘network of hard labour houses’ by building new houses or by upgrading 
existing facilities.221 These ambitious plans were downgraded to build two prisons, 
one male and one female.222 Eventually these plans collapsed and it was not until 
1816 that a new prison was built.223 Reformers throughout the 1820’s became 
increasingly frustrated with the lack of proper reform.224 The Gaol Act 1823 was 
enacted to create more uniformity between prisons and forbade the use of alcohol. 
Whilst the Act fell short of enacting independent prison inspectors, it was the first 
attempt to set guidelines as to how prisons should be run.225 The Prison 
Inspectorate was established in 1835, and whilst it did not have the power to order 
changes or close prisons, it did help to undermine the tradition of locally 
administered prisons.226 Another great influence on prison reform came from The 
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Society for the Improvement of Prison Discipline (SIPD), which was formed in 
1816 counting influential politicians among its members.227 One of the most 
striking things about the influence and ideals of the SIPD was how it diverged 
from the ideals and practice of other prominent Quaker prison reformers such as 
Elizabeth Fry. The SIPD cultivated a technical knowledge of prison reform, and 
were invited to appear before Parliamentary select committees. They developed 
knowledge on prisons by visiting and collecting information, and relying upon 
technical advances such as the tread wheel.228 One of their reports published in 
1822 stated that ‘uniform’ punishment was necessary.229 ‘Scientific’ knowledge 
and ‘rational uniformity’ gave the SIPD legitimacy in the eyes of a male 
dominated and patriarchal society. The approach of Fry differed greatly from this, 
and her contribution was valued as a respectable ‘mother’ figure who was teacher 
and minister to the ‘childlike and ignorant’ women prisoners. 
In Discipline and Punish, Foucault reiterates the totality of the control of 
the carceral environment, which has the control of the body as its primary 
objective, through the use of the organisation of the prison, as a total entity, 
almost like a machine. Discipline can be both at once repressive and productive: 
discipline creates docility, repressing individuality and resistance. It also ensures 
that the maximum productivity can be achieved with the minimum of effort.230 
The same principle applies to the organisation of schools, hospitals and other 
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institutions.231 The carceral environment is designed around the needs of the 
institution; the arrangement of subjects and the environment ensures the 
maximum amount of control with the minimum amount of effort. Foucault takes 
Bentham’s vision of the Panopticon, the prison of which the primary purpose is to 
house prisoners separately from one another, whilst simultaneously allowing for 
their complete observation at all times. He states that such power should be 
‘visible and unverifiable.’232 The prison complex, the tower, the architecture of 
power is visible at all times, but the prisoner cannot be sure when they are 
actually being watched.  
Punishment and Penitence: the Victorian Prison 
The discrepancy between the claims for reforming the individual on the 
one hand and the reality of the creation of a punitive and harsh system reflect the 
different approaches to penality and types of power. These continue to coexist 
within the prison environment today. The modern drive for uniformity comes 
from a scientific approach to penality, which needs to objectively measure 
outcomes. The approach of Fry and other reformers in this period made the 
prisoner’s soul the key subject of their attention. Religion has a long history in the 
development of penality and had a central influence in the types of punishment 
used to control populations.233 The idea of penitence was central to the ideals of 
Fry and other reformers. It was thought that through austere conditions and 
spiritual guidance, offenders would repent of their wrong doings and become 
reformed subjects. When Victorian prison reforms began in earnest with the 
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construction of Pentonville Prison in 1842, penitence as well as deterrence was at 
the heart of the reforms. Prisoners were subjected to the ‘separate system’ which 
itself was based upon the system of imprisonment practiced in Philadelphia 
Penitentiary.234 Silence was enforced between prisoners and they had to don 
masks to prevent themselves from being seen and being recognised by fellow 
prisoners. Hard labour was punctuated with chapel services and visits from 
workers who were charged with ensuring prisoners reformed and repented of their 
sins.235 Prisons today retain a ‘Victorian’ flavour, through the use of strict regimes, 
uniforms, and Spartan living conditions.236  
Many of these Victorian prisons, including Pentonville are still in use 
today.237 Although the roots of Victorian policy can be seen with the early 
eighteenth century reformers, Garland argues that the way it was organised, as 
well as the new structure and agencies of Victorian criminal justice amounted to a 
new form of penality.238 These included, the ‘separate system’ in many prisons, in 
which criminality was treated as a contagion. The prevailing view was that the 
contagion of criminality could be passed from prisoner to prisoner so all prisoners 
were completely isolated.239 The separate system was relaxed in Pentonville 
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throughout the 1840s and 1850s as it became clear that it provoked insanity 
amongst the prisoners.240 However, certain elements of the separation of prisoners 
remain today. Solitary confinement is still used as a punishment, and association 
of prisoners is restricted in certain circumstances.241 Generally, in this period, 
prisons developed much more uniform and austere conditions. Diets were sparse 
and monotonous, restrictions existed with relations with the outside world, and 
prisons became more closed institutions with characteristics that are recognisable 
today.242 Prison staff developed a professional scientific knowledge of criminality, 
classification and methods of dealing with prisoners.243 The Prison Act 1877 
nationalised prisons and brought them under the control of the Prison 
Commission.244 The system became more rigid and hierarchical, and local 
magistrates ceased to have control or any influence over local prisons. 
The Prison Today 
‘A total institution may be defined as a place of residence and work where 
a large number of like-situated individuals, cut off from the wider society 
for an appreciable period of time, together lead a closed, formally 
administered round of life. Prisons serve as a clear example, providing we 
appreciate that what is prison-like about prisons is found in institutions 
where members have broken no laws.’ 245  
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In both the USA, and in England and Wales, there are various kinds of 
prison, some with much higher levels of security than others.246 Whilst some 
prisons have ‘open’ conditions, in which prisoners are not enclosed by security 
and bars, most prisons are ‘closed’. Many resemble the Victorian ‘ideal’ of a 
prison, with security restrictions, high walls and limited access to the outside 
world. Those dwelling within the prison are constrained in their ability to contact 
those outside of the prison. Whereas in ‘free society’ the public arena of work and 
the private arena of home are generally separate, in a closed institution, the entire 
space becomes public. Activities of daily living often occur in the same physical 
space, and the element of compulsion is constantly palpable.247 The prisoner has 
no choice over where they are accommodated. Their day is a succession of 
regimented rules, which leave little room for autonomy and self-determination.248 
The prison itself becomes the site of coercion and power, which is used to control 
and maintain order over prisoners.249 Crewe describes coercion as the ‘bulwark of 
the penal institution.’250 Often the threat of coercion or punishment is used to 
effectively control prisoners, or the routines that restrict movement can achieve 
this.251 The social dynamics Goffman observed within a mental asylum are also 
common to prisons, boarding schools, military training barracks and individuals 
collected together in religious orders. The modern prison governs every single 
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aspect of the prisoner’s life, controlling whom they associate with and how they 
contact the outside world. The prisoner can no longer pay for extra services, have 
his family live with him or carry on his business behind bars. Even the work a 
prisoner undertakes is strictly regulated and controlled. Sexual intercourse with 
partners is forbidden. In the words of Sykes, they become ‘an unwilling monk of 
the 20
th
 Century’ and are deprived of family, sexual relationships, relationships 
with partners.252 The ‘religious order’ analogy is a strong one, in many different 
ways. There is no separation of an offender’s public and private persona. Prison, 
like religious orders, integrates both the ‘public face’ of the offender, including 
‘work’ with the ‘private face’ of living that would normally be shared in private 
with family. In essence, everything in a prisoner’s life becomes ‘public’, and so 
becomes something to be publically governed. Prisoners do have certain rights to 
enable them to maintain contact with friends and family on the outside, but they 
have no privacy. Their desire, and the decision to have children becomes a public 
one, subjected to official scrutiny. Whilst today’s prison is not the’ impervious’ 
environment as described by Sykes and Goffman, it is still a discrete, cut-off 
microcosm of society, with its own social norms. Despite the fact that many 
prisoners and relatives find it difficult to maintain family relationships whilst 
incarcerated, some relatives have even recast the prison as a place for maintaining 
family contacts.253  
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The Pains of Imprisonment 
Sykes first used the term ‘pains of imprisonment’ in his classic prison study 
The Society of Captives to describe the non-physical pains that prisoners 
experience during their incarceration.254 These non-physical pains of 
imprisonment cause as much distress to prisoners as the older physical 
punishments of flogging and deprivation of food.255 They attack the very core of 
individual prisoners’ self-esteem.256 In conjunction with this, Goffman described 
how a ‘total institution’ as a series of mortifications and humiliations in which the 
individual’s concept of self is eroded and attacked.257 These add to, and form part 
of, the pains of imprisonment that the prisoner experiences. Sykes classified the 
psychological pains of imprisonment into five groups, each of which are affected 
to a different extent by a prohibition on procreation. These will be discussed in 
turn. 
The Deprivation of Liberty 
This is the loss of liberty and removal from society, with the according 
loss of social status and loss of relationships with loved ones.258 This is the most 
obvious pain of imprisonment, which physically isolates the prisoner from their 
family and loved ones. Should a prisoner wish to procreate this places them at the 
mercy of the prison officials and requires the prisoner and their family to subject 
their wishes to their scrutiny. Some prisons have layers of bureaucracy and have 
requirements that prisoners on indeterminate and life sentences are required to 
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meet before their release. Using Gidden’s term ‘ontological insecurity,’ Crewe 
describes how in England and Wales prisons over the last 20 years, whilst the 
regime and conditions of confinement have improved, prisoners complain about 
uncertainty, about what courses they need to attend in order to be released, about 
psychological assessments where they feel under constant scrutiny, unsure of 
whether their behaviour has been misinterpreted.259 Prisons can be bureaucratic 
places, and requesting access to AI facilities or private visits when time is limited 
for couples seeking to conceive (perhaps due to age or illness), could engender 
feelings of ontological insecurity. 
The Loss of Possessions and Services 
Sykes is careful to differentiate between basic needs and choice within his 
analysis.260 As Sykes argues, each prisoner in his study was provided with 
adequate shelter, clothing and food. He states ‘material possessions are so large a 
part of the individual’s conception of himself that to be so stripped of them is to 
be attacked at the deepest layers of personality.’261 On a practical level, some 
prisoners claim that their medical needs are not provided for and in some cases 
the treatment offered was poor.262 Those prisoners who may want children may 
find themselves unable to care for their reproductive health adequately. Should 
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they be granted access to IVF or AI facilities, they may be restricted to certain 
providers.263 
The Deprivation of Heterosexual Relationships 
Of all the pains of imprisonment, this is the one deprivation that causes 
prisoners the most obvious difficulty when it comes to the conception of children. 
Prisoners are prevented from conceiving children through sexual intercourse and 
thus become reliant upon other methods being allowed to them by the prison 
authorities to procreate. Sykes refers to sexual deprivation as the prisoner being 
‘figuratively castrated by his involuntary celibacy.264 Prisoners are prevented 
from maintaining close physical relationships with a partner outside of prison, 
which can lead to strain and the breakdown of family relationships.  
The Deprivation of Autonomy 
 According to Sykes, the multitude of rules and restrictions that prisoners 
are subject to operates as another pain of imprisonment, assaulting their 
individuality and sense of self.265 These rules provide another barrier to prisoners 
choosing how and when to procreate, mostly by preventing procreation entirely. 
Prisoners cannot exercise autonomy over their reproductive choices, because 
those choices are removed and regulated by the prison. 
Deprivation of Security  
Prisoners are ‘thrown together’ in enforced company with sometimes 
violent and unpredictable people.266 This can cause the prisoner considerable 
                                                
263 It is accepted that prisoners in the USA would most likely have to pay for treatment themselves 
in the unlikely situation that they are granted access to fertility treatment. Prisoners in England and 
Wales would most likely be treated under the same circumstances as people within the 
community, paying for treatment that is normally charged for, such as IVF.  
264 Gresham Sykes, Society of Captives (Princeton University Press, 1958) 70. 
265 ibid 73. 
266 Gresham Sykes, Society of Captives (Princeton University Press, 1958) 76-8; Alison Liebling, 
 
 
86 
anxiety and may be worrying for pregnant prisoners. Crewe highlighted in his 
research that male prisoners could feel the need to put on a ‘front’ in order to 
check potential bullying and exploitation of weaknesses.267  
Other Pains’ of Imprisonment: Psychological Assessment and 
Uncertainty 
‘Perhaps the simplest conclusion is that while the pains of confinement 
can be reduced, pain is intrinsic to imprisonment, and it is much easier to alter its 
form than to eliminate it from the prison experience.’268 As Crewe argues, the 
pains of imprisonment cannot be entirely removed from the prison experience, 
and many might argue that they should remain in order to maintain the punitive 
elements of the prison sentence. Crewe describes three additional types of pains 
that prisoners serving long sentences experience: continuous psychiatric 
assessment, uncertainty and the requirement to self-govern.269 For prisoners who 
want to become parents, these pains can also affect their chances of parenthood, 
because they affect how they negotiate with prison staff and the bureaucracy that 
surrounds prisoners making requests. The increased use of indeterminate 
sentences, where release depends upon behaviour and public safety assessments 
can lead to much uncertainty for prisoners. For those that want to have children, 
they may feel unable to plan for the future. Within England and Wales, to be 
granted access to AI facilities, a prisoner’s release date must not be either too far 
in the future that he will not be present when the child is growing up, or too close 
                                                                                                                                
Shadd Maruna, (eds), ‘The Effects of Imprisonment’ (Routledge, 2011) 5-6.  
267 Ben Crewe, The Prisoner Society: Power, Adaptation, and Social Life in an English Prison 
(Oxford University Press, (2009) 409. 
268 Ben Crewe, ‘Depth, weight, tightness: Revisiting the pains of imprisonment’ (2011) 13 
Punishment & Society 509, 524. 
269 ibid 513, 518, 524. 
 
 
87 
to his release date that means he could simply wait until he gets out of prison.270 
The prisoners most likely to want to have children whilst serving a prison 
sentence are most likely to be these kinds of prisoners, serving long prison 
sentences who are seeking to try and maintain family relationships with those on 
the outside of prison.  In conjunction with indeterminate sentencing, prisoners on 
long sentences are continually psychologically assessed. Crewe argues that 
prisoners often feel that in order to work with the system for release, which they 
have to perform, as their truthful responses may be at odds with the viewpoint of 
the psychological assessor.271 Crewe terms this anxiety ‘performance 
purgatory.’272 The determination of psychological assessment would be another 
factor taken into account when deciding whether to allow the prisoner access to 
AI facilities. Prisoners are also expected to take an active role in their 
rehabilitation, termed as ‘responsibilisation.’273 This assumes that they have a 
greater deal of control over their surroundings and access to courses than they in 
reality do as prisoners.274  
In their research with wrongly convicted and politically sentenced 
prisoners, Jamieson and Grounds found that all family relationships suffered 
during long term incarceration.275 Increasing the difficulties for prisoners to 
maintain family relationships, including conceiving children, can only increase 
this estrangement and alienation from existing family. As the psychological 
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effects of imprisonment with loss of relationships and ‘life history’ continuing 
long after the imprisonment of individual, Jamieson and Grounds argue that it 
becomes increasingly difficult to argue that long term prison sentences remain 
proportionate in the punishment that they effect.276 
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Summary 
 Prisons have evolved from holding places for the offender to the main 
method of punishment for serious offenders in both England and Wales and the 
USA. Prisoners remain separated from society, and prevented from close 
association with family and loved ones. Punishment has moved away from 
mortification of the flesh to the psychological pains of imprisonment described by 
Sykes.277 
 Prior to the modern conception of the prison as an isolated ‘total 
institution’ they were porous places, often run with little centralised control.278 
Howard noted that they were often places where debtors could have their family 
residing with them.279 Prisoners were often kept in a destitute condition, with only 
some prisoners being allocated a small bread allowance.280 Warders were not 
often paid for their duties, making up the shortfall by extracting a fee from their 
debtor prisoners.281  However, prison reform begun by Howard and continued in 
the Victorian times by others such as Fry began to change prisons into the 
institutions we recognise today. Prisoners were subject to a Spartan system, with 
basic human needs only just met: in some circumstances, they were not.282 Prison 
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regimes were designed to increase the pains of imprisonment and not alleviate it. 
Prisoners were also separated in earlier prisons in order to prevent the contagion 
of criminality from passing from prisoner to prisoner.283  
Today, prisoners are not subject to separation and isolation, unless they 
are confined in solitary cells in maximum security, but elements of the Victorian 
prison system remains. Many of the prisons built during the Victorian period 
remain in use as prisons, especially in England and Wales and the effects of the 
Victorian ideal of less-eligibility still linger. Prisoners are not generally afforded 
accommodation or varied cuisine, but rather the minimum that is deemed 
acceptable to meet physical needs.284 Barriers to procreation for prisoners arise 
from the austerity of prison and its development into a total institution. This 
restricts the offender from associating with his or her loved ones, from making 
autonomous choices over when and how to have children or how to maintain 
family relationships. The uncertainty of serving a life sentence or an 
indeterminate sentence creates further anxieties.285 
As some authors have detailed, these restrictions continue to have an 
effect even after prisoners are released, as prisoners become estranged from their 
family members, life plans are thwarted and relationships strained. Some argue 
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that because these effects continue long after the imprisonment part of the 
sentence ends, that the punishment itself is disproportionate.286 Snacken and Van 
zyl Smit argue that the punishment given to offenders is imprisonment only and 
that other ‘pains’ of imprisonment should not be added to ‘enhance’ the 
punishment.287  
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Chapter Four: Case Law Review- 
England and Wales 
Introduction 
 The right to procreate within England and Wales is protected by Article 
8(1) of the ECHR, which has been codified within the Human Rights Act 1998.288 
Article 8(2) allows for this right to be interfered with only if it is necessary to 
protect the health, morals and the prevention of crime or for the promotion of 
economic welfare.289 Article 12 protects the right of citizens of ‘marriageable age’ 
to marry and found a family.290 Within free society there is a high protection 
afforded to the right of individuals to marry, form relationships and procreate.  
 In contrast to this, prisoners inhabit a public domain, where all actions and 
decisions are subject to public scrutiny. In theory, prisoners retain all of their 
Convention rights that are not removed by incarceration.291 The Prison Act 1952 
allows for the minister responsible for prisons to make rules as necessary to 
administer and govern the specific regime and day to day running of custodial 
institutions.292 The Prison Rules 1999 provide the current guidelines for the prison 
regimes including the minimum allowed number of visits, as well as the contact 
prisoners can expect to have with their family members.  The Prison Rules 
themselves are not legally enforceable by prisoners, even though it is a statutory 
instrument.293 By setting minimum levels of contact allowed between prisoners 
and their families, however, the Prison Rules do demonstrate some commitment 
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to the idea that prisoners should maintain a relationship with their families. This 
minimum level of visits may be increased if desired by the governor in 
accordance with the Incentives and Earned Privileges Scheme.294 Rule 4(2) states 
that the prison has a duty to enable the prisoner to maintain family relationships in 
order to promote the prisoner’s rehabilitation, which places the prisoners’ family 
in the central position of helping offenders desist.295  
 Another standard that is of relevance to prisoners in England and Wales 
are the European Prison Rules (EPR).296 The EPR are not based upon prisoners’ 
rights, but on minimum standards of imprisonment.297 They are not themselves 
legally binding on member states of the Council of Europe, but are used as a 
guide by the ECtHR to help examine questions around prisoners’ rights and 
prison conditions.298  The EPR were considered relevant by the Grand Chamber in 
Dickson, especially Rule 2, which states that prisoners retain all rights that are not 
‘lawfully taken away by the decision sentencing them.’299 
 This chapter will begin with a description of the legal background to 
prisoners claiming a right to procreate in England and Wales, examining how the 
framework of the Prison Act, the Prison Rules and the provisions made for 
contact between prisoners and their families interact. The chapter will then turn to 
an examination of the facts of the Mellor and Dickson cases within the domestic 
courts before proceeding to discuss the Dickson case in the ECtHR.  
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Legal Background to Prisoner Procreation in England 
and Wales 
A prisoner who wishes to procreate within England and Wales has to 
submit an application to the Family Ties Unit of the Prison Administration 
Group.300 This application is considered centrally. As prisoners do not retain the 
right to private or conjugal visits in England and Wales, the applicants in both 
Mellor and Dickson accepted that procreation would only be achieved through the 
use of AI.301 Only a Minister from the Ministry of Justice can make the final 
decision whether or not to allow a prisoner to have children. The Minister would 
consider several factors when making the decision. The safety and welfare of the 
putative child is considered and the putative parent’s home must be judged 
adequate for the child. Both parties must be medically fit to undergo the required 
procedures, and both must consent to the required procedures. The prisoner’s 
release date is also considered and must not be too distant for them to assume the 
responsibilities of parenthood and not so near that the prisoner could simply wait 
until their release. Information about the prisoner and their offending history are 
considered, such as the risk of harm that they present to either a putative child or 
to society and whether it would be in the public interest to allow access to AI 
facilities. The stability of the relationship between the prisoner and their partner is 
considered and whether it would endure after the prisoner’s release. Finally the 
Minister making the decision considers whether the only way that a pregnancy 
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will be achieved is through the provision of AI or assisted conception.302 The 
decision is discretionary and other relevant facts can be taken into account.303  
Sexual intercourse is prohibited in all circumstances due to security concerns and 
this restriction is not relaxed under any circumstances, even when the prisoner 
and their partner cannot use assisted conception for religious reasons.304 Although 
prisoners are no longer required to show that they have an exceptional reason for 
wanting to procreate, it is still difficult in practice for prisoners to gain access to 
AI.305 
 The Secretary of State for Justice is entitled to make rules governing the 
management of prisoners and prisons within Section 47 of the Prisons Act 
1952.306 The current incarnations of these are the Prison Rules 1999.307 There are 
no specific provisions for prisoners to have children whilst in prison. There is 
however a general rule about prisoners having contact with their family outside of 
prison.308  
Raymond v Honey provides the basis for assessing what rights prisoners 
have. All prisoners retain rights that are not expressly removed or removed by 
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necessary implication.309 This was affirmed in Simms where Lord Steyn stated 
that although prison was intended to restrict the freedoms and rights of the 
prisoner, the starting point should be to assume a right is preserved unless it has 
been expressly removed or its loss is an inevitable consequence of 
imprisonment.310  
The Mellor Case  
Gavin Mellor was sentenced to life for murder in 1995 and met his wife 
Tracey whilst she was working at the prison. Tracey Mellor resigned her post in 
the Prison Service prior to marrying Gavin Mellor in 1997. That year, they 
requested permission to access AI facilities so that they could have a child.311 In 
his application, Gavin Mellor argued that Tracey Mellor would be at increased 
risk of conceiving a child with abnormalities, because of the long tariff period that 
he was required to serve as a life-sentenced prisoner.312 The tariff period for 
Gavin Mellor was due to expire in 2006, after which time he would be eligible for 
release on licence. At the projected date of Gavin Mellor’s possible release on 
licence in 2006, Tracey Mellor would be 31 years old. On the advice of medical 
professionals, it was judged that the couple should have no difficulties in 
conceiving naturally after his release on licence after he served the tariff element 
of his sentence. The Mellors’ request was refused, as the Home Office only 
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granted assistance with reproductive matters for prisoners when there were 
exceptional reasons to allow AI to take place.313  
High Court: First Instance Refusal 
Gavin Mellor argued that judicial review was justified on two grounds. 
Firstly, he stated that the decision made by the Home Secretary interfered with his 
Article 8 human right as a prisoner to a family and private life.314 Gavin Mellor 
relied upon the judgement in Raymond v Honey which stated that a convicted 
prisoner ‘retains all of their civil rights which are not taken away expressly or by 
(necessary) implication.’315 Eastman describes this as a ‘residual’ approach to 
prisoners’ rights.316 Article 8(1) of the ECHR was codified into UK statutory law 
in 1998. 317 Interference with this Article right must be proportionate and can only 
be justified in certain circumstances. These are: the need to protect the interests of 
national security, to prevent crime, protect health and morals, or to protect the 
rights and freedoms of others.318 Article 12 was also raised as relevant by Gavin 
Mellor, arguing that this supported his right to found a family and marry. Gavin 
Mellor contested that the decision of the Home Secretary interfered with this 
decision.319 The second limb of Gavin Mellor’s challenge was that the Home 
Secretary had taken into account irrelevant and irrational factors when refusing 
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him permission to artificially inseminate Tracey Mellor.320 He argued that 
consideration of the applicant’s relationship and the welfare of the potential child 
was irrelevant, stating that the only relevant considerations were concerns over 
security and discipline. It was also argued that Tracey Mellor suffered unfair 
restriction as a free citizen of her Article 8 right to a private and family life with 
the partner of her choice.321 In the first instance decision, counsel for Gavin 
Mellor argued that the Commission’s ruling in Hamer v United Kingdom did not 
necessarily restrict a prisoner’s right to procreate via AI, just that conjugal visits 
were justifiably restricted because of security concerns.322  
The Secretary of State argued that prisoners had no legal right granted to 
procreate whilst in prison.323 He stated that the right to a family life did not extend 
to allowing the prisoner who was in ‘lawful custody’ the right to use assisted 
reproductive technology (ART) because he was unable to cohabit with his 
partner.324 Article 12 did give the right to a prisoner to marry, but did not impose 
an obligation upon the state to make provision for the conception of a child.325 It 
was held that in X and Y v Switzerland that an interference with a right that was 
justified under Article 8(2), could not also constitute an interference with Article 
12.326 Forbes J ruled that as there was no legal right to reproduce in prison, there 
could be no violation of Article 12. Rather than having a right to access AI 
facilities, Gavin Mellor was actually seeking the granting of a privilege from the 
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Home Secretary.327 Because he was seeking assistance rather than asserting a 
right, the Government stated that they were free to develop what they felt was an 
appropriate policy, provided that it took into account the requirements of the 
Human Rights Act.328 The only ground remaining for judicial review therefore 
would be whether or not the policy itself was irrational, or whether the decision to 
refuse Gavin Mellor’s request was considered irrational. Forbes J did not feel that 
the policy developed by the Secretary of State was irrational and that it took into 
account many relevant factors.329 Finally, Forbes J stated that the public interest 
of maintaining prison as deterrence was justification enough to refuse permission 
to prisoners to access AI.330 The decision was not seen as ‘Wednesbury 
unreasonable’, as Tracey Mellor would still be young enough to conceive when 
Gavin Mellor was due to be released.331  
Court of Appeal Decision 
When the decision was reviewed in the Court of Appeal it was 
unanimously rejected. The Mellors again argued that the request itself would not 
lead to any disruption to prison security or create undue burdens to the Prison 
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Service.332 The Secretary of State stated that the purpose of imprisonment was to 
deprive Gavin Mellor of the right to found a family. Lord Phillips agreed with the 
Home Secretary’s submission, noting that the original drafters of the Convention 
would not have intended a prisoner, lawfully deprived of his liberty, to have the 
right to artificially inseminate his wife. He stated that rights are not merely 
restricted because of a need to promote good order in the prison, but because of 
the need to promote the punitive element of the prisoner’s punishment. This was 
seen as a legitimate aim of imprisonment.333 This was affirmed in Simms where 
Lord Steyn stated that although prison was intended to restrict the freedoms and 
rights of the prisoner, the starting point should be to assume a right is preserved 
unless it has been expressly removed or its loss is inevitable because of 
imprisonment.334 The Mellors’ counsel submitted that because of Simms, a 
prisoner should be allowed to exercise any rights he would be entitled to in free 
society, so long as they were compatible with the smooth running of the prison. 
Lord Phillips argued that this interpretation of Simms was incorrect. The question 
was one of proportionality, the interference with the right had to be proportionate 
to the inference with the rights of the individual prisoner.335 Mellor’s application 
to appeal to the House of Lords was refused. 
The Dickson Case 
The facts of the Dickson case are very similar to those of Mellor. Kirk 
Dickson was a life-sentenced prisoner who met his wife Lorraine Dickson 
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through a prison pen-pal scheme, as she was also serving a prison sentence.336 
The Dicksons married in 2001, whilst they were both serving prison sentences. At 
the time of the case, Kirk Dickson was due to be released at the earliest in 2009, 
at which point he would be 37 and Lorraine Dickson be 51. Lorraine Dickson had 
been released from prison at the time of the case and she owned her own four-
bedroom house. She was unemployed and claiming benefits, but was undertaking 
a university-based course. Lorraine had three grown up children from a previous 
relationship.337  
In October 2001, Kirk Dickson applied for the right to inseminate 
Lorraine, who joined the application in December 2002. In the application to the 
Home Secretary, the Dickson’s claimed the exceptional circumstances of 
Lorraine’s advancing age in support of their request. If they had to wait until his 
release in 2009, Lorraine Dickson would most likely be post-menopausal and be 
unable to conceive. On the 28th May 2003, the Secretary of State refused their 
application. The Dickson’s then sought leave to seek judicial review of the 
decision, which was refused on the 29th July 2003. This application was then 
renewed and the High Court again refused leave to appeal on the 5th September 
2003. On the 13th October 2003 the Dickson’s applied to the ECtHR, but as they 
had failed to exhaust domestic remedies it was deemed inadmissible. Finally, the 
case was allowed to go to appeal in the UK in September 2004, where it was 
unanimously rejected.338  
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The Court of Appeal Judgment 
Like the Mellor’s application, the Dickson’s application was unanimously 
rejected in the Court of Appeal. In their favour, the Home Secretary considered 
Lorraine Dickson’s advanced age at the time of his earliest possible release, 
which would have been 51.339 However, this was weighed against other 
competing factors, namely those considering the welfare of the child and public 
concern reasons. The main reason given by the Home Secretary for refusing the 
application were concerns about the welfare of the putative child and concerns 
about Lorraine Dickson’s ability to provide materially for the child. The Home 
Secretary also felt that the Dicksons’ relationship was ‘untested’ in the outside 
world, as they met whilst Kirk Dickson was in prison. There was also concern 
about the fact that Lorraine Dickson would be bringing up the child as a single 
parent whilst waiting for Kirk Dickson to be released.340 The other major concern 
was about the fact that Kirk Dickson had been convicted of murder, and by 
allowing him to procreate, the public might be concerned that his sentence was 
not sufficiently punitive enough. There was also an argument that by allowing 
prisoners to procreate that the deterrent effects of the sentence would not be 
sufficiently stringent enough.341 
In their judgment, the CA agreed with the Home Office policy in their 
judgment. Auld LJ made reference to Mellor, emphasising how similar the cases 
were, to emphasise the importance of the policy to limit the procreation of 
prisoners in the public interest. 342 In this case, however, rather than arguing the 
policy was irrational, the counsel for the Dickson’s argued that it was a 
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disproportionate interference with Lorraine Dickson’s Article 8 rights because she 
was close to the menopause. By preventing the Dickson’s from using AI, their 
chance to have a child together would be ‘totally extinguished.’343  
The Court of Appeal argued that the ECtHR ruling in Hirst should not 
affect the reasoning of the court in Dickson.344 Auld LJ argued that Hirst was 
referring to a complete ban on voting for prisoners, and as there was no blanket 
ban on access to AI, Hirst was irrelevant. He stated that the Government was 
allowed to use their discretion to allow cases in exceptional circumstances.345 
However, by placing the bar so high, arguably the policy amounted to a complete 
ban for the vast majority of prisoners. There is a tension between the judges and 
the Dickson’s counsel, about what is an appropriate consideration for penal policy. 
The CA argued that rather than public concern and welfare of the child 
considerations being irrelevant; they were centrally important to the policy. Auld 
LJ ruled that it was appropriate for both the policy and the courts to consider child 
welfare and public opinion when deciding which prisoners should be allowed to 
procreate.346  He argued that the restrictive policy was Convention compliant, as 
the Convention allowed for derogation from Article 8(1) rights, so long as it was 
for the protection of morals and the rights of others.347 The Dicksons were refused 
leave to appeal to the House of Lords, so appealed directly to the ECtHR. 
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Dickson v UK  
Chamber Ruling 
Once the Dicksons had exhausted their domestic appeal options, they were 
given leave to appeal to the ECtHR. Their claim was denied on their first hearing 
in the First Chamber on the basis that there was no existing general right to have 
children whilst incarcerated.348 The majority verdict firstly restates the law as set 
out in the CA judgement, and reiterates the UK’s reliance on the decision in 
Mellor. Member states had wide appreciation afforded to them with the 
application of Article 8(2).349 The Dickson’s counsel submitted that if the aim of 
the restriction upon procreation was to be punitive, then it made no legal sense to 
allow exemptions. Criticising the Home Office, they stated that social factors 
were not factors relevant or considered by Article 8(2), relying upon the ruling of 
Hirst.350 The Dicksons claimed that the starting point for the policy was wrong.351 
In order to remove a fundamental right, there had to be a ‘considerable’ 
justification. Instead, the Government had set the bar towards the opposite end, 
stating that there had to be an exceptional reason for access to AI to be allowed. 
There was also no logical link between the offence and the refusal to access to AI, 
according the Dickson’s. Dickson argued that whilst AI could be justifiably 
withheld in certain circumstances, such as for those convicted of offences against 
children, the indiscriminate withholding of facilities was unjustified.352  
There was also dispute from the Dickson’s about the claims made by the 
Home Secretary and the Court of Appeal in justification of refusing to allow them 
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access to AI. They claimed that the statement given by the Government that there 
was no financial provision made for the child was unfair. Lorraine Dickson 
owned a house outright that was worth £200,000 and was undertaking a course 
that would allow her to work as a counsellor. Restricting access to AI on the basis 
that their relationship had not been ‘tested’ outside of prison was also unfair. It 
was not necessarily true that any relationship was guaranteed to fail or succeed. It 
was a circular argument that could prevent any long-term prisoner from accessing 
AI.353 Finally, it was argued that the policy was an unjust infringement of 
Lorraine Dickson’s Article 8 rights, especially as she was no longer serving a 
prison sentence, but was still affected by the policy. 
The Government then argued that the policy was consistent with the 
ECHR. The restriction on procreation was a necessary part of the punishment of 
the prisoner.354 The Government then argued that by allowing discretion within 
the policy, it meant that each case could be examined on its merit. If prisoners 
were allowed to procreate, they argued, it would undermine public confidence in 
the criminal justice system.355 The narrow margin between the majority and 
minority judgement in the Chamber demonstrates how contentious and difficult 
the decision was to make. The ruling that there was no violation of either Article 
8 or 12 was held at four to three, showing how easily a different make up of 
judges could have affected the final ruling. It also demonstrates how murky the 
lines are between legitimate punishment and unjust infringement of Convention 
rights. This raises questions about what the appropriate margin of appreciation is 
that should be allowed to member states. The majority judgment accepted that 
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prisoners enjoy all of their Convention rights apart from the right to liberty.356 
However, they accepted that some curtailment of these rights was a necessary and 
inevitable part of imprisonment. The majority judgment said that there was no 
interference with the Dicksons’ Article 8 right because there was no general 
restriction of a general entitlement present within the prison environment.357 The 
Chamber reasoned that there was a wide margin of appreciation between the 
member states and there was no consensus on the issue of either conjugal visits or 
procreative provision for prisoners.358 The provision of AI was not seen as a 
negative right to not be interfered with by the authorities, but rather that it was the 
state refusing to take exceptional steps to allow the fulfilment of a positive 
obligation.359 The Chamber also explained that the burden for promoting a 
positive right should not be too great, and should not infringe others rights 
disproportionately.360  
The Court in this instance ruled that the policy itself considered relevant 
matters as the government had a positive duty to protect the future welfare of 
children under Article 8(2), as well as positive obligation to the prisoner and his 
partner.361 The considerations of public opinion were also thought to be important, 
and a relevant factor in developing the policy, although they accepted that a 
balance had to be struck between the needs for recognition of public opinion and 
the need for tolerance on the other hand.362 The decision made by the Home 
Secretary was deemed lawful in the light of the Government policy, and was 
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allowed under the wide margin of appreciation afforded to member states under 
the Convention. Because there was no infringement of Article 8, according to the 
Court, there could therefore be no infringement of Article 12. 
Grand Chamber Ruling 
In 2006, a panel of the Grand Chamber granted the applicants a request to 
refer the case to the Grand Chamber. In the final judgment, the judges held twelve 
to five that there had been a violation of Article 8, and decided that it was not 
necessary to examine whether or not there had been a violation of Article 12. 
Although there was some dissent, in the Grand Chamber the case did not cause 
such a close split as that in the Chamber.  
As well as reiterating the legal framework for governing prisoners’ access 
to AI, it also examined the role and objectives of a prison sentence.363 The 
judgment refers to a ‘progressive principle’ in which the earlier parts of a longer 
prison sentence focuses on retribution and punishment, and the later stages of the 
sentence should see the prisoner progressing through the categories, into lower 
security settings, focussing on rehabilitation and reintegration into the community. 
It is hoped that during this time the prisoner will develop a sense of personal 
responsibility. The judgment refers to various international human rights 
instruments, all of which encourage this important principle.364 The main point of 
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reiterating these various instruments was to demonstrate the importance of 
rehabilitation and reintegration into the community for the prisoner. These 
instruments highlighted how the Government policy of England and Wales which 
restricted access to AI conflicted with the aim of rehabilitation with the premise 
that prisoners retain all of their convention rights bar liberty.  
The majority judgement in the Grand Chamber firstly considered whether 
the Dickson’s Article 8 right had been infringed. Again, they reiterated the 
fundamental principle ruled on in Hirst, that a prisoner only loses the right to 
liberty when incarcerated, and does not any other of his fundamental rights.365 
Any justification for the restriction of rights has to take place on a case-by-case 
basis.366 The Grand Chamber declined to judge whether procreation was a 
positive or negative obligation, instead of confining itself to whether a ‘fair 
balance’ struck between public and private interests.367 This was a lost 
opportunity to explore in more detail whether there is a fundamental right to 
reproduce and whether that takes the form of a positive or negative state 
obligation. The Grand Chamber did however examine the Governments’ 
justification for the policy. They stated that whilst the inability to have children 
might be a consequence of imprisonment, it was not an ‘inevitable’ one.368 The 
majority took the view that as there was no financial burden placed upon the 
Prison Service, so a fair balance was not struck between the rights of the 
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individual and the prison authorities’ requirements.369 This in itself may cause an 
issue if the prisoner in question as female and the question of balancing the 
burden between the prisoner and the prison authorities arose. The thorny issue of 
the role that public confidence played was also discussed.  
Whilst the Grand Chamber accepted the importance of public confidence 
with the penal system, they stated policy should not be solely dictated by what 
could offend the public. It also reiterated the importance of rehabilitation and the 
vital role of the family to help reintegrate the offender back into society. The 
Grand Chamber stated that the Government seemed to retain the policy with the 
overall aim of punishing the offender, even if this was not explicitly stated.370 
Regarding the policy itself, considerations of child welfare were relevant, but 
could not in themselves be used to prevent potential parents from conceiving, 
especially as Mrs Dickson was a free citizen and would have taken primary 
responsibility for any child.371  
The main challenge of the majority judgment to the UK government was 
concerning the margin of appreciation. It stated ‘where a particularly important 
facet of an individual’s existence or identity is at stake…the margin of 
appreciation accorded to a State will in general be restricted.’372 However, in 
complex social issues that have little consensus across member states this margin 
would be wider. The real problem with UK policy lay with the exceptionality 
clause, as that prisoners would generally be denied AI unless exceptional reasons 
existed which meant that these should be granted.373 The way the policy was 
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structured prevented a proper and proportionate weighing of the competing 
interests of state and individual.374 In conclusion, the Grand Chamber ruled that 
the absence of a proportionality assessment fell outside the margin of appreciation 
and thus a violation of Article 8 had occurred.375  
In a concurring opinion, Bratza J, who sat in the Chamber and was 
required to sit in on the Grand Chamber explained why he changed his decision 
from the first hearing. He highlighted how the first Chamber decision was more 
concerned with whether the policy itself was compatible with Article 8. This was 
differentiated from Hirst because the removal of suffrage for prisoners operated 
as a blanket ban. Bratza J agreed that a fair balance between the needs of the state 
and individual had not been struck. The burden placed upon the prisoner to show 
that he was deserving of AI because of exceptional circumstances demonstrated a 
lack of a fair balancing of interests.376 
The dissenting judges highlighted in their judgment that they thought that 
the majority judgment itself was contradictory.377 Whilst there is no recognised 
right to conjugal visits, they claim that there has now been a right recognised for 
prisoners to access AI facilities. The issue of conjugal visits is given a wide 
margin of appreciation by the Member States, but AI is not. The dissenting 
judgment highlights that this margin of appreciation affords the member state the 
ability to apply the Convention in line with their own laws and aims, as long as 
the legal restrictions applied are because of a legitimate policy aim.378 In answer 
                                                
374 ibid.  
375 ibid para 85. 
376 ibid (Joint Concurring Opinion of Bratza J).  
377 Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 (Dissent of Wildhaber, Zupančič, Jungwiert, 
Gyulumyan and Myjer, JJ) argued that this should be considered under the individual country’s 
margin of discretion, highlighting the contradiction that conjugal rights are considered under the 
‘margin of discretion’ doctrine, but that a right to AI is not. 
378 ibid Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Wildhaber, Zupancic, Jungwiert, Gylumyan and 
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to this particular point, the margin of appreciation with regards to conjugal rights 
can be understood from the perspective of balancing the burdens on the prison 
service with the rights of prisoners. Conjugal visits place a large resource burden 
upon the prison, as they require the provision of secure and private 
accommodation for conjugal visiting, extra staffing for the visit areas, as well as 
the increased risk of security issues arising. Male prisoners producing semen for 
AI produce minimal burdens upon the prison service. The only requirement is an 
appropriate receptacle and a private room in which to produce the required semen 
sample. The health risks to staff can be minimised by passing the sample straight 
to a health care professional. The dissenting judges then argued that the majority 
judgement in the Grand Chamber failed to address the issues of whether the 
Member States should retain their margin of appreciation when considering 
whether AI should be accessible to either homosexual prisoners or female 
prisoners. The dissenting judges claim that the member states should retain this 
margin of appreciation when considering different types of prisoners and 
partnerships, which deviate from the case of the male prisoner wishing to 
inseminate a female partner outside of prison.379  
                                                                                                                                
Myjer.  
379 ibid. 
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Summary 
  Litigation and judicial review remain one of the few avenues open to 
prisoners who wish to have certain rights recognised. In theory, prisoners in 
England and Wales do not automatically lose their right to procreate, unlike those 
in the USA, but in practice they find it extremely hard to successfully gain access 
to AI or other medical assistance in order to become a parent.  
 Until Dickson v UK, prisoners were only granted access to AI in 
exceptional circumstances.380 This was argued by the court in both Mellor and 
Dickson to reflect the principle that lawfully detained prisoners were responsible 
for their own misfortune and that they lost their right to procreate once committed 
to prison until their release.381 The starting point for defining exceptional 
circumstances was set out by Phillips LJ in Mellor who stated that the starting 
point was ‘if facilities for artificial insemination are not provided, the founding of 
a family may not merely be delayed, but prevented altogether.’382 This was 
reaffirmed at the same time by Auld LJ in Dickson, but Mance LJ the prospect of 
childlessness was not enough to pass the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test.383 
The Grand Chamber felt that the decision to refuse access to AI did not 
strike a fair balance between the public interests claimed by the Government and 
the private interests that the Dicksons’ held in procreation.384 The Grand Chamber 
emphasised the importance of the progression of the prisoner through their 
                                                
380 Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 16. 
381 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 para 
62; Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for the Home 
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382 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 para 
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383 Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 25. 
384 Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 para 82. 
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sentence, which firstly focuses on retribution and punishment, but later on 
concentrates on rehabilitation and resettlement within the community.385 
In practice it appears that it is still extremely difficult to obtain permission 
for access to AI. There were no known applications from women prisoners in 
2011 for access to AI, and as stated earlier, only one successful male application. 
The Joint Committee on Human Rights stated in their 2007-8 report that it 
appears that the only concession made by the Government was to remove the 
reference to exceptional circumstances.386 The Government continued to factor 
into their decision matters that related to public interest, which the Grand 
Chamber had objected to in Dickson.387 This leaves the Government open to 
further claims for human rights breaches.388 Whilst prisoner procreation appears 
to be a fringe issue in the greater debate surrounding prisoners’ rights; it is likely 
that further litigation claims may reach the domestic courts, as well as the ECtHR, 
especially as the Government is unwilling and unlikely to change their approach. 
The Freedom of Information request received in 2011 still showed the same 
policy being used to make decisions as stated by the Joint Committee in 2008.389 
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Chapter Five: Case Law Review- The 
United States of America	  
Introduction 
 In the USA, prisoners have a similar ‘guarantee’ to prisoners in England 
and Wales that protects their constitutional rights when imprisoned, although in 
practice these are extremely restricted.390 There is no specific right to a private 
and family life, rather there is an acknowledged protection of areas of family life, 
such as the right to use contraception, the right to abortion, as well as the right for 
individuals to make decisions about their family without interference from the 
state.391 These cases were generally based upon the 14th Amendment of the US 
Constitution, under the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause.392 
Neither state nor Federal jurisdictions are compelled to consider prisoners as 
candidates for AI, even under exceptional circumstances. Prison authorities can 
restrict a prisoner’s constitutional rights so long as the authorities meet the four-
part test outlined in Turner v Safley.393 Only the case of Goodwin considered how 
the restrictions also affected the rights of the free partner of the prisoner. They 
stated that infringement of the right of a free citizen to have children was not 
enough to warrant subjecting the prison ruling to strict scrutiny.394 Prisoners are 
further compounded in their ability to litigate on rights issues following the 
passage of the Prison Litigation Reform Act.395 The Act places restrictions on a 
prisoner’s ability to bring an action to court, requiring them to wait until they 
                                                
390 Wolff v McDonnell 418 US 539 (1974). 
391 Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541(1942); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965); 
(Roe v Wade 410 US 113; Carey v Population Servs Int'l 431 US 678, 685 (1977).  
392  US Const. amend. XIV, s 1.    
393 Turner v Safley 482 US 78, 95, 96 (1987).  
394 Goodwin v Turner, 980 F.2d. 1395, 1399 (1990).  
395 Prison Litigation Reform Act 1996: United States Code Title 42 s1997e Suits by Prisoners.  
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have exhausted all internal procedures for settling the dispute.396 Time limits also 
apply to bringing a case. This places prisoners in a less favourable position than 
members of free society in bringing cases to court.  
 This chapter will firstly examine the background to prisoner procreation in 
the USA, including the constitutional protection of procreative rights for free 
members of society. The chapter will then turn to look at the facts and ruling of 
the three cases examined from the USA: Percy, Goodwin and Gerber. In common 
with Mellor and Dickson, all three cases concern male prisoners sentenced to 
either life imprisonment or very long sentences whom wanted to produce semen 
samples so that their wives could be artificially inseminated. Apart from the 
ruling in Gerber II, none of the prisoners gained support for access to AI. The 
legal situation remains uncertain as the Supreme Court declined to rule on 
Gerber’s case.397 
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397 Gerber v Hickman 537 US 1039 (2002). 
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Legal Background to Prisoner Procreation in the United 
States of America 
Several United States Supreme Court judgments have recognised that in 
different situations, individuals have reproductive rights, based mostly upon the 
14th Amendment, the right to due process.398 The United States Supreme Court 
have also recognised that former prisoners also had the right to retain their 
reproductive capabilities, stating that procreation was central to the reproduction 
of the human race.399 The case of Skinner is not as protective of a prisoner’s right 
to procreate as it may first appear. The case itself turned not on the invasion of a 
prisoner’s right to procreate, but rather on how the statute mandating sterilisation 
of offenders operated in a discriminatory manner only targeting repeat offenders, 
who committed offences of ‘moral turpitude.’ So-called ‘white collar’ offenders 
were excluded, as the statute itself had eugenic aims.  
Generally, it is accepted that prisoners possess all of the same civil rights 
that free people possess bar those removed by imprisonment.400  The 1960s and 
                                                
398 Many cases protect several constitutional rights attached to privacy and reproduction. Skinner v 
Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541(1942) (procreation is ‘one of the basic civil rights of man’, based on 
the 14th Amendment Equal Protection Clause); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965) (right 
to privacy regarding contraceptive decisions within marriage, founded within the 5th Amendment 
against self-incrimination); Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973) (a woman has right to abortion based 
upon her right to privacy under the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment); Carey v 
Population Servs Int'l 431 US 678, 685 (1977) (right of privacy to make decisions that relate to 
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and education, based 
upon the 14th Amendment and protection of due process); Stanley v Illinois 405 US 645, 651 
(1972) (right of unmarried fathers to attend fitness to parent hearing in the same capacity as 
mothers and married fathers); Planned Parenthood v Casey 505 US 883 (1992) (provision in 
Pennsylvania Abortion Act 1982 s3209 that required married women to inform their husbands that 
they were having an abortion was deemed unconstitutional); Eisenstadt v Baird 405 US 438, 453 
(1972) (right of unmarried mothers to access contraception). 
399 Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541(1942). 
400 Wolff v McDonnell 418 US 539 (1974); Prisoners retain many constitutional rights such as the 
right to free exercise of religion (O’Lone v Estate of Shabazz 482 US 342 (1987); the right to 
access the courts (Bounds v Smith 430 US 817 (1977); the right to protection against cruel and 
unusual punishment (Estelle v Gamble 429 US 97 (1976); Rights to due process in prison 
disciplinary procedures (Wolff v McDonnell 418 US 539 (1974); and the right to freedom of 
speech (Pell v Procunier 417 US 817 (1974). 
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1970s provided the greatest activity in the Supreme Court in support of prisoner’s 
rights.401 Prisoners gained recognition of the right to freedom of religion,402 and 
the right to express their opinion about the prison without being censored in mail, 
403 as well as the right to due process in disciplinary matters.404 However, in 
practice, rights have become increasingly limited as the US Supreme Court has 
become more conservative. The right to be provided with an adequate law library 
or trained professionals was challenged by Lewis v Casey.405 Following this 
judgment, prisoners retain the right of access to the courts, but do not have a 
‘free-standing’ right to a law library or assistance with litigation. Furthermore, 
prisoners are also subjected to the restrictive Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(PLRA) 1996 which seek to limit ‘frivolous’ litigation.406 Amongst other 
restrictions, the PLRA requires that prisoners exhaust the internal appeals 
processes within their institutions before bringing a case to court.407 This serves to 
make it increasingly difficult for any prisoner who wants to challenge a 
prohibition on AI to take their claim. Deadlines imposed by the court can be 
missed, preventing prisoner litigants pressing their claims through the court.  
                                                
401 Jack E Call, ‘The Supreme Court and Prisoner’s Rights’ (1995) 59 Federal Probation 36. 
402 Cruz v Beto 405 US 319 (1972) (a prison could not prevent a Buddhist prisoner from using the 
chapel, from writing to religious advisors and from distributing religious material to other inmates, 
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403 Procunier v Martinez 416 US 396 (1974) Right of correspondent outside of prison infringed by 
prison censorship. Prisons should only censor that which is necessary to further the aims of prison 
security, order or rehabilitation. 
404 Wolff v McDonnell 418 US 536 (1974). 
405 Johnson v Avery 393 US 483 (1969); Bounds v Smith 430 US 817 (1977); Lewis v Casey 516 
US 804 (1996). 
406 See footnote 395, Human Rights Watch, No Equal Justice: The Prison Litigation Reform Act in 
the United States (Human Rights Watch, 2009). Human Rights Watch makes the important point 
that unlike other western democracies, the USA lacks a national prison inspectorate to enforce 
minimum decent standards. Litigation is often a prisoner’s only recourse to improve debilitating 
standards of living. See also Kermit Roosevelt III, ‘Exhaustion Under the Prison Litigation 
Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural Error’ (2003) 52 Emory LJ 1771, 1772. 
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  The strict scrutiny approach used in Procurier v Martinez was eroded by 
the latter case of Turner v Safley.408 Procurier v Martinez provided a more robust 
protection for prisoner’s rights than the test introduced by Turner v Safley. Turner 
introduced a four-part test that was termed the ‘rational basis test’ to be used 
when deciding whether it was legal to restrict a prisoner’s rights.409 When 
restricting a prisoner’s rights it is easier for a state to pass the rational basis test.410 
To establish whether a restriction on a prisoner’s constitutional rights are 
reasonable, the court must be satisfied that a) there is a rational connection 
between the legitimate penological objective and the restriction, b) whether there 
is an alternative way for the prisoner’s constitutional rights to be met, c) what 
effect accommodating the right has on other prisoners and staff, and d) whether 
the prisoner can point to alternatives to the regulation which come at minimal cost 
to the prison and allows for the prisoner’s right to be accommodated. If there is an 
absence of alternatives this may provide evidence that a restriction is 
exaggerated.411  Court action can only be commenced when all other institutional 
avenues to appeal have been extinguished. 
The Goodwin Case 
This case originated in the Western District of Missouri. The plaintiff, 
Steven Goodwin was a federal prisoner who was sentenced in 1986 to a 14-year 
sentence for drugs offences.412 In 1987 he requested permission from the Warder 
to be able to be provided with the facilities to produce a semen sample to allow 
                                                
408 Procunier v Martinez 416 US 396 (1974). 
409 Turner v Safley 482 US 78 (1987); Jack E Call ‘The Supreme Court and Prisoner’s Rights’ 
(1995) 59 Federal Probation 36, 42. 
410 Jack E Call, ‘The Supreme Court and Prisoner’s Rights’ (1995) 59 Federal Probation 36, 42. 
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412 Tim Bryant, ‘Barred Reproduction: Inmate’s Request to Father Child is Denied’ St. Louis Post-
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his wife to be artificially inseminated.413 His request was justified by the concern 
that on his earliest release from prison his wife, Sabrena Goodwin would be at an 
age that would put her at increased risk of birth defects.414 This was initially 
refused because the Federal Bureau of Prisons had no policy on AI and 
prisoners.415 Steven Goodwin then pursued a court order to force the prison 
authorities to allow him to provide a sperm sample, and to allow for his doctor to 
collect the sample from prison. He also requested that he was tested for sexually 
transmitted diseases and given a guarantee that he would not be transferred from 
the prison until the situation had been resolved.416 The magistrate ruled that 
Bureau of Prison’s refusal on the grounds merely on absence of a policy did not 
meet minimum due process requirements and so recommended that Steven 
Goodwin be allowed to resubmit his claim in detail.417  
The District Court Ruling 
Steven Goodwin asserted that his right to reproduce was a fundamental 
constitutional right, which survived incarceration and was ‘compatible with his 
status as a federal prisoner.’418 In this respect, Steven Goodwin argued that the 
right to reproduce should be treated the same way as the right to marriage, which 
had been ruled by the United States Supreme Court to survive incarceration.419 
Steven Goodwin argued that his wife Sabrena Goodwin’s constitutional rights to 
procreate were also affected by the ruling.420 The magistrate supported Steven 
Goodwin’s claim in this respect, stating that the right to procreate survives 
                                                
413 Goodwin v Turner 980 F2d 1395, 1397 (1990). 
414 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1452 (1988). 
415 Goodwin v Turner 980 F2d 1395, 1397 (1990). 
416 ibid. 
417 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452 (1988).  
418 ibid 1453. 
419 ibid. Turner v Safley 482 US 78 (1987). 
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incarceration.421 Collinson J began his judgment by citing the principle that 
prisoners are not separated from the state by an ‘iron curtain’ but that they retain 
all of their rights that are not incompatible with either their status as a prisoner, or 
incompatible with legitimate penological aims.422 The rights that Collinson J lists 
as being retained by the prisoner are: the right to be free of racial discrimination, 
the right to petition the government for ‘redress of grievances’ and the right to 
practice one’s religion.423 He then ruled that incarceration remained an 
‘insurmountable obstacle’ to Goodwin procreating whilst in prison.424 Collinson J 
stated that Steven Goodwin ‘does not have a fundamental constitutional right to 
father a child through artificial insemination that survives incarceration’ because 
his ability to procreate was inconsistent with his status as a prisoner.425 Steven 
Goodwin had argued his right to procreate survived on a number of levels, stating 
that he had a fundamental right to procreate as set out under Skinner. This was 
dismissed by the judge, however, stating that Skinner merely stood for the right to 
not be forcibly sterilised against one’s will, thus suffering permanent deprivation 
of the ability to reproduce.426 Similarly, Steven Goodwin failed to press his claim 
under the right to marry. Collinson J stated that the right to marry was subject to a 
number of restrictions. The right to bear and rear children fall under the 
‘unavailable incidents of marriage,’ which are not open to prisoners.427 Neither 
was Steven Goodwin’s right to procreate protected by the right to privacy, as loss 
                                                
421 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1453 (1988). 
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of the right to privacy was considered to be an inherent part of imprisonment.428 
Finally, his claim failed under the proposition that denial of the right to procreate 
constitutes a cruel and unusual punishment, which violated his Eighth 
Amendment right.429 Collinson J argued that denial of AI facilities did not 
constitute an excessive punishment also adding that even though the restriction 
affected Sabrina Goodwin as well, this did not justify subjecting the restriction to 
the strict scrutiny approach detailed in Procurier v Martinez. 430 
Court of Appeal Ruling (Eighth Circuit) 
The Court of Appeal for the Eight Circuit of the United States also refused 
to allow Goodwin’s appeal, however, its reasoning turned on other grounds. The 
leading judgment did not examine the question of whether Goodwin’s right to 
procreate survived incarceration, but merely stated that the restriction on AI was 
reasonable because it was connected to the legitimate penological interest of 
treating all prisoners the same.431 Magill J did accept that there is a 
constitutionally protected fundamental right to reproduce, but the judgment itself 
concentrated upon examining whether the restriction on AI implemented by the 
Bureau of Prisons met the appropriate standards.432 Goodwin argued that because 
the case affected his wife that the restriction should be subjected to a strict 
scrutiny test, stating that incarceration causes deprivation of family connections as 
a matter of course.433 The four-part test in Turner was applied. Restrictions in the 
prisoner’s rights are permissible so long as the restriction is reasonably related to 
                                                
428 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1455 (1988), citing Bell v Wolfish 441 US 520, 537 
(1978).  
429 ibid 1455. 
430 ibid.  
431 Goodwin v Turner, 980 F2d 1395, 1396 (1990).  
432 The general right to reproduce is recognised in many cases, see footnote 398. 
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achieving a legitimate penological objective.434 Magill J argued that a complete 
restriction was justified as it was ‘rationally related to the Bureau’s interest in 
treating all inmates equally, to the extent possible.’435 The major concern of the 
Bureau and the court was that women prisoners would start requesting permission 
to become pregnant whilst serving their sentence. The Bureau and Magill J argued 
that the demand from women prisoners wanting to procreate would cause an 
unacceptable burden upon the Bureau of Prisons, who would need to expand their 
medical services.436 The need to identify an alternative method to conjugal visits 
to maintain prisoner’s constitutional to the prisoner under the test in Turner was 
not seen to be necessary by the court. They argued that allowing AI as an 
alternative would lead to the Bureau having to accommodate female prisoners 
wanting to have children.437   
The dissenting judgment in Goodwin refuted the claim that the restriction 
of procreation was in furtherance of a legitimate penological aim. McMillan J 
argued that the Turner test had been improperly applied, and that the prohibition 
was not related to a legitimate penological aim.438 He also stated that Goodwin’s 
request was narrowly defined, and that he retained some right to procreate.439  The 
complete prohibition upon AI was judged by McMillan J as an ‘exaggerated 
response’ and not related to a legitimate penological aim This, along with the 
Bureau of Prison’s changing reasons for refusing Goodwin’s request made a 
refusal unconstitutional according to McMillan.440 Importantly, he also notes that 
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equal treatment of male and female prisoners is not a legitimate penological 
interest when accommodating it results from the denial of a request that could 
otherwise be accommodated.441 As far as gender equality is concerned, McMillan 
argues that the State would be justified in prohibiting female prisoners from 
reproducing in prison because of the larger burden on prison staff and services, 
which would satisfy the requirement in Turner.442  
The Percy Case 
 Robert Percy was a 45-year-old prisoner of the State of New Jersey who 
was convicted of homicide in 1985 and was sentenced to a life term in prison. He 
had to serve a minimum of a 30-year period where he was ineligible for parole. 
This minimum 30-year term would expire on November 23rd 2014. Robert Percy 
married in prison in 1986. At the time of the court hearing, Robert Percy was 45 
and his wife was 36. They had one child together, who was 15. Robert Percy’s 
wife had a fulltime job and the case stated that she also had medical benefits.443 
They wished to have another child together and applied to the New Jersey 
Department of Corrections in 1988 and again in 1990.444 Robert Percy made a 
final application in July 1993 in which he requested permission to either be 
conveyed to a medical facility in order to produce a sperm sample, which would 
then be used to inseminate his wife. As an alternative, he requested that he was 
provided with a sterile container in order to produce a sperm sample. His wife 
would convey from the prison to the nearest medical facility. Robert Percy stated 
that he and his wife would bear all of the costs for the transport, medical costs and 
                                                                                                                                
penological concern in the request opening the door to women prisoners wanting to become 
pregnant in prison. 
441 ibid 1405. 
442 ibid 1406. 
443 Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 543, 545 (1995). 
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treatment. His request was refused by the Department of Corrections on the 
grounds that insemination was an elective medical procedure and could not be 
authorised without a court order.445 Robert Percy then appealed to the Superior 
State Court of New Jersey in 1995.446 The appeal hearing took place in front of 
three judges who unanimously ruled against the claimant. 
The Ruling 
The appeal hearing consisted of three judges, King, Muir Jr and Eichen 
who unanimously ruled in favour of the Californian Department Of Corrections, 
strongly disagreeing with Percy that prisoners should have the right to AI 
facilities.  The judgment itself is very short. The single opinion of the court was 
delivered by King J. Percy’s request to be able to produce a sperm sample in 
order that his wife could be artificially inseminated was refused. The judgment 
stated that no court in the USA had ever recognised that prisoners retained the 
right to procreate, citing the decision of Goodwin as justification.447 King J further 
justified the refusal by citing the United States Supreme Court ruling of Turner v 
Safley in which the right of the prisoner to marry was upheld, but the right to 
procreate was not.448  
Percy argued that the right to procreate had been recognised by the United 
States Supreme Court in several instances.449 He then went on to argue that the 
right to procreate is not itself inconsistent with the status of prisoner.450 In support 
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of his request he also stated that there was no valid penological interest furthered 
by refusing his request to allow his wife to be artificially inseminated. Percy 
attempted to rely on Monmouth County Correctional Institutional Inmates v 
Lanzaro in which female inmates were deemed to have a right to access abortion 
services without a court order to obtain an abortion. He claimed that the right to 
procreate should also share the same status as the right to an abortion.451 The 
Court stated that legitimate penological interests justified refusing prisoners the 
right to procreate via AI and that equal protection measures were an important 
consideration.452 There was great concern that allowing female prisoners to 
procreate would create an onerous burden for the Department Of Corrections and 
would reduce the available income for rehabilitation and other ‘desirable 
programs.’453 The court acknowledged that they gave ‘considerable deference’ to 
the expertise of the Department Of Corrections who are best placed to make 
decisions about the effects of allowing prisoners to procreate which they stated 
carried risks to security, scarcity of resources and equal protection measures.454  
Gerber Case 
William Gerber was a state prisoner sentenced to 100 years to life plus 11 
years imprisonment under the ‘three strikes and out rule’ after shooting his 
television set.455 Under Californian prison rules, he was ineligible for family visits, 
which were only granted to prisoners who had a set parole or release date. Gerber 
wanted permission to mail a semen sample in a special overnight service to his 
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doctors. The doctors would then use this sample to artificially inseminate his wife 
Evelyn Gerber.456 As Evelyn Gerber was 44 years old at the time of the hearing, 
the Gerber’s were approaching, if not already passing the possible time frame for 
conceiving a biological child of their own.457 Initially, William Gerber applied to 
the Warder of Mule Creek State Prison for permission to produce a semen sample 
that would be mailed overnight in an appropriate package. If this was not 
acceptable to the Warder, he asked alternatively whether his legal counsel could 
be permitted to collect the sample.458  This was refused by the District Court 
(Gerber I), allowed initially by a panel of three judges in the Californian Appeal 
Court (Gerber II), and then refused a year later en-banc by the full panel of 12 
Justices in the Appeal Court in Gerber III. Finally, William Gerber attempted to 
appeal to the United States Supreme Court, who refused to hear the case.459 
William Gerber’s case rested upon the presumption that all people, including 
prisoners, retained a right to procreate.460 This argument is based upon a series of 
Supreme Court cases, in which procreation itself has been recognised as a 
fundamental constitutional right in different situations.461 However, there have 
been no cases that specifically rule that procreation in prison is a fundamental 
constitutional right. 
Gerber 1 
William Gerber initiated his case by claiming that the denial of the right to 
mail his semen was in contravention of his constitutional right to procreate. In 
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addition to this, William Gerber claimed that the refusal to allow him to procreate 
was in contravention of the California Penal Code 2600, which stated that 
prisoners can only be deprived of the rights which are linked to the pursuance of 
legitimate penological interests, thus he also claimed a statutory right to 
procreate.462 He also claimed that his rights under section 2601 were violated.463 
William Gerber’s request was refused in the District Court by Damrell Jr. J, who 
stated that William Gerber’s right to procreate did not survive incarceration.464 
Damrell Jr. J, started by setting out that following Pell, prisoners retain all of 
those rights not expressly removed by incarceration, or those rights that are 
inconsistent with the status of prisoner.465 Turner v Safley however highlighted 
that not all rights survive incarceration and those that do may be subject to 
specific restrictions.466 Damrell Jr. J argued that Goodwin stated that a right to 
artificial insemination is ‘fundamentally inconsistent with imprisonment itself.’467 
The case of Anderson v Vasquez was also quoted in support of the fact that 
prisoners do not retain a right to either preserve sperm or have conjugal visits.468 
Gerber also argued that the restriction on procreation was tantamount to his 
sterilisation due to his wife’s age and the length of his prison sentence. Finally, 
Gerber cited that the Warden’s refusal to accommodate his request violated equal 
                                                
462 California Penal Code s2600. 
463 ibid s2601. This section allows prisoners the right to marry, inherit, convey and dispose of 
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467 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1453 (1990). 
468 827 F Supp 617, 620 (CA, 1992) In this case, death row inmates claimed that they had a 
constitutional right to conjugal relationships and the right to preserve their sperm. The court held 
that the right to conjugal rights did not survive incarceration. The claim of the right for inmates to 
preserve their sperm was not ‘ripe for consideration’ because the prisoners had failed to exhaust 
the administrative process for appealing a decision first. 
 
 
128 
protection rights, as women prisoners were not required to have abortions on 
entry to prison. Gerber argued that as such women prisoners had a right to 
procreate and make decisions about procreation. The court argued that male and 
female prisoners are not similarly situated, as male prisoners cannot become 
pregnant, so the question of forced abortion or forced pregnancy does not apply to 
them. Both life-sentenced male and female prisoners are treated similarly in that 
both groups are prohibited from having conjugal visits.469 Damrell Jr. J was more 
troubled by the ‘chaos’ that recognition of a general right to procreate might cause 
in female prisons, where women would request insemination.470 Gerber argued 
that the prohibition on AI also violated 14th Constitutional Amendment, which 
guarantees equal protection under the law for all people. Those convicted after the 
passage of the ‘three strikes and out’ law were treated more harshly than those 
convicted before its passage. Those convicted of similar offences before the ‘three 
strikes and out’ law were given much more lenient sentences than those convicted 
afterwards, and so would have access to contact and private visits.471 This 
difference in treatment was justified by the entitlement of the legislature to pass 
sentencing policies, which were designed to have a strong deterrent effect on 
habitual criminals.472 
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Gerber II 
In contrast to Gerber I, the three judge panel appeal hearing found that 
Gerber did retain a right to procreate via AI. Bright J, giving the verdict of the 
court, stated that the right to procreate survives incarceration, albeit in a restricted 
form due to legitimate penological interests.473 The court firstly addressed the 
claim that the Warder had denied Gerber his due process rights under 42 United 
States Code s1983.474 The Court stated that for a claim to be successful, Gerber 
had to establish whether a fundamental right was involved and whether that 
fundamental right is not inconsistent with the status of prisoner. Then, it had to be 
assessed whether there were any legitimate penological interests, which justified 
restricting the prisoner’s exercise of their fundamental right.475 The majority of 
the Court agreed that the United States Supreme Court recognised a fundamental 
right to reproduce in both Carey and Stanley.476 The United States Supreme Court 
held in Skinner that the right to procreate is a basic civil right central to the 
perpetuation of a race, and that prisoners’ had the right to retain their procreative 
capacities for use after their release.477 The Court firstly established that prisoners 
retain a right to procreate whilst still in prison because of Skinner. If prisoners had 
the right to procreate after release from prison, and their ability to procreate 
cannot be destroyed, the court reasoned that some form of right to procreate must 
survive incarceration. The Court demonstrated that there was a line of 
constitutional cases that supported Gerber’s application that prisoners retain a 
range of rights after incarceration. Prisoners do not lose the protection of the 
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Constitution, and all prisoners retain all of their constitutional rights that are not 
inconsistent with their imprisonment.478 The court also listed several United 
States Supreme Court cases that dealt with prisoner’s constitutional rights, to 
demonstrate how some rights survive incarceration.479 
The case of Turner also lent some support to the ruling that the right to 
procreate survives incarceration in some form. The right to marriage survives 
imprisonment, albeit in an attenuated and restricted form.480 The acceptance that 
conjugal visits are legally prohibited for those serving life sentences does not 
mean that the right to procreate does not survive incarceration, as the alternative 
of AI still exists.481 Bright J also argues that conjugal visitation and childbirth in 
prison are not inherently inconsistent with incarceration, as some prisoners in 
California give birth and have access to family visits whilst in prison.482 
The issue of gender was also addressed by Bright J. He argued that the 
male prisoner seeking to provide sperm for AI is different to the female prisoner 
who wants to become pregnant, as they are not similarly situated. The Court of 
Appeal dismissed the Warden’s claim, that allowing male prisoners to provide 
semen samples for their partners would lead to women prisoners requesting to be 
artificially inseminated under equal protection claims.483 It was seen as 
unacceptable to restrict the rights of one group of prisoners because of the 
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burdens that might arise from another group making a claim.484 The state law 
claim made under the Californian Penal Code 2600-2601 was assessed to have an 
identical legal analysis, which was that procreation was a fundamental protected 
right.485  
The dissent provided by Silverman J demonstrates complete disagreement 
with the majority ruling, by stating that the majority’s ruling is ‘unprecedented as 
it is ill-conceived.’486 Silverman’s dissent reflects the District Court judgment, as 
well as the majority judgments of Goodwin and Percy stating that the right to 
procreate does not survive incarceration.487 The case of Skinner was not taken by 
Silverman to imply that prisoners had a constitutional right to procreate, but rather 
that they had a right to protection from being forcibly sterilised whilst in prison. 
Similarly, the case of Turner was taken to mean that prisoners had the right to 
marry whilst in prison, but did not have the right to procreate.488 The cases of 
Goodwin and Anderson are also used to demonstrate that previous case law did 
not support the notion that prisoners had procreative rights.489 Judge Silverman 
states that ‘common sense also suggests that procreation is fundamentally 
inconsistent with incarceration’ as prisoners can be legitimately deprived of their 
liberty and subjected to prison rules.490 He stated that prisoners do not have a right 
to procreate and so analysing whether there is a legitimate penological reason to 
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restrict this right is pointless.491 His final point was that denial of the right to 
procreate does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment as prohibited by the 
Eighth Amendment of the US constitution.492 
Gerber III 
The en-banc reversal of Gerber III arose due to the negative reaction of 
male prisoners being granted a right to procreate.493 The Court reversed the 
decision of the court in Gerber II, following a 12-judge panel. This decision 
demonstrated a division between those judges who thought that there was no right 
to procreate and the large minority of judges who stated that the right to procreate 
did survive incarceration. There was a close majority of seven judges who ruled 
that there was no right to procreate, with the five judges dissenting. The leading 
judgment was delivered by Silverman J, who had dissented in the three-judge 
panel in Gerber II. 494  The primary rationale given by Silverman J for refusing 
Gerber’s claim was that ‘the right to procreate is fundamentally inconsistent with 
incarceration.’495 The legal framework that Silverman J sets out addresses the two 
questions asked by the court in Gerber II, although the legal conclusion reached 
was different. Silverman J firstly addresses the issue of whether the right to 
procreate is fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. He states that if the 
claim fails on this first test, then analysing the second limb of the Turner test is 
unnecessary, which examines whether the restriction of the right claimed by the 
prisoner can be justified because of legitimate penological aims.496 The basis for 
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the ruling that procreation is fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration is that 
the primary purpose of prison is to remove the prisoner from society, isolating 
them from their family and partners.497 The physical isolation of the prisoner 
leads to the prevention of physical intimacy with their outside partners.498 
Marriage survives imprisonment as a legally recognised partnership, but the right 
to have children, according to Silverman J, does not.499 He stated that the 
‘attributes’ of marriage, such as cohabitation, intimate relationships and 
procreation do not survive imprisonment because they are inconsistent with 
incarceration.500 Silverman J argued that basis that procreation is inconsistent with 
incarceration, which is founded upon principles of ‘the legitimate policies and 
goals of the corrections system.’501 The main purpose of imprisonment he argued 
was the removal of offenders, ‘quarantining’ them away from society, in order to 
protect the public and act as deterrence against future crime.502 Silverman J also 
justified physical isolation of the prisoner in order to enable the rehabilitative 
effects of prison to work, although this justification cannot be used in Gerber’s 
case as he was incarcerated for his natural life. Arguably, rehabilitation is not 
considered relevant for prisoners who will never be released.503 Imprisonment 
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makes the curtailment of certain features of an offender’s life necessary as a 
practical issue, as institutional needs must be accommodated.504  
Silverman J takes it ‘for granted’ that prisoners are subject to physical 
restrictions upon their freedom, which includes restrictions upon the right to 
procreate.505 The majority judgment was very dismissive of the idea that there is a 
constitutional right to procreate. Procreation is characterised as a privilege to be 
granted as and when the prison authorities see fit.506 The avoidance of sexual 
intercourse was seen as irrelevant too, as he stated that procreation is inconsistent 
with incarceration, regardless of the method of conception. This seems to suggest 
any prisoners procreating is inherently wrong, and that justifications about 
avoiding sexual intercourse are peripheral to the real issue, which is whether any 
serving prisoner should be allowed to have children at all.507 This is based upon 
the notion that prohibiting procreation itself is based upon legitimate penological 
aims of ‘isolating prisoners, deterring crime, punishing offenders, and providing 
rehabilitation.’508 The argument advanced by William Gerber, (and supported by 
the majority in Gerber II) was that Skinner combined with the right to marriage 
(in Turner) creates a right for prisoners to procreate is dismissed by the majority. 
According to the majority, Skinner stands for the right of the prisoner to be free 
from forced surgical sterilisation, and nothing more.509 Procreative abilities are 
preserved for later use after release, not current use.510 It is irrelevant that a person 
is incarcerated for life and will never be able to exercise their procreative abilities. 
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The right to marry in Turner did not include the right to consummate the marriage 
or the right to beget children.511 The division between the majority and the 
minority judgments is clear from the statement: ‘A holding that the State of 
California must accommodate Gerber’s request to artificially inseminate his wife 
as a matter of constitutional right would be a radical and unprecedented 
interpretation of the Constitution.’512  
The majority decision of the court felt no need to evaluate whether the 
regulation prohibiting AI was linked to a legitimate penological interest.513 The 
statutory claim under the California Penal Code s2600 and s2601 was ruled to 
mirror the test under Turner v Safley and also failed.514 Equal protection claims 
also failed, because as stated earlier, the majority saw granting of conjugal visits 
to some prisoners as a privilege, not a right. Gerber was not seen to be ‘similarly 
situated’ to those prisoners who were allowed contact visits because he had been 
sentenced to life imprisonment with no possibility for release.515 On the 
majority’s reasoning, Gerber’s case also fails on his Eighth Amendment claim 
against cruel and unusual punishment. The legal definition of ‘cruel and unusual 
punishment’ is defined in Hudson v McMillan as the deprivation of ‘the minimal 
civilized measure of life’s necessities.’516 The divisiveness of the case is 
demonstrated by the two dissenting judgments delivered by Judges Tashima and 
Kozinski.517 The divisive nature of the cases and the difficulty in deciding the 
correct legal position is shown by the way that both the leading and dissenting 
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opinions of the court used the same cases and came to very different conclusions. 
The first dissenting opinion was delivered by Tashima J, who was joined by 
Judges Kozinski, Hawkins, Paez and Berzon.  
The starting point taken by Tashima J was the same as the majority. He 
concluded that there is a fundamental right to procreate protected by the 
American Constitution. The nature of this right is one of a right to privacy over 
the various decisions involved in human reproduction, the right to make decisions 
over contraception, procreation, marriage and family relationships.518 Skinner 
again reinforced the central importance given the ability to procreate. Procreation 
is ‘one of the basic civil rights of man’ and ‘fundamental to the very existence and 
survival of the race.’519 The question asked by the dissenting judgment was the 
same as that asked by the majority; that is whether the right to procreate is 
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration, and if it is not, whether there are 
any legitimate penological justifications for restricting this right.520 Tashima J was 
unconvinced by the repeated assertions of the majority that procreation is 
inconsistent with incarceration. He stated that the majority has relied upon the 
repetition of ‘glittering generalities’ that ‘the right to procreate is inconsistent 
with incarceration.’521 There was no definitive reason given by the majority as to 
why the right to procreate is fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. 
Tashima J accepts that the right to intimate association and the right to privacy 
were inconsistent with incarceration, but the use of AI was not subject to these 
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concerns.522 The whole procedure could be monitored and supervised by 
appropriately trained medical staff, and procreation via AI can circumvent 
security concerns.523 The dissent stated that the cases used by the majority ruling 
to support their views on the ‘nature and goals of the penal system’ do not 
actually support this finding.524 Recognising that the right to marriage survives in 
Turner (despite the fact that the marriage itself cannot be consummated until the 
prisoner is released) supported the premise that the right to procreate survived 
incarceration. Tashima J stated that to use this reason to justify the position that 
the right to procreate is inconsistent with incarceration was to ‘twist logic.’525  
The practical restrictions in place against intimate contact have their basis within 
legitimate security concerns, but this does not lead to the ‘conclusion that 
procreation itself is fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration.’526 Tashima J 
also stated that Hudson cannot be used as justification for restricting the right to 
procreate either, as this case merely refers to prisoners claiming a Fourth 
Amendment right to not be subjected to unreasonable searches. In this case, the 
need to maintain security is of far greater importance than a prisoner’s claim to 
privacy.527 In contrast to this, Gerber was not requesting privacy to have sexual 
intercourse with his wife, but to be medically supervised whilst he produced a 
sperm sample, away from his wife.528 The dissent judge makes the point that the 
majority has no facts to demonstrate why procreation via AI should be treated in 
the same way as the Fourth Amendment right in Hudson.529 Tashima J also 
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distinguishes Pell, which considered whether the prison could legitimately restrict 
prisoners from meeting face to face with journalists for interviews. In Pell, the 
restriction was justified by security concerns.530 The alternative avenues of 
communication open to prisoners meant that the restriction on visits was seen as 
constitutional.531 There is no alternative method left for a male prisoner to 
procreate if both sexual intercourse and medically assisted fertility treatment are 
denied to him.532 The procedure itself that involves producing a sperm sample and 
mailing it in a container was argued to not cause any inherent problems, as 
prisoners were using the same identical procedure to mail samples to attorneys to 
prove their innocence in court cases. Tashima J states that there is no justification 
for treating the two procedures differently when the physical processes required 
are exactly the same.533 The majority judgment relied upon reference to the 
‘nature and goals of the prison system’ as to why procreation was considered 
inconsistent with legitimate penological aims.534 However, there was no attempt 
to demonstrate why preventing prisoners having children via AI was inconsistent 
with maintaining public confidence in the prison system, or how the prohibition 
ensured that prisoners were both punished and rehabilitated, whilst deterring 
potential offenders.535 Tashima J makes the point that if prohibiting prisoners 
from procreating is part of their punishment, then this is a ruling that should be 
made by the legislature not the judiciary, and that there was no statutory basis to 
this claim.536 The Warden’s justification for prohibition of procreation was based 
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upon the California Penal Code s3350(a), which only provides for medical 
treatment that is medically necessary.537 However, this statute did not justify the 
prohibition upon procreation, as Gerber was not seeking medical treatment.538 
Furthermore, permitting the privilege of conjugal visits for some prisoners allows 
for the possibility of procreation for thousands of prisoners, which means that 
procreation cannot be fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration.539 He argued 
that Gerber was not seeking conjugal visits, but permission to mail a sample of 
sperm to medical staff. Tashima J dismissed the question of conjugal visits as 
irrelevant, because Gerber was not seeking permission for a private visit with his 
wife.540 The denial of conjugal visits also relied upon legitimate penological 
objectives for their restriction, not the fact that conjugal visits themselves were 
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration.541 As Tashima J highlights, there 
were no concrete reasons given by the majority judgment to justify why 
procreation is fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. It was based upon 
the ‘impression’ that prisoners should not have the right to procreate via AI.542  
Finally, the majority used a very narrow reading of Skinner, confining its 
application merely to the question of the forced surgical sterilisation of habitual 
criminals. Goodwin was used as support to the notion that refusing access to AI 
facilities was not the same as permanently sterilising an offender.543 The court in 
Goodwin and the majority in Gerber III argued that depriving an individual of 
procreative opportunities in prison was merely delaying procreation, not 
                                                
537 California Penal Code s3350(a). 
538 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 626 (2002). 
539 ibid. 
540 ibid 627. 
541 ibid. 
542 ibid. 
543 ibid 628; Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452 1454 (1998), Skinner v Oklahoma 316 US 531 
(1942). 
 
 
140 
permanently preventing it. In Goodwin, this could be argued to be the case as he 
was sentenced to 14 years in prison, but Gerber was sentenced to life 
imprisonment without parole. Any deprivation of Gerber’s ability to procreate 
would have the same overall effect as surgical sterilisation as the deprivation 
would be permanent.544 Tashima J also argued that by taking such a narrow view 
of Skinner, the majority missed the wider point, which was the ‘fundamental 
importance of the right to procreate.’545  
Whilst Skinner was interpreted narrowly, Turner was interpreted very 
broadly according to Tashima J. The physical aspects of marriage were judged by 
Turner to not survive incarceration, which led to the majority judging that 
procreation is inconsistent with imprisonment. However, on a basic level, Gerber 
is merely requesting permission to allow his lawyers to collect, or for the prison to 
post, a sample of semen. There is no request for the prisoner to be allowed to 
engage in the physical aspects of marriage.546 Tashima J states that general 
restrictions upon physical intimacy and marriage do not support the premise that 
there should be a broad prohibition upon the fundamental right to procreate.547 
The second, and final dissenting judgment was delivered by Kozinski J, 
who was joined by Paez and Berzon JJ. This judgment concentrated upon the 
majority proposition that procreation is fundamentally inconsistent with 
incarceration.548 The practical steps of Gerber’s request were broken down into 
their constituent parts, in order to raise the question about what it is in particular 
that made procreation via AI fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration. The 
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stages that Kozinski J identified are: ejaculation into a plastic cup, the prison 
mailing the container to the laboratory, or Gerber handing the container to his 
lawyer, the delivery to a laboratory and finally the insemination of Evelyn 
Gerber.549 As Kozinski J states, ‘I gather that the first step of this process is not 
fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration and prison guards don’t patrol cell 
blocks at night looking for Onan’s transgression.’550 The prison would also have 
no legitimate penological interest in the choice of receptacle for the semen, so 
long as the sample is not used in a ‘gassing’ incident.551 Posting parcels to 
laboratories or handing them to lawyers was also not inconsistent with 
incarceration. When a sample arrives to a destination outside the prison the 
authorities have a greatly reduced legitimate interest in what happens to that 
sample: ‘Whether it is used to inseminate Mrs Gerber, or create a clone Gerber, or 
as a paperweight has no conceivable effect on the safe and efficient operation of 
the California prison system.’552  
Kozinski J then examined if what the majority meant was a more general 
ideal of prisoners being prohibited from freedom to choose where to live for 
example. He defined this as a restriction of the right to ‘locomotion.’553 Whilst 
private visits could be considered under this term ‘locomotion’, procreation via 
AI could not.554 The legislature did not create a statutory punishment that 
included removal of the right to procreate. Dismissing the right to procreate based 
purely upon this assumption, is in effect is deciding upon an extra punishment 
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that was not expressly intended by the legislature.555 To claim that the right to 
procreate is implicitly removed just because an individual is in prison is a slippery 
slope, which could lead to prisoners’ other essential rights being abridged 
unfairly.556 The state cannot also have intended to cut off the prisoner’s right to 
procreate as some prisoners still retain the privilege of conjugal visits, which 
leaves the possibility of procreation.557 If the state had intended all prisoners to be 
deprived of the right to procreate, then prisons would be forbidden from allowing 
some prisoners the privilege of private visits.558 Kozinski J felt that the 
punishment aspect of a prisoner’s sentence should be set by the legislature alone 
and that by denying William Gerber the right to procreate, the prison authorities 
were enhancing his punishment beyond what was legally permitted by the state.559 
Evelyn Gerber, who was an innocent party, was also considered to be unfairly 
punished by this stance, and has been ‘consigned to a childless marriage.’560 
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Summary 
 Even though Percy, Goodwin and Gerber have almost identical 
circumstances, each judgement was justified in a different way. There were 
varying reasons given between the first instance decision and the Court of Appeal 
decision. Each case raised three questions. The judges had to decide whether 
prisoners retain a right to procreate. They then had to decide whether that right 
survived incarceration, or whether it was compatible with incarceration. If the 
right did survive incarceration, the next question was whether there was a 
legitimate penological concern that justified limiting the right. Concentrating on 
the first question, the starting point was the recognised protection that the 
Constitution normally gives to individuals over the private sphere of 
procreation.561 Each case also reiterated that imprisonment did not automatically 
mean that prisoners forfeited their constitutional rights, citing Woolf v 
McDonnell.562 Ultimately though, only Gerber II stated that a prisoner should be 
allowed to produce a semen sample for AI purposes and this was overturned in 
the en-banc rehearing.563   The District Court in Goodwin and Gerber I both stated 
that prisoners do not have a right to procreate that survives incarceration.564 Percy 
did not directly state that prisoners retain a right to procreate that survived 
incarceration, but stated that even if they did, the restriction was justified by 
legitimate penological objectives of equal treatment of all prisoners.565 Magill J in 
Goodwin similarly stated that it was unnecessary to decide whether prisoners have 
                                                
561 Skinner v Oklahoma, 316 US 535, 541(1942); Griswold v Connecticut, 381 US 479 (1965); 
Roe v Wade, 410 US 113 (1973); Carey v Population Servs Int'l 431 US 678, 685 (1977). 
562 Wolff v McDonnell 418 US 539 (1974). 
563 Gerber v Hickman 264 F3d 882 890 (2001); Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 619 (2002).  
564 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1453 (1988); Gerber v Hickman 103 F Supp 2d 1214, 
1218 (2000).  
565 Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 543, 549 (1995).  
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a right to procreate that survives imprisonment because the restriction on 
procreation was justified by the legitimate penological objective of treating all 
prisoners equally.566 Gerber II recognised that prisoners retained a right to 
procreate in some form.567 The Court limited this to recognition of the right of 
male prisoners to provide a semen sample for AI and did not extend it as a general 
right to procreate for all prisoners.568 In doing this, the majority circumvented the 
argument that this could lead to women prisoners claiming a right to become 
pregnant.569 The Court in Gerber II did state that an analogous situation for 
women may be if a prisoner was to donate her eggs to a lesbian partner or a 
surrogate mother, but this is not a similar situation either, apart from the donation 
of gametes. Egg donation requires clinic visits, medication and invasive methods 
of retrieval, all of which could be claimed to place too much of an onerous burden 
on the prison.570  
All of the dissenting judgments in Gerber III and Goodwin stated that 
prisoners retained a right to procreate when incarcerated.571 McMillian J in 
Goodwin justified his dissent by demonstrating that the Federal Bureau of Prisons 
failed to apply the Turner test correctly.572 The Federal Bureau of Prisons stated 
that the restriction was in place to further the objective of treating all prisoners 
equally, when it was in reality about reducing the potential costs and burdens of 
female prisoners claiming a right to procreate.573 These burdens are hypothetical 
in this case argues McMillian and so should not have been considered by the 
                                                
566 Goodwin v Turner, 980 F2d 1395, 1398 (1990).  
567 Gerber v Hickman 264 F3d 882, 889 (2001). 
568 ibid. 
569 ibid 891.  
570 ibid. 
571 Goodwin v Turner, 980 F2d 1395, 1403 (1990). 
572 ibid 1405 (1990).  
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Court.574 In Gerber III, the two dissenting judgments by Tashima and Kozinski JJ 
concentrated on the purpose of imprisonment, and whether prohibiting 
procreation is an explicit part of the punishment of imprisonment. They each 
concluded that prohibiting procreation was not a punishment required or justified 
by statute.575  
The rulings of Percy, Goodwin and Gerber demonstrate that the similar 
difficulties faced by Mellor and Dickson when claiming a right to procreate, even 
through AI. The next chapter will consider all of these cases together to 
demonstrate what the justifications are for removing a right to procreate and 
whether these are sufficient to remove a prisoner and their partner’s right to 
procreative self-determination.
                                                
574 ibid 1406. 
575 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 630, 632 (2002). 
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Chapter Six: Joint Analysis of Cases  
Introduction 
Each of the cases and jurisdictions studied show a different approach to 
the question of whether prisoners should be given access to AI and the wider 
question of whether prisoners have the right to procreate. The judges in Dickson 
and Mellor took a strong stance against the possibility of prisoners becoming 
parents unless there were exceptional circumstances, justifying the provision of 
AI.576 This strong stance was justified by protecting the welfare of the unborn 
child whom it was assumed would not develop as well in a family where one of 
the parents was in prison. Enquiries were made about the suitability of the 
potential parents, the status of their relationship and their ability to provide for 
their putative child. In contrast, the judges in Goodwin, Percy and Gerber 
confined their judgments to the question of whether the prisoner had the right to 
procreate, and whether that right was consistent with their status as prisoners.577  
There was no explicit judgment of the suitability of whether the prisoners 
and their partners would make good parents, apart from the reference in Percy to 
the fact that Robert Percy’s wife (her name was not given) worked as a book 
keeper and was not reliant upon public welfare.578 Apart from the court ruling in 
Gerber II, the American cases in both Federal and State courts favoured a blanket 
                                                
576 R v Secretary of State Ex parte Mellor [2000] EWHC Admin 385 [2000] HRLR 846; R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472; Dickson and 
Dickson v Premiere Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1477.  
577 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452 (1988); Goodwin v Turner 908 F2d 1395 (1990); Percy v 
State of New Jersey, 278 NJ Super 543 (1995); Gerber v Hickman 103 F Supp 1214 (2000); 
Gerber v Hickman 264 F3d 882 (2001); Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617 (2002).   
578 Percy v State of New Jersey, 278 NJ Super 543, 545 (1995). 
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prohibition for all prisoners, stating that procreation was inconsistent with 
imprisonment. 
The starting point taken by the judges in all of these cases was that 
prisoners retain those civil rights that are not removed by or incompatible with 
imprisonment. Prisoners are not legally in a state of civil death (apart from those 
under a life sentence in those states that retain civil death as a punishment).579 The 
right to make decisions about children, marriage, contraception and abortion are 
protected by the US Constitution.580 In England and Wales, the right to a private 
and family life is protected by the Human Rights Act 1998.581 The right to 
procreate in both the USA and in England and Wales for those in free society is a 
right to make private decisions about procreation free from unnecessary state 
interference.582 Applying the same statement to prisoners however, causes 
controversy. Many commentators state that prisoners do not have the right to 
procreate.583 This was the view taken by the domestic courts in England and 
                                                
579 In England and Wales, The Forfeiture Act 1870 allowed for prisoners convicted of treason and 
felony to retain their property, as it has previously been forfeit to the Crown upon conviction. It 
also expressly removed their right to vote or hold public office whilst in prison. In the USA, the 
status of civil death was expressed in Ruffin v Commonwealth 62 Va 790, 796 (1871) in which the 
court held that the prisoner ‘has, as a consequence of his crime not only forfeited his liberty, but 
all his personal rights, except those in which the law in its humanity accords to him. He is for the 
time being the slave of the State.’ The US states that retain civil death as a punishment are New 
York and Rhode Island. See New York Civil Rights - Article 7 - § 79-A Consequence of Sentence 
to Imprisonment for Life; State of Rhode Island General Laws, Title 13 Criminals- Correctional 
Institutions Chapter 13-6 Loss of Rights by Prisoners, 13-6-1 Life Prisoners Deemed Civilly 
Dead. 
580  Several US Supreme Court cases have established the importance of the right to procreate. See 
footnote 398.  
581 Schedule 1 Art 8(1)(2). 
582 The state does not have a positive obligation to provide every person who wants to become a 
parent with the means to become one, but rather procreation is a negative right that should not be 
interfered with. See David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood' (2 edn, Routledge, 2004, 
2010 reprint) 137.    
583 A recent example of is the Justice Secretary Chris Grayling stating that he wants to completely 
ban prisoners in the UK from procreating via AI or IVF, even though this right was upheld by the 
Grand Chamber in Dickson. See Jack Doyle ‘I’ll ban IVF for prisoners, says Grayling: Justice 
Secretary vows to take on Strasbourg Judges’ Daily Mail (London, 28 February 2013); John-Paul 
Ford Rojas ‘Grayling seeks to ban inmates from access to IVF treatment’ The Daily Telegraph 
(London, 28 February 2013) 15.  
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Wales and the USA, but was not supported by the Grand Chamber in Dickson v 
UK.584 Prisoners do not retain the same rights to privacy, but should still be able 
to negotiate their procreative decisions under the ‘public gaze’ of prison officials. 
The starting point for evaluating prisoner’s rights in England and Wales 
and the USA is slightly different. Raymond v Honey stated that: ‘a convicted 
prisoner, in spite of his imprisonment, retains all civil rights which are not taken 
away expressly or by necessary implication’585 For a right to be refused to a 
prisoner, it has to be shown that the right in question is removed by imprisonment. 
The prisoner in the USA is subject to a similar restriction upon their rights: 
‘Lawful imprisonment necessarily makes unavailable many rights and privileges 
of the ordinary citizen’.586 The prisoner however does not necessarily lose all of 
their rights: ‘There is no iron curtain drawn between the Constitution and the 
prisons of this country.’587 Since Turner v Safley however, the robust protection 
of prisoner’s rights has been eroded.588 Prisoners in both the USA, and England 
and Wales have certain rights automatically removed that are inconsistent with 
prison, such as the right to privacy or freedom of movement. However, the 
prisoner in the USA is subject to a further restriction. American prisoners’ rights 
can be restricted if those rights are deemed to be inconsistent with ‘legitimate 
penological aims.’589 Therefore, if their rights conflict with the aims of the prison 
system they can be legitimately curtailed.  Deciding what is a legitimate 
                                                
584 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 para 
39 (Phillips LJ); Dickson and Dickson v Premiere Prison Service Ltd., Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 23 (Auld LJ); Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 
46 EHRR 41 para 70. 
585 [1983] 1 AC 1, 10 (Wilberforce LJ). The appellant was the Governor of Albany Prison and was 
accused by a prisoner of interfering with his correspondence with his solicitors. Interference with 
legal correspondence can constitute contempt of court. 
586 Woolf v McDonnell 418 US 539, 555 (1974). 
587 ibid 555-6. 
588 Pell v Procunier 417 US 817, 822 (1974).  
589 ibid.                                   
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penological aim and what rights are inconsistent with imprisonment adds another 
layer of discretion allowed to prison officials.590 Prison officials can attenuate or 
completely restrict those rights that conflict with legitimate penological aims, 
which are defined largely by the prison authorities.591 The four-part test 
enunciated in Turner does give the prisoner some protection against unfettered 
discretion, as the restriction must have a ‘valid, rational connection’ between it 
and the legitimate penological objective. The penological objective itself must be 
‘legitimate and neutral.’592 Turner then goes on to state that a restriction is 
reasonable if there are alternative means available to the prisoner to exercise their 
right.593 Another important consideration that is taken into account is the effect of 
accommodating the right in question on the prison staff and prisoners, and the 
effect upon prison resources.594      
When considering the specific question of how the courts deal with 
requests for AI, the judgments can be broken up and considered under the 
following areas: the rights of the prisoner to procreate, the rights of the prisoner’s 
partner and their family, legitimate penological considerations, welfare of the 
child considerations, gender considerations, and judgments that cast prisoners and 
their families as outside of society. This will allow for a comparative analysis 
between the legal judgments of England and Wales, the USA and the ECtHR. 
                                                
590 Turner v Safley 482 US 78 (1987). 
591 The legitimate aims of imprisonment are protecting the public, deterring crime, rehabilitation 
and the internal security of the prison itself. See Pell v Procunier 417 US 817 822-3 (1974); 
Turner v Safley 482 US 78, 79 (1987). 
592 Turner v Safley 482 US 78, 89-90 (1987).  
593 ibid 90. 
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The Right of the Prisoner to Procreate 
Whilst the domestic cases from both the USA and England and Wales 
accepted that prisoners retain some civil and human rights, the majority of judges 
failed to accept that prisoners retained a right to procreate. Apart from the appeal 
ruling in Gerber II, the majority of judges were of the opinion that prisoners do 
not have a right to procreate, and emphasised point in the strongest way. Phillips 
LJ stated this succinctly in Mellor, stating that ‘A lawfully convicted prisoner is 
responsible for his own situation and cannot complain that on that account that his 
right to found a family has been infringed.’595 In both Dickson and Mellor, the 
UK Government’s position was that prisoners could request the privilege of being 
accorded AI facilities, but these would only be granted in exceptional 
circumstances.596 The rights to procreate and a family life were the preserve of 
free citizens alone and these rights were lawfully affected by incarceration.597 
State interference with the prisoner’s Article 8 right to a private and family life 
was, according to the judges, justified under the margin of appreciation outlined 
in Article 8(2).598 The judges in Mellor and Dickson made the point that justice 
occasionally requires that prisoners should be allowed access to AI, but that this 
should be the exception. The majority of the US judgments took a firm stance 
against all prisoners procreating, stating that procreation was inconsistent with 
                                                
595 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex-parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 1472, 
[2001] HRLR 38 para 26.  
596 ibid; Dickson and Dickson v Premiere Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 6 (Auld LJ).  
597 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex-parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472, 
[2001] HRLR 38 para 26 (Phillips LJ) Dickson and Dickson v Premiere Prison Service Ltd and 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 20 (Auld LJ). 
598ibid. Human Rights Act 1998 Art 8(2)   
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incarceration itself.599 The reason why incarceration itself is inconsistent with 
incarceration was not explored in any detail in any of the US judgments opposing 
procreation. The minority decision in Gerber III stated ‘There is absolutely 
nothing in the record indicating that procreation … is fundamentally inconsistent 
with incarceration.’600 Collinson J, in the first instance decision in Goodwin 
simply stated that the right to procreate did not survive incarceration.601 He 
distinguished Skinner, stating that case stood for the right to not be permanently 
denied the right to procreate after release from prison, not that they should be 
allowed to procreate whilst serving their sentence.602 On appeal in Goodwin, the 
majority stated that the court did not have to decide whether the right to procreate 
survives incarceration, as restricting AI was related to pursuing a legitimate 
penological objective.603 This possibility was also reiterated in Gerber I where 
Judge Damrell Jr stated that the prospect of women prisoners having access to AI 
would cause ‘institutional and societal chaos.’604 Silverman J, in his dissenting 
judgment in Gerber II and majority judgment in Gerber III avoided engaging with 
the theoretical issue of whether the right to procreate does survive incarceration 
by simply stating that the right to procreate is inconsistent with incarceration.605 
In a similar vein to Mellor and Dickson, this rationale was stated as a ‘common 
sense’ approach; as prison isolates the prisoner from their family, their right to 
procreate must be automatically inconsistent with their status as a prisoner. The 
                                                
599 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1453 (1988); Gerber v Hickman 103 F Supp 2d 1214, 
1217 (2000). 
600 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 624 (2002) (Tashima and Kozinski JJ). 
601 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1454 (1988). 
602 ibid.  
603 The restriction was justified by preventing the possibility of women prisoners demanding the 
right to be impregnated whilst serving their sentence, which would have far greater costs than 
would male prisoners providing AI samples to impregnate their partners outside of prison. 
Goodwin v Turner 908 F2d 1395, 1398 (1990).  
604 Gerber v Hickman 103 F Supp 2d 1214, 1218 (2000). 
605 Gerber v Hickman 264 F3d, 882, 894 (2001); Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 620 (2002).  
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argument that because prisoners retain the right to marry that they also retain the 
right to procreate is also dismissed in both Goodwin and Gerber. Silverman J 
stated in Gerber III, the concept of marriage as a legally recognised relationship 
survives, but the attributes that make up marriage, such as physical intimacy and 
family life do not.606 In Percy, the court refused to concede that prisoners retain a 
right to procreate highlighting that the case of Turner stated that whilst many of 
the rights arising from marriage survived imprisonment, procreation did not.607 
The divisive nature of the debate is demonstrated by the narrow margins 
that exist between the majority and minority judgments in Goodwin and Gerber 
and the ECtHR case of Dickson. Unlike the domestic cases of England and Wales, 
there were minority judgments in the appeal cases of Goodwin and Gerber in 
support of the assertion that the right to procreate did survive incarceration.608 The 
lack of minority judgments in the domestic cases of Mellor and Dickson could be 
because there was no absolute ban on AI. 609  It may have been the case, that in 
their mind, the judges in these cases were only ruling on those specific cases, and 
were not asked to decide whether all prisoners should be able to procreate. If there 
had been an absolute ban on all prisoners accessing AI, then judges may have 
raised objections on these grounds.610 When deciding whether prisoners did retain 
                                                
606 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 621 (2002). 
607 Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 543 (1995) 547 
608 Goodwin v Turner 908 F2d 1395, 1402 (1990) (McMillian J) ‘Our society places special 
emphasis on procreation within the marriage relationship, and the two rights are viewed in 
tandem. Because of its fundamental nature and importance to the marriage relationship, the right 
to procreation, like the right to marry must survive incarceration.’  
609 In Gerber II there was a split of 2:1 in favour of Gerber’s assertion that procreation as a right 
survived incarceration. The en-banc reversal in Gerber III showed a 6:5 split for the majority 
decision.  The Chamber held in Dickson v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 21that there had 
been no breach of Article 8 by four votes to three, which was reversed in the Grand Chamber in 
Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 by 12 votes to five.  
610R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472, [2001] 
HRLR 38 paras 39, 45 (Phillips LJ); Dickson and Dickson v Premiere Prison Service Ltd., 
Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 11 (Auld LJ) The 
‘exceptionality clause’ was regarded as important by both Lords Mance and Auld to recognise that 
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the right to procreate whilst incarcerated, the minority judges from the US cases 
started from the same legal position as the majority position. Prisoners do not 
automatically lose all of their rights when incarcerated. The Turner test applies: to 
decide if a prisoner retains a right, it first has to be judged consistent with 
incarceration and any restriction has to be justified by a legitimate penological 
objective.611 The minority judgments agreed with the majority arguments, in that 
the right to procreate is a fundamental right protected by the US Constitution.612 
After this point they diverged by stating that the right to procreate was not 
inconsistent with incarceration.613 Arguably the dissenting judgments in Gerber 
III highlight the weaknesses in the majority argument. The judgment in Gerber I 
and the majority judgment in Gerber III provided no real explanation of how 
procreation itself is inconsistent with procreation. Some prisoners are allowed 
access to conjugal visits as a privilege and so procreation itself cannot be 
inconsistent with imprisonment.614 The majority judgment relied upon a very 
narrow reading of Skinner, justifying the total prohibition with a very wide 
reading of Turner.615 The cases of Turner, Hudson and Pell that were cited by the 
majority were based upon specific concerns about security and privacy, not a 
                                                                                                                                
the restriction of a prisoner’s human rights was an exercise in proportionality, and that in 
exceptional circumstances the restriction on a prisoner’s ability to procreate would be a 
disproportionate to the aims of restricting that right. 
611 Turner v Safley 482 US 78, 89-90 (1987). 
612 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 627 (2002) (Tashima J); Hernandez v Coughlin 18 F3d 133 
(1994); Toussaint v McCarthy 801 F2d 1080, 1113-1114 (1986). 
613 Goodwin v Turner 908 F2d 1395, 1402 (1990); Gerber v Hickman 264 F3d, 882, 884 (2001); 
Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 629 (2002).  
614 Judges Tashima and Kozinski argue that the majority’s reasoning is vague, and the existence of 
some prisoners having access to conjugal visits means that procreation itself cannot be 
inconsistent with incarceration if some prisoners are already becoming parents behind bars. 
Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 627 (2002). 
615 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 629 (2002).  Kozinski J argues that the court in Turner was 
arguing that physical intimacy was inconsistent with incarceration, not AI itself, which does not 
involve private visits or physical intimacy.  
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more general concern about being ‘inconsistent with incarceration.’616 The cases 
used by the majority to support their assertion that procreation itself was 
prohibited in prison, only prohibited conjugal visits. The cases of Hernandez v 
Coughlin and Toussaint v McCarthy did not extend this prohibition to AI 
facilities.617 The majority in Gerber III cited the ‘nature and goals of the prison 
system’ without stating how allowing a prisoner to provide a sample for AI would 
be inconsistent with the prison regime.618 Kozinski J, in his dissenting judgment 
reduced Gerber’s request for AI into steps to demonstrate how the request itself is 
not fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration.619 The first of the two required 
steps, ejaculation into a plastic cup is itself not inconsistent with incarceration.620 
The other steps identified by Kozinski J, the mailing of the package, or giving it 
to his lawyer are also things that commonly happen within the prison 
environment.621 Arguably, the prison authorities have little legitimate interest in 
what happens to the sperm sample once it is outside of the prison environment, 
although the domestic courts in Mellor and Dickson argued that they have a 
primary interest in the creation of new life, because of child welfare concerns.622  
The dissenting judgments in Goodwin and Gerber III had a stronger legal 
foundation than the majority judgments, which relied upon accepted ‘common 
sense’ that prisoners lost the right to procreate when incarcerated, even though 
                                                
616 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 626 (2002). 
617 Hernandez v Coughlin 18 F3d 133 (1994); Toussaint v McCarthy 801 F2d 1080, 1113-1114 
(1986). 
618 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 622 (2002). 
619 ibid 629, Kozinski J. 
620 ibid 629. The posting of samples to a laboratory is standard procedure for suspects attempting 
to prove their innocence in a crime, especially in such cases as rape and violent attacks. 
621 ibid 
622 ibid, Gerber v Hickman 264 F3d, 882, 891 (2001); R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 para 67 (Phillips LJ); Dickson and Dickson v 
Premiere Prison Service Ltd., Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 
1477 para 20 (Auld LJ) 
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this is not explicitly required for security concerns or mandated by statute. That 
prisoners are not explicitly denied the right to procreate when incarcerated, that 
there are no statutory provisions denying prisoners the right to procreate supports 
the stance that prisoners retain a legal right to procreate.623 Those arguing against 
prisoner procreation stated that Skinner merely stood for the right of the prisoner 
to not to be subjected to compulsory sterilisation. In other words, their ability to 
have children was not being permanently removed, but merely delayed by 
incarceration.624 The minority judgments highlight how this argument could be 
used a slippery slope to deprive prisoners of many other rights that should be 
accorded to them. The consequences of using this argument would have serious 
consequences for many other civil rights that prisoners currently enjoy, such as 
the right to free expression of their religion.625 The minority argued that testing 
whether the restriction merely delays a constitutional right is irrelevant for life-
sentenced prisoners.626 Prisoners that are not sentenced to life at least have the 
prospect of being released from prison eventually, and so may retain some chance 
of having children after release.627 This raises the question of whether prisoners 
sentenced to whole-life tariffs should be treated differently to prisoners who may 
eventually be released. In the case of the prisoner who may be released, there may 
be some substance to the argument denying them the ability to procreate whilst in 
                                                
623Gerber v Hickman 264 F3d, 882, 891 (2001); Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 626 (2002) 
(p626, Tashima J), (p630, Kozinski J).  
624 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1454 (1988); Gerber v Hickman 103 F Supp 2d 1214, 
1217 (CA, 2000); Gerber v Hickman 291 F Supp 3d 617, 622 (2002). 
625 Gerber v Hickman 291 F Supp 3d 617, 630-631 (2002) (Kozinski J). This argument was 
rejected in many Supreme Court judgments such as O’Lone v Shabazz 482 US 342 (1983) (free 
exercise of religion); Bounds v Smith 430 US 817 (1974) (right to meaningful access to the 
courts); Wolff v McDonnell 418 US 539, 555 (1974) (due process rights in disciplinary 
proceedings); Pell v Procunier 417 US 817 (1974).(First Amendment rights to free speech); Lee v 
Washington 390 US 333 (1968) (Equal protection against racial discrimination).  
626 Goodwin v Turner 908 F2d 1395 (1990).  
627 However, it is acknowledged that in the case of Dickson, Lorraine Dickson was extremely 
unlikely to be able to conceive after Kirk’s release, as she would have been 51. 
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prison is not constructive sterilisation, but merely suspending their rights until 
they are released. The prisoner serving a whole-life or for that matter, a prisoner 
sentenced to death, is a person who will die in prison. One of the main differences 
between Mellor, Dickson, Percy and Goodwin and Gerber was that William 
Gerber was destined to die in prison. If William Gerber were denied access to AI 
facilities, he would never become a father. He has been ‘constructively 
sterilised.’628 In specific cases such as when prisoners have been convicted of the 
murder or abuse of children there would be valid justification for prohibiting 
prisoners from procreating whilst in prison and it may be necessary to introduce 
legislation in particular jurisdictions to achieve this. It may also be argued that 
some crimes committed by some offenders are especially heinous and that 
preventing these prisoners from procreating would also be justified.   
  Another important question raised by some of the cases is whether the 
fertility and age status of the partner’s prisoner should be a factor in the decision 
making process. Like Lorraine Dickson and Evelyn Gerber, who were both 
approaching the menopause, female prisoners are also vulnerable to the effects of 
age upon their fertility. They stand a higher chance of losing their fertility than a 
male prisoner whilst serving a relatively short prison sentence. In order to 
promote equal protection of male and female fertility, this would justify allowing 
women to access AI or IVF during short sentences if they are nearing their 
menopause, if access to procreation assistance continues to be controlled. In 
theory, the stance of the government in Dickson and Mellor arguably took into 
account all relevant factors, which should include whether the prisoner or their 
                                                
628 John Williams, ‘The Queen on the Application of Mellor v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department’ Prisoners and artificial insemination- have the courts got it right?’ (2002) 14 Child & 
Fam LQ 217.   
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partner is nearing the end of their reproductive life. Age and naturally declining 
fertility alone may not be sufficient to allow a prisoner to procreate, and in 
Dickson was not considered to be an exceptional reason that should have 
compelled the Home Secretary to allow fertility treatment. The complete denial of 
AI for all prisoners in all US cases apart from than Gerber II meant that the judges 
could completely avoid engaging with questions about the age or fertility of the 
prisoner or their partner.  
The Rights of the Prisoner’s Partner 
The rights of prisoner’s families are often forgotten, intentionally or 
otherwise, or dismissed as ‘collateral damage’.629 The domestic cases of Dickson 
and Mellor demonstrated this reasoning. The judges dismissed the procreative 
restrictions affecting Tracey Mellor and Lorraine Dickson as an inevitable 
consequence of imprisonment.630 Similarly on appeal, Magill J dismissed Mrs 
Goodwin’s rights as irrelevant because the prohibition was related to a legitimate 
penological aim and so could be dismissed.631 The judgment in Percy did not 
even mention Robert Percy’s wife, other than to set out the facts of the case.632  
Rather than just dismissing the rights of Tracey Mellor and Lorraine 
Dickson, the domestic courts failed to consider them at all. Even though Lorraine 
Dickson was named as the second applicant, her individual situation was not 
                                                
629 Megan Comfort, Doing Time Together: Love and Family in the Shadow of the Prison 
(University of Chicago Press, 2007). Comfort shows that the ‘collateral consequences’ of 
imprisonment suffered by relatives manifests themselves in numerous ways. Prisoner’s families 
find that when trying to maintain contact with their loved one that they are subjected to many 
different ‘collateral’ consequences, including undergoing demeaning procedures in order to visit 
their loved one (63), the requirement to alter their dress or their personal appearance in order to 
conform to prison requirements in order to visit their relative (52-55), and financial penalties from 
having their partner who may be a wage earner in prison, as well as having to support them 
financially (92).  
630 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1455 (1988) Collinson J. 
631 Goodwin v Turner 908 F2d 1395, 1399 (1990). 
632 Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 543 (1995).  
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considered separately from her husband, apart from when the Government 
queried her ability to support her putative child.  When one considers the 
consequences of denying a non-incarcerated individual a human right, the 
decisions themselves should be subjected to strict scrutiny as they affect non-
imprisoned partners of prisoners. Strictly speaking, the partners of prisoners 
arguably retain the same rights as any other person in free society, but this is 
untrue when one considers how restrictions that affect the prisoner also affect the 
partner as well.633 
The domestic cases of Mellor and Dickson failed to consider the needs of 
the partners of the prisoners at all, whilst in Goodwin and Gerber, the 
infringement of the rights of the free partners was considered in the most detail by 
the dissenting judges.634 The rights of the free partners of the prisoner were in 
direct conflict with the aims and decisions of the prison authorities, with 
penological concerns given more weight. The judges in Dickson and Mellor also 
had very little sympathy with the partners of the male prisoners who wanted to 
have children. The Prison Rules 1999 state that ‘special attention’ should be paid 
to the maintenance of the relationships between prisoners and their families and 
that prisoners should be able to maintain contact with agencies outside of the 
                                                
633 Helen Codd, In the Shadow of Prison: Families, Imprisonment and Criminal Justice (Willan 
Publishing, 2008) 110- 111. 
634 In the District Court ruling in Goodwin, Mrs Goodwin was mentioned only to say that it was 
not essential to ensure against hardship of third parties affected by the lawful imprisonment of an 
offender. Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1455 (1988). The majority ruling in Goodwin also 
rejected the argument that because the regulation affected a non-prisoner that it should be 
subjected to strict scrutiny (Goodwin v Turner 908 F2d 1395, 1399 (1990). In Percy, the 
claimant’s wife is not even mentioned by name, she is referred to as the ‘Appellant’s wife’ and 
was discussed in terms of her age of 36 and occupation. Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 
543, 545 (1995). In Gerber, the only mention of Mrs Gerber’s right to procreate is made by the 
Kozinski J, who dissented in Gerber III, stating that the decision would confine Mrs Gerber to a 
childless marriage. (Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 631 (2002).   
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prison that can assist with their rehabilitation.635 In both Mellor and Dickson, one 
of the reasons for denying the request was that neither the Mellors’, nor the 
Dicksons’ relationships had been tested outside of the prison.636 Both 
relationships started after the prisoners had started their sentence. There was no 
real consideration of the collateral consequences of the infringement of the Article 
8 rights of either free partner of the prisoners, even though Lorraine Dickson was 
named as a second party to the application. The appeal decision of Mellor 
summed up the view of the judges: ‘a lawfully convicted prisoner is responsible 
for his own situation and cannot complain on that account that his right to found a 
family has been infringed.’637 It is only when the case of Dickson reached the 
ECtHR that the issue of collateral damage to Mrs Dickson’s Article 8 rights were 
discussed in any detail in the Chamber. The concurring opinion of Judge Bonello, 
whilst agreeing with the first decision of the Chamber to deny that there had been 
a violation of the Dickson’s Article 8 right to found a family, at least mentioned 
Lorraine Dickson in person, specifically highlighting the difficulty of balancing 
her Article 8 rights separately to her husband’s.638 The minority judges had 
greater sympathy with Mrs Dickson’s application, considering her human rights 
claims separately from her husband’s. Judges Casadevall and Garlicki felt that the 
advancing age of Lorraine Dickson and her greatly reduced chances of 
procreating was exceptional enough to allow the Dicksons access to AI 
                                                
635 Prison Rules 1999, SI 1999 No 728 rule 4. 
636 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2000] EWHC Admin 385; 
[2000] H.R.L.R. 846. [16], R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor 
[2001] EWCA Civ 472 [15] Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of 
State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 [7]. 
637 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 [26] 
(Phillips MR). 
638 Dickson v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 21 (Concurring Opinion of Bonello J) 
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facilities.639 In the second dissenting opinion, Borrego Borrego J called Lorraine 
Dickson the ‘forgotten person’ highlighting that Lorraine Dickson was a free 
person, whom had not been mentioned in the main judgment at all.640 Kirk 
Dickson’s role was minor compared to Lorraine Dickson’s who would be 
required to carry the pregnancy to term, give birth and care for the child.641 
Borrego Borrego J added, ‘It really would be regrettable if a real problem became, 
through the passage of time, a purely theoretical one.’642  In the Grand Chamber, 
Lorraine Dickson was finally recognised as an applicant in her own right, the 
court referred to the ‘applicants’ jointly.643 Lorraine Dickson herself reiterated 
that the policy, which applied to prisoners, should not apply to her as a free 
person.644 In the main however, the applicants were considered jointly by the 
majority judgment, and the Grand Chamber failed to grapple with the important 
question of how far should restrictions affect the free partner of the prisoner. This 
could be simply because they did not feel it was necessary, having found that 
there had been a breach of Kirk Dickson’s Article 8 rights. 
The American cases of Goodwin and Gerber did make some mention of 
the constitutional rights of the free partners of the prisoners. The case of Percy 
was silent on this issue however.645 In the District Court ruling of Goodwin, it was 
accepted that Mrs Goodwin’s right to procreate had been violated, but that the 
Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment was not 
intended to require the state to ensure that third parties such as partners were not 
                                                
639 ibid (Joint Dissenting Opinion of Casadevall and Garlicki JJ)  
640 ibid. 
641 ibid. 
642 Ibid (Dissenting Opinion of Borrego Borrego J). 
643 Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 para 65 onwards. 
644 ibid para 56. 
645 Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 543 (1995). 
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subjected to hardship.646 It was seen as ‘inevitable’ that the incarceration of the 
prisoner would also affect his family members and friends adversely.647 On 
appeal, the court rejected Steven Goodwin’s argument that the prison regulation 
required strict scrutiny because it affected his wife’s right to procreate. Magill J 
argued that it was inevitable that many elements of imprisonment affect the rights 
of the prisoner’s family and friends, and that ‘such restrictions on the prisoner’s 
liberty would be sustained if they were reasonably related to achieving a 
legitimate penological objective. To that extent, the wife’s associational rights are 
not relevant.’648 In Gerber III, the specific rights of Evelyn Gerber were not 
mentioned by the majority decision, but were raised in one of the dissenting 
judgments. Kozinski J, stated that the authorities must have compelling reasons to 
prohibit prisoners from procreating, because they affect not only the prisoner but 
the prisoner’s partner from procreating as well. Because of their importance, he 
argued that they should be subject to a stricter standard of scrutiny because of the 
effect on non-prisoners.649 Kozinski J then points out that through its decision the 
court had consigned Evelyn Gerber to a ‘childless marriage.’650  The majority 
judgment makes little mention of Evelyn Gerber, other than to say that William 
Gerber has no right to have private visits.651 
Legitimate Penological Objectives 
All of the cases demonstrate the same conflict: the balancing of the rights 
of the prisoner and the aims and goals of the penal system. The aims of 
                                                
646 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1455 (1988).  
647 ibid. 
648 Goodwin v Turner 908 F2d 1395, 1398 (1990). 
649 He argues that the Supreme Court ruling in Turner v Safley 482 US 78, 85 (1987) states that 
when a prison regulation creates a ‘consequential restriction’ on those who are not prisoners then 
it should be subjected to a ‘more searching scrutiny’ Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 631 (2002).  
650 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 632 (2002).  
651 ibid 621.  
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imprisonment are largely concerned with protecting society, preventing 
recidivism, as well as deterrence, retribution and punishment.652 The practical 
concerns of the prison as an institution would be the maintenance of prison 
security, the safety of prisoners and staff, protection of the public, punishing the 
prisoner in accordance with their sentence, promoting individual prisoners contact 
with their families and promoting the rehabilitation of offenders through the 
delivery of courses and the provision of meaningful work. These institutional 
requirements often clash with the prisoner’s desire to start a family: for example 
conjugal visits are prohibited in England and Wales because of the perceived risk 
that they pose to prison security. In the USA they are allowed in certain states as a 
privilege for selected groups of prisoners.653 The cases have shown that even 
when prisoners and their relatives attempt to mitigate these security concerns 
through the use of AI, they still face opposition from officials who claim that their 
requests conflict with both legitimate penological aims and the operational issues 
concerned with running the prison. Often the punitive and security aims of the 
penal system, as well as the operational demands of the prison itself, are 
prioritised over rehabilitating offenders and maintaining contact between 
offenders and their families. This is often due to the punitive nature of the 
                                                
652 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s142 (a)(b)(c)(d)(e) (which details the purposes of sentencing); SC 
Busch 'Notes: Conditional Liberty: Restricting Procreation of Convicted Child Abusers and Dead 
Beat Dads' (2006) Case W Res L R 479. 
653 See footnote 1; also Christopher Hensley, Rutland S, Gray-Ray P 'Conjugal Visitation 
Programs: the Logical Conclusion' in Christopher Hensley (ed) Prison Sex: Practice and Policy 
(Lynne Reinner Publishers, 2002) 143 Previously, Mississippi and New Mexico allowed certain 
prisoners conjugal visits, but removed this privilege from February 2014, citing budgetary 
concerns, STI transmission and the worry of babies being born to prisoners, leading to single 
parent families outside of the prison. Mississippi Department of Corrections, Press Release 
‘MDOC Ends Conjugal Visits’ (Mississippi Department of Corrections, Office of 
Communications, 15 December 2013) 
<http://www.mdoc.state.ms.us/PressReleases/2013NewsReleases/ConjugalVisits.htm> accessed 
20 April 2015; Joseph J Kolb, ‘New Mexico to eliminate conjugal visits for prisoners’ (Reuters, 
16 April 2014) http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/04/16/us-usa-prisons-newmexico-
idUSBREA3F21220140416 accessed 20 April 2015. 
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criminal justice system and the desire of politicians to be seen as being tough on 
crime and criminals, thus mandating a harsher and more punitive penal regime.654 
In the US, all of the justifications given by the state and the courts to 
prohibit procreation concerned reference to ‘legitimate penological aims.’655 The 
first priority was isolating the prisoner from the rest of society in order to deter 
potential criminals.656 The term used in Pell is quite revealing: the criminal is 
‘quarantined’ to allow ‘the rehabilitative processes of the corrections system work 
to correct the offender’s demonstrated criminal proclivity.’657 This statement 
makes two assumptions, firstly, that for some offenders, rehabilitation can only 
take place away from their normal lives in prison, and secondly, that the offender 
is somehow ‘diseased’ and so are placed in ‘quarantine’ for the public’s 
protection. For some offenders, there is certainly a valid argument that removing 
a person from a chaotic environment where they may be addicted to drugs or may 
associate with other offenders, for example, helps some offenders to refrain from 
these behaviours and rehabilitate themselves. It is also correct to say that many 
offenders are dangerous individuals, for whom incarceration is necessary in order 
                                                
654 Comfort notes that legislation allowing Californian prisoners serving a life sentence access to 
private family visits was repealed in 1996. Megan Comfort, Doing Time Together: Love and 
Family in the Shadow of the Prison (University of Chicago Press, 2007) 117; Tyler Davidson ‘Jail 
Date: Wives of San Quentin Inmates Protest Politicians’ Efforts to Restrict the Family Visitation 
Program’ SF Weekly (San Francisco, 7 February 1996) 6. Liebling highlights how in England and 
Wales in the mid 1990’s following the Prison Disturbances April 1990: Report of an Enquiry 
(Woolf Report) that prisons underwent a period of reform to reduce liberal regimes and increase 
tighter controls. These changes served to make the prison environment more controlled and 
punitive. Prisoners who had previously enjoyed more than the minimum visit contact time with 
their children had their entitlements reduced, and their relationships with their families was placed 
second to discipline. Families were thus enlisted as additional pressure to ‘encourage’ prisoners to 
behave. Alison Liebling, ‘Incentives and Earned Privileges Revisited: Fairness, Discretion, and 
the Quality of Prison Life’ (2008) J Scandinavian Stud Criminology & Crime Prev 9, 25, 28-29, 
33.  
655 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 621 (2002) citing Hudson v Palmer 468 US 517, 524 (1983); 
Goodwin v Turner, 980 F.2d. 1395, 1396 (1990); Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 543, 
548 (1995).   
656 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 621 (2002).   
657 Pell v Procunier 417 US 817, 852 (1974). 
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to protect wider society. This line of argument fails to address the positive effects 
of closer ties to family and how the promotion of strong social bonds aids in 
offender desistance, as well as negating the more harmful effects of 
incarceration.658 Other general aims of imprisonment referred to in the judgment 
are deterrence, justice and retribution.659 The case of Percy directly turns on the 
furtherance of legitimate penological aims, even when it concedes that Percy may 
retain a right to procreate.660 King J in Percy states the main reason for giving 
‘considerable deference’ to the Department of Corrections is that prison 
administrators are those best placed to judge whether prisoner procreation poses 
risks to prison security, and risks overburdening the penal system.661  In Mellor 
and Dickson, rather than making direct references to the aims of imprisonment, 
the judges refer to the ‘explicit consequences of imprisonment.’662 The 
justifications for a restrictive AI policy included maintaining public confidence in 
the penal system and outrage at the thought of prisoners having babies before 
their release.663 The prohibition was justified on appeal in both Goodwin and 
                                                
658 Alice Mills, Helen Codd, ‘Prisoners’ families and offender management: Mobilizing social 
capital’ (2008) 55 Prob J 9; William D Bales, Daniel P Mears, ‘Inmate Social Ties and the 
Transition to Society: Does Visitation Reduce Recidivism?’ (2008) 45 J Res Crime & 
Delinquency 287.  Bales and Mears conducted a cohort study of 7,000 inmates released in the 
period November 2001 and March 2002 who had served at least 12 months were followed up for 
24 months post release. 58% of the inmates had no visitation prior to release. Recidivism rates 
were 30.7 % lower in those who had received a visit in the 12 months prior to their release than 
those who had not been visited. 
659 Pell v Procunier 417 US 817, 822 (1974); Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1463 (1988); 
Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 621 (2002); Pell v Procunier 417 US 817, 822 (1974). 
660 Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ Super 543, 548-549 (1995). 
661 ibid 549.  
662 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 para 
26; Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 10. 
663 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2000] H.R.L.R. 846 para 16; 
[2000] EWHC Admin 385 para 16 (the policy is in place because serious public concern would 
result if prisoners had children whilst serving prison sentences, it is an explicit consequence to of 
imprisonment that prisoners cannot have children whilst serving a prison sentence) para 51 (it is 
important to maintain public confidence in the system of imprisonment by only allowing 
procreation in exceptional circumstances and is necessary to maintain the deterrent effect of 
prison); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 1472 
 
 
165 
Percy because it was related to the ‘legitimate penological aim of treating all 
prisoners equally.’664  
Taking each penological aim in turn, the arguments for prohibiting 
procreation based upon preserving these aims are weak. The most cited 
justification in both England and Wales and the USA cases was the need to 
maintain the deterrent effect of imprisonment. This was especially important in 
Dickson and Mellor. The deterrent effect depends upon the would-be criminal 
making an objective decision about whether or not to engage in the planned 
criminal enterprise, before committing the offence. The suggestion that a potential 
criminal would be deterred from his planned course of action because he wanted 
to start a family and imprisonment would prevent this seems unconvincing. Many 
crimes are committed in situations where no planning or rational decisions have 
been made.  
The argument that prohibiting procreation is part of the punishment of 
imprisonment is also quite weak, and as previously stated, prohibiting the 
procreation is not stipulated by statute in either England and Wales or the USA.665 
The Grand Chamber in Dickson also stated that losing the right to procreate is not 
                                                                                                                                
para 17 (reiterating the Government’s policy as not being able to procreate is an explicit 
consequence of imprisonment, as well as justified and serious public concern over prisoners 
procreating) para 58 (it is justifiable for imprisonment to interfere with human rights so long as 
they are not disproportionate to the aim of maintaining a penal system which is designed to punish 
and deter), para 65 (penal sanctions are given to ‘exact retribution’ for the wrong committed and 
that public perceptions is an important consideration when deciding penal policy). Dickson and 
Dickson v Premiere Prison Service Ltd., Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] 
EWCA Civ 1477 para 3 (the policy is justified because of the legitimate public concern that may 
arise if prisoners procreate that they are getting around the punitive and deterrent elements of their 
sentence) para 7 (concern the public will have if prisoners circumvent the punishment and 
deterrent effects of their sentence) para 10 (Government policy justifications repeated: prisoners 
may get around the punishment and deterrent elements by having children).  
664Goodwin v Turner 980 F.2d. 1395, 1399-1400 (1990), Percy v State of New Jersey, 278 NJ 
Super 543, 548-549 (1995). 
665 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 626 (2002); Dickson v United Kingdom (2007) 44 EHRR 21 
(Dissenting Opinion of Borrego Borrego J). 
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a necessary consequence of imprisonment.666 The arguments put forward that 
prisoners procreating may offend public opinion was given little credit in the 
Grand Chamber of the ECtHR. They stated that prisoners should not 
automatically lose their rights because of fear of offending public opinion.667 
There is a place for taking into account public discourse when shaping penal 
policy, but the weighing up between prisoners’ rights and public opinion should 
always be proportionate. It is especially important to ensure that penal policy 
guards against excessively punitive public opinion, which could potentially see 
prisoners kept in conditions that are degrading. One reason for the use of the 
criminal justice system is that punishment should to be just, measured and 
objective. In some respects this acts as a bulwark against public opinion. Public 
opinion, left unchecked, could lead to vigilante ‘justice’ being meted out by 
certain groups of people. The Grand Chamber also makes another important 
point; that is, one aim of imprisonment is rehabilitation, which should be balanced 
against the requirement for punishment.668   
 The justification used by the State in Goodwin, Percy and Gerber was that 
it was in the interests of equal opportunities to ban all prisoners from procreating 
is explored more fully in the section concerning gender. It disingenuous to 
suggest that by prohibiting all individuals from exercising their right to procreate 
is acting in the interests of both fairness and equal opportunities. Nobody can 
benefit from a complete absence of opportunities. 
                                                
666 Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 para 74. 
667 ibid para 75. 
668 ibid. 
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Welfare of the Child and Judgments about Parental 
Suitability 
One of the fundamental differences between the England and Wales cases 
and the cases from the USA was how they tackled the ‘child welfare’ issue and 
whether it informed any part in the decision-making process. For the government 
of England and Wales, the consideration of the welfare of any child born to a 
serving prisoner is central to the decision-making process and forms part of 
official Government policy.669 In Goodwin, Percy and Gerber, the putative child 
was not considered as a potential person, and no discussion was given over to the 
ethical issues of creating a single parent family. In contrast to the England and 
Wales, the USA does not have an overarching statute, which governs how fertility 
treatment is licensed and administered.670 Due to the lack of any ‘child welfare’ 
considerations in either Goodwin Percy or Gerber, this section will concentrate 
exclusively on Mellor and Dickson. Forbes J stated in Mellor that the requirement 
for the Government to consider the welfare of the child was the ‘the same basic 
principle which underlies the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990.’671 
This principle required that the doctors treating infertile couples must have 
regards to the need for a father, which has since been amended to ‘supportive 
parenting.’672 It seems unlikely that had the requirement for ‘supportive parenting’ 
                                                
669 Appendix, R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2000] H.R.L.R. 
846 paras 16, 54; [2000] EWHC Admin 385 paras 16, 54; R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 [17], [67]; Dickson and Dickson v Premier 
Prison Service Ltd Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 paras 3, 
6, 7, 10, 20.    
670 The Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act 1992 is a Federal Act which requires all 
fertility treatment clinics to report their pregnancy and success rates directly to the Centres for 
Disease Control and Prevention. For details of the legal regulation of IVF more generally in the 
USA see David Adamson, ‘Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the United 
States’ (2005) 39 Fam L Q 727. 
671 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2000] H.R.L.R. 846 para 54; 
[2000] EWHC Admin 385 para 54.  
672 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 13(5), amended by The Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act (2008) s14(2)(b). Treatment will only be given if the patient can demonstrate 
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been current at the time of the cases whether it would have made any practical 
difference to the decision made by the Government, as it seems that many other 
factors also worked against the applicants, as both the Mellors’ and Dicksons’ 
relationships had not been ‘tested’ in outside society. It is worth noting that the 
Government minister made direct reference to the fact that each child would lack 
a father until the prisoners were released.673 It is also worth noting that in this 
particular situation, that a person undergoing simple AI would only be covered by 
the HFEA if the treatment took place in a licensed clinic.674  
In both Mellor and Dickson, the reasons for the Secretary of State’s refusal 
were given in a letter, which had been received by the applicants and was quoted 
in both judgments. In Mellor, the letter noted that the Secretary of State refused 
their request because they had no extenuating medical reason to require 
immediate fertility treatment, and, more tellingly, because their relationship had 
not been ‘tested under normal circumstances’ as it was formed after Gavin Mellor 
had entered prison.675 In contrast, one of the reasons (amongst others) given for 
refusing permission to the Dicksons was the fact that there was a ‘seeming 
insufficiency of resources to provide independently for the material welfare of 
any child who might be conceived’ as well as concern about the lack of a father 
                                                                                                                                
they meet the need for ‘supportive parenting’ rather than the need ‘for a father.’ 
673 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 
(Government considerations for the length of time the child will be without their prisoner parent 
[17] consideration about the disadvantage of single parent families para 67; Dickson and Dickson 
v Premier Prison Service Ltd Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 
1477 [7] (factors taken into account by the government minister making the decision, including 
how long the child would be without their parent; the welfare of the child born as a result of 
treatment and how the imprisonment of the parent would affect child welfare paras 19- 20.  
674 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 Sec 11 1(a) Licences authorising treatment with 
gametes and embryos; 1(b) Licences authorising the storage of gametes and embryos. 
675 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2000] H.R.L.R. 846 paras 16, 
54; [2000] EWHC Admin 385 [14]. 
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for a considerable part of the child’s early life.676 In comparison, to this the 
current guidance from the HFEA states that a single woman or a couple can only 
be provided with licensed fertility treatment if regard is given to the need for 
‘supportive parenting’ and the welfare of the child. Supportive parenting is 
defined by the HFEA as: ‘a commitment to the health, wellbeing and 
development of the child.’ 677 Factors to consider include where the putative 
parents have past convictions for child abuse or neglect, have had child protection 
measures taken against existing children, and when there is ‘violence or serious 
discord in the family environment.’678 Other considerations include where the 
parents themselves may be impaired from caring for their child due to mental or 
physical conditions, or where the putative parents suffer from alcohol or drug 
addiction.679 Whilst there is a general aspiration towards a ‘commitment to the 
health, well being and development of the child’ there is no stipulated 
requirement for one of the parents to be working or earning above a certain level 
to be granted fertility treatment.680 In practice, the lack of funded IVF treatment 
may prove a barrier to those on low incomes accessing treatment, but there are no 
official guidelines suggesting that the clinic should enquire as to the amount that 
putative parents earn. The court assumed that Lorraine Dickson would have to 
claim state benefits to support herself. They also assumed that Kirk Dickson 
would be unable to act as an active parent to the child whilst in prison.681 An 
                                                
676Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 7. 
677 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Code of Practice (Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, 8th ed, 2009, revised April 2015) para 8.10. 
678 ibid para 8.10. 
679 ibid. 
680 One case where a minimum required level of financial support was required by a court was in 
State v Oakley, which appears to require non-resident parents to pay minimum levels of child 
support, or face criminal sanctions. State v Oakley 2001 WI 103 (2001). 
681 The applicants submitted to the Chamber of the ECtHR that Mrs Dickson owned a property 
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important difference between the decision-making process for those applying for 
IVF and prisoners applying for the right to procreate are that the Ministers 
responsible for making the decision of whether to allow prisoners to procreate 
may give far more weight to the political consequences of the decision than any 
human rights considerations of the prisoner and their family. It is in effect the 
same kind of decision being made by two very different bodies. Codd highlights 
that a couple applying for IVF will have their case judged by appropriately trained 
doctors, with a HFEA appointed panel appointed to investigate difficult cases. 
The prisoner who applies for permission to inseminate his partner will instead 
have his or her decision made by people in the Prison Service, who would not 
have the specialised knowledge or training of healthcare practitioners.682 Their 
decision would be based upon the needs of the prison service and the needs of the 
prisoner and their family would come second to this.  
Mellor and Dickson raise questions about the legitimacy of deciding who 
should become a parent. There are several critics of the requirement for people to 
have to satisfy a child welfare provision, including that it subjects infertile people 
to a degree of public scrutiny over their private decision to start a family, which 
fertile people are not subject to.683 In the case of prisoners, Codd argues that 
prisoners may in fact be subjected to a higher threshold to which they have to 
prove their suitability to become a parent, and in turn, the prisoner’s free partner 
is also subjected to a far higher standard of scrutiny than they would happen were 
                                                                                                                                
worth £200,000 and that she was following a counselling course and would be able to charge £30 
an hour once qualified. Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 para 23.  
682 Helen Codd, ‘Policing Procreation: Prisoners, Artificial Insemination and the Law’ (2006) 2 
Genomics, Society & Policy 110, 115 
http://www.lancaster.ac.uk/fss/journals/gsp/docs/vol2no1/HCGSPVol2No12006.pdf accessed 1 
May 2015. 
683 Emily Jackson, 'Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle' (2002) 65 MLR 176, 
202. 
 
 
171 
their partner not also a prisoner.684 Whilst the domestic cases make no specific 
judgments about the suitability of the prisoners and their partners as potential 
parents, the judges are willing to say, that in effect it is in the child’s best interests 
to not exist.685 Both Mellor and Dickson stated that children thrive better in two-
parent rather than single families and that it is a legitimate Government aim to 
prevent the creation of single-parent families.686 The first instance decision of 
Mellor justified having regulatory standards in the case of prisoners, because the 
state was being asked to be an active party to the creation of a child into a de-
facto single parent family.687  
The ECtHR dealt with the question of child welfare in both the Chamber 
and the Grand Chamber in Dickson. Ultimately, whilst they reached different 
conclusions, both judgments contained important considerations for how the child 
welfare principle should be applied in the case of prisoners. The majority in the 
Chamber felt that it was legitimate for any Government to have regard for the 
welfare of any child conceived as a result of AI.688 Some clue as to the strength of 
feeling that the judges may have felt about the suitability of the applicants to 
become parents can be gleaned from the concurring opinion of Bonello J who was 
disparaging about the prospects of a child born to a prisoner and his partner in a 
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de-facto single-parent family.689 He then makes reference to the potential parents 
requiring social welfare support to raise their child, as well as the ‘dysfunctional 
ambience’ of a relationship founded when both applicants were in prison.690 In 
contrast to the strong and vitriolic language of Bonello J, the dissenting opinion of 
Judges Casadevall and Garlicki state that the Government was being overly 
paternalistic in determining ‘who may have children and when.’691 The 
government of England and Wales used Article 8(2) as a justification for 
removing the right of prisoners to procreate if necessary to protect the health and 
morals of citizens.692 Interestingly, Auld LJ in the domestic hearing of Dickson 
stated that this could apply to the protection of the rights of the unborn: ‘It seems 
to me that… concern for the rights of a putative child in the upbringing it would 
receive depending on the circumstances and length of imprisonment involved, are 
highly relevant circumstances, for the purpose of Article 8.2.’ 693 The Grand 
Chamber, was quite firm on how far the Government should be able to consider 
the welfare of the child as a reason for refusing access to AI. They stated that 
whilst it was legitimate that the government of a country could consider the 
welfare of the child as a relevant matter under Article 8(2), this consideration did 
not extend to preventing prisoners and their partners from conceiving a child.694 
Jackson finds this reasoning flawed however: firstly it considered the 
rights of a non-existent person, over an actual person, again encountering the 
‘non-identity’ problem.695 Neither a foetus nor a non-existent child has rights 
                                                
689 ibid concurring opinion of Bonello J.  
690 ibid. 
691 ibid, dissenting opinion of Casadevall and Garlicki JJ. 
692 Human Rights Act 1998, Article 8(2) 
693 Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 20. 
694 Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 para 76. 
695 Emily Jackson, ‘Case Commentary Prisoners, Their Partners and the Right to Family Life’ 
 
 
173 
under the ECHR, whereas the Dicksons’ did. The policy is in effect stating that it 
is in the best interests of the child to not exist at all than to have a prisoner as an 
absent parent. 
Gender and prisoner reproduction 
One of the most important issues explored by the US cases, but not 
explicitly examined in Mellor and Dickson is the question of whether male and 
female prisoners should have equal access to AI facilities. One of the apparent 
difficulties faced by the courts was defining the exact right that the prisoners 
possessed when they are litigating for access to AI. What troubled the courts most 
in the USA was the subsequent effect that this could have on gender equality, 
especially the increased burdens of providing for female pregnant prisoners.696  
Women prisoners require substantial antenatal and postnatal care, with 
transfer to an appropriate maternity facility to give birth following ART. The 
prison would be required to make some significant amendments to the normal 
prison regime to accommodate the physical and psychological needs of the 
pregnant prisoner, including provision for protecting the health and wellbeing of 
the foetus. In certain cases the prison may provide a mother and baby unit, which 
is another considerable expense. The responsibility of caring for babies also 
creates another substantial burden and duty of care upon the prison services. This 
situation raises some problematic areas that need to be tackled and addressed such 
as whether male and female prisoners be treated differently when requesting AI 
facilities. 
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One way that the majority in Gerber II and minority decision judgments in 
Goodwin and Gerber III avoided directly tackling the question of women 
prisoners procreating was by characterising the right at question within the narrow 
context of providing a sample for AI, rather than by the end of result, which is 
parenthood. In Gerber II, the majority judgment argued that the request of a male 
prisoner to provide a sample for AI was fundamentally different to a female 
prisoner requesting to be artificially inseminated.697  The minority judgment in 
Goodwin argued that what was being claimed was the narrow right to provide a 
sperm sample, not the right of a prisoner to be artificially inseminated 
themselves.698  The minority judgment also stated that denying a right that could 
be easily accommodated to one group in order to prevent another group from 
claiming a right did not further the penological aim of treating male and female 
prisoners equally. By denying rights to all prisoners could not be seen to be 
promoting fairness and equality for all prisoners.699 Prisons often allow the 
exercise of some rights in some circumstances for some prisoners and the denial 
of some rights for other prisoners. As such, this prohibition also failed the Turner 
test because the complete prohibition on AI did not leave any other method of 
allowing the prisoner to exercise their right to procreate, so it could be argued that 
the prohibition was disproportionate.700 In Gerber III, the minority judgment of 
Kozinski J examined the actual process of producing a semen sample for AI and 
found nothing in the process itself that was inconsistent with procreation.701 
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On a basic level, this argument is true, as on the face of it the request to 
provide a semen sample has a different set of requirements to allowing a woman 
to be artificially inseminated whilst in prison. The practical consequences are 
different for male and female prisoners as well as for the prisons in these 
situations. It may be that the male prisoner producing a semen sample is more 
similarly situated to the female prisoner having her ova frozen for future use. 
Gerber II stated that the female prisoner who wished to donate eggs to a lesbian 
partner outside of the prison were similarly situated to the male prisoner who also 
donates gametes for conception and gestation to occur outside of the prison.702 
Whilst ovum retrieval is the female equivalent of providing a semen sample, it is 
incorrect to claim both procedures are equally straightforward. As Roth highlights, 
a claim based upon ovum retrieval would be as likely to fail as a claim to be 
artificially inseminated because of the specialised medical treatment required to 
stimulate the ovaries to produce more than one egg and the surgical procedure 
that would be required to extract the eggs.703 Dunn however recommends that 
women prisoners should be allowed to preserve their eggs, and that to ensure 
equal protection, male prisoners should be allowed to preserve their sperm or 
have them used for AI.704 Ovum donation may be seen as a ‘middle-ground 
solution’ when compared to IVF treatment of female prisoners. There would be 
no pregnancy in prison, and the prisoner retains some hope of retaining their 
chance to have a genetically related child. However this does not leave the 
woman prisoner in the same position as the male prisoner: she is reliant upon 
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another person such as a surrogate or release from prison before she can become a 
mother. Whilst a male prisoner is reliant upon his partner gestating the pregnancy, 
the chances of this happening are far higher than the female prisoner finding a 
surrogate or becoming pregnant herself. 
Intrinsically, however, the overall aim of all of these procedures is the 
same, the prisoner intends to become a parent. From a gender equality perspective, 
the ruling in Gerber II is unjust towards women prisoners. For a fair system of 
punishment and rehabilitation, equality of outcome rather than exact parity of 
treatment is required to ensure fairness between male and female prisoners. Roth 
makes a valid point that judges use unfairly the concept of women’s rights as a 
reason to restrict the rights of all groups of prisoners and by ‘doing so they 
manage both to hold women responsible for men’s grievances and to compromise 
women’s claims to constitutional equality.’705   
This reasoning is evident in Goodwin, where the judgment states that 
‘male prisoners cannot be allowed to procreate while incarcerated because the 
Bureau cannot afford to expand its medical services for its female prisoners.’706 
King J also used the same point in Percy to justify prohibiting all prisoners from 
procreating.707 As Roth states the argument made is that men cannot exercise their 
rights because women’s rights are far too costly and burdensome.708  
 Kirkley argues however, that a prohibition on procreation for all prisoners 
was in the interest of promoting equal treatment for all prisoners.709 She states 
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that allowing access to fertility treatment creates a situation where resources are 
diverted away from other necessary prison work, and so these rights should be 
restricted for everyone. Furthermore, she argues that should the United States 
Supreme Court recognise a constitutional right for prisoners in the USA to access 
reproductive medicine, it could lead to unfair outcomes.710 In the case of women 
who are artificially inseminated, she hypothesises that those on death row could 
get a stay of execution and stay alive longer than men who could produce their 
sperm sample but would still be put to death in the time scale demanded by the 
judicial process.711 The Ministry of Justice in England and Wales appears to avoid 
addressing this issue explicitly because of the approach of the Minister for Justice, 
who assesses each application individually. There is no complete prohibition on 
requests in theory, although in practice it appears difficult to make a successful 
application, even for male prisoners.712 Some authors have argued adopting a 
discretionary strategy in US prisons would allow authorities the option of refusing 
applications from women because of the increased burden of allowing them to 
procreate.713 This would inevitably lead to concerns about discrimination. The 
only mention of the policy applying specifically to both male and female 
prisoners in England and Wales was made in Mellor, where it was clarified that 
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the policy applies to both men and women prisoners equally.714 The ECtHR 
judgment of Dickson only mentions the possibility of women prisoners in the 
Grand Chamber, where the dissenting judges highlight how the majority decision 
has failed to grapple with the issue of how to apply the principle of procreative 
rights to women prisoners, homosexual couples and those who require fertility 
treatment.715 In England and Wales, there may be more scope for officials to use 
their discretion to deny applications from women prisoners because of the 
burdens to the prison service, or even the welfare of the child arguments because 
the child would be born in prison and this would not be in their best possible 
interests.716  
 Returning to the proposition that prisoners should be treated as citizens as 
far as is possible, both male and female prisoners would ideally be allowed to 
procreate, so long as they do not have convictions involving children. In England 
and Wales and in most US jurisdictions, this would entail using reproductive 
technologies to reproduce. It is undeniable however that when a woman enters 
prison pregnant or becomes pregnant in prison, then this creates significant 
disruption for the prison and places far greater burdens on the prison service. 
Munsterman argues however, that prisons already make provision for pregnant 
women and that accommodating some extra prisoners who choose to procreate 
would not necessarily increase burdens placed upon the prison and correctional 
services. 717 The burden of providing healthcare in England and Wales would be 
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met by the NHS. The authorities may wish to deny the individual parenthood if 
they feel that they are unsuitable as parents, but this should be separated from the 
right to procreate.  
Punishment and Civil Death 
All of the cases examined here reflect the wider debate surrounding 
prisoners’ rights, and what rights a prisoner keeps after incarceration. Some of the 
cases make direct reference to punishment and what constitutes the punishment of 
imprisonment.718 The references to ‘public concern’ about murderers procreating 
raises a number of questions, such as whether the ‘general public’ might think 
that all prisoners should be prevented from having children as part of their 
punishment, or whether it is a privilege which should be limited to those who 
have been convicted of non-violent crimes. The immediate assumption of many is 
that prisoners lose access to many rights that free people take for granted: the 
right to vote, the right to earn their own living and the right to have children. 
However, the minority judgment in Gerber III and the Grand Chamber in Dickson 
v UK question this stance, stating that there is no automatic forfeit of the right to 
have children.719 The judges in Mellor and Dickson considered the inability to 
have children as a part of the punishment of prison.720 Part of this argument 
derives from the ‘natural consequences’ of imprisonment argument.  
In both Mellor and Dickson, public concern at prisoners having children 
was cited as justification for not allowing Dickson and Mellor access to AI 
                                                
718 Percy does not make a direct reference to punishment, confining it’s short judgment to whether 
the prisoner retained a right to procreate and whether any legitimate penological objectives 
justified removing the right.   
719 Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 626 (2002); Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 
para 68.  
720 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 [62]; 
Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd, Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] EWCA Civ 1477 [20]. 
 
 
180 
facilities. Linked to this, Lord Phillips MR argued in Mellor that public concern 
and perception was an appropriate influence on penal policy.721 This point was 
also reiterated by Auld LJ in Dickson.722  In the first instance decision of Goodwin, 
the claimant argued that refusing his request for AI facilities was tantamount to a 
cruel and unusual punishment. This argument was dismissed, stating that refusing 
Goodwin permission to artificially inseminate his wife did not constitute 
excessive punishment.723  In Gerber I, the District Court stated that restricting the 
prisoner’s right to procreate was a legitimate part of their punishment.724 
Similarly, public confidence in the system was also seen as important in the US 
decisions. Gerber argued that the three strikes law violated equal treatment as his 
offence was sentenced far more harshly (a life sentence without parole) than a 
similar offender convicted of their first offence.725 The court viewed the statute as 
valid because it maintained public confidence in the system and acted as 
deterrence.726 Restriction of procreation was seen as a legitimate part of the 
punishment of imprisonment and this was affirmed in the en-banc reversal in 
Gerber III.727 In comparison with this, the Grand Chamber judgment in Dickson v 
UK was unconvinced by the Government citing ‘public opinion’ as justification 
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for prohibiting prisoners from accessing AI.728 The exceptionality reasons 
required by the UK Government to allow a prisoner to procreate prevented a 
proper weighing up of the competing factors of both the prisoner’s and their 
partner’s human rights claims, as well as the legitimate aims of the prison system 
to punish.729 The Grand Chamber also emphasised the importance of considering 
the rehabilitation of the offender in the decision making process.730 This implies 
that if the inability to conceive is not an inevitable consequence of imprisonment, 
then it cannot automatically form part of the punishment that the prisoner endures. 
The dissenting judgments in Gerber III, argued that inability to have children is 
not an automatic part of the punishment that prisoners suffer. Kozinski J stated 
that the legislature has not specified that prisoners be automatically denied the 
right to procreate, and that prison authorities cannot ‘supplement’ the punishment 
meted out to offenders simply to enhance ‘deterrence and retribution.’731 Tashima 
J also makes the point that should denial of procreation be a part of the prisoner’s 
sentence, then the decision should lie with the legislature and should not solely 
arise at the discretion of the prison authorities.732 The ECtHR has reiterated the 
principle that the only punishment that a prisoner should be subjected to in prison 
is the removal of liberty. Prisoners retain all of their other convention rights.733 It 
appears that the legal arguments against an automatic forfeiture of the ability to 
procreate are quite weak when one is also claiming that prisoners retain all of 
their civil rights unless they are incompatible with incarceration. There is no 
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legislative support for the explicit removal of a prisoner’s right to procreate whilst 
incarcerated in either England and Wales or the USA. Such a legislative demand 
may be accused of having eugenic overtones. The extreme reluctance may be due 
in large part to the public disgust towards the notion of prisoners convicted of 
very serious offences having children. Politicians are extremely cautious of giving 
concessions to prisoners, such a move would be extremely unpopular with the 
majority of the electorate. There are valid and legitimate arguments against some 
classes of serious offender being prohibited from having children, including those 
convicted of murdering children, or those convicted of child abuse. It is arguable 
that a more transparent decision-making process could justify denying certain 
individual prisoners their right to procreate under Article 8(2) if it was necessary 
to protect the potential child from the real risk of harm. In this situation, the denial 
of the right to procreate would be a proportionate weighing of competing factors 
and not rooted in the simple claim that denial of procreation is part of the 
punishment of the prisoner. 734  
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Summary 
Apart from the majority ruling in Gerber II and the Grand Chamber ruling 
in Dickson v UK, the case law demonstrates the extreme reluctance of the 
judiciary to contemplate the notion that prisoners have a legal right to procreate 
via ART whilst in closed prison conditions. The Government of England and 
Wales and the judiciary in Dickson and Mellor acknowledged that a complete ban 
would be unjust and incompatible with the HRA.735 However, their exceptionality 
requirement set the bar so high as to render most applications unsuccessful.736 In 
practice, little appears to have changed since the ruling in the Grand Chamber in 
Dickson v UK, with the Joint Select Committee for Human Rights claiming that 
‘We do not share the Government's confidence that the minor changes to existing 
policy agreed so far will be adequate to eliminate the risk of a further finding of a 
breach of the right to respect for private and family life of prisoners and their 
partners by the ECtHR.’ 737 The FOI request made by the Daily Mail also shows 
that since the ruling, only one prisoner has been successful in their application to 
gain access to AI, which is a further indication that in reality prisoners’ access to 
ART is extremely restrictive.738 Within the USA, there is still no Supreme Court 
ruling on whether prisoners have a constitutional right to procreate, and the three 
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current judgments to date show an extreme reluctance to allow prisoners the right 
to procreate. 
The justifications made for maintaining either a complete prohibition on 
procreation or for maintaining a very restricted access to procreation for prisoners 
at first appear to make sense. Prisoners are incarcerated because they need to be 
punished for their crime, isolated from society to ensure that the deterrent effect 
of a prison sentence is maintained. However, this premise depends upon certain 
assumptions, which, under close inspection, fail to stand up to scrutiny. The first 
assumption is that prisoners must be punished by being removed from their 
families. The ‘punishment’ element of the prison sentence is determined by the 
length of time that the prisoner remains incarcerated. Denial of the ability to have 
children is not stipulated in any statute in either the USA or in England and 
Wales.739 Prisoners are not placed on compulsory contraception medication on 
incarceration, nor are they surgically sterilised. The denial of private or conjugal 
visits to all prisoners in the England and Wales and the majority in the USA could 
be justified by security concerns. It is not justified specifically because prison is 
explicitly intended to deprive prisoners of the ability to procreate. The claim that 
prisoners retain all of their civil rights unless those rights are incompatible with 
prison would also give strength to the claim that prisoners retain the right to 
procreate, not weaken it. The fact that many prisoners are already parents when 
incarcerated shows that prison itself is not incompatible with parenthood. In the 
USA, it is even harder to maintain that prison is incompatible with parenthood 
when there are groups of prisoners who are allowed private visits, with the result 
that many prisoners must have become parents whilst serving their sentences. 
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This also weakens the argument that removal of the right to procreate is a natural 
consequence of imprisonment. As argued in Dickson v UK, the loss of the right to 
procreate may be a consequence of imprisonment but is not necessarily an 
inevitable one. 
If the removal of the right to procreate is not based in statute, then the root 
for the common law justification of the removal of the right to procreate must 
come from another source. One of the reasons may be simply that it has been 
accepted by courts and the state that prisoners do not possess that right without 
examining whether there is any strong legal or theoretical basis for that 
justification. One theoretical justification might be that prisoners are not full 
citizens. This approach is evident from other prisoner’s rights issues, such as the 
right to vote or earn a living. By using the definition of standing developed by 
Shklar, prisoners are not considered to be full citizens.740 One of the reasons may 
be that the current understanding of prisoners as ‘semi-citizens’ it is a remnant of 
a legal system, which treated prisoners as civilly dead, which itself evolved from 
the rule of attainder.741 Arguing that a right is merely delayed rather than removed 
can also lead to a slippery slope where prisoners are denied essential rights 
because the deprivation is not characterised as permanent. In the case of a life or 
death sentenced prisoner, this argument becomes academic as prisoners are in 
practice permanently deprived of certain rights.  
The minority judgments in Goodwin and Gerber I and III as well as the 
majority judgments in Gerber II and Dickson v UK demonstrate why it cannot be 
assumed that prisoners automatically lose their right to procreate when 
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incarcerated. Procreation is far too an important right for prisoners and their free 
partners who suffer collateral damage to their right to procreate because of their 
partner’s imprisonment.742 When a prisoner’s right to procreate is removed, their 
fundamental rights are often dismissed without real consideration of whether 
there is a legitimate foundation for removing those rights. The judgments in 
Mellor and Dickson in particular make several value judgments about the 
individual prisoner and their partner’s suitability to parent.743 Whilst it could be 
argued that similar decision making processes are used by clinicians when 
deciding whether to provide a couple with fertility treatment, clinicians, these 
individuals are trained to make these decisions and are only concerned about the 
welfare of the child and best interests of their patients.  Government officials, on 
the other hand are not trained to make these kinds of decisions and may tend to 
give greater weight to the desire to punish the offender and political ramifications 
of decisions, rather than considering the importance of maintaining family ties 
and promoting rehabilitation. 
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Chapter Seven: Punishment 
Introduction 
‘The power to convict and punish represents the most vivid exercise in 
relation to individual citizens.’744 
Identifying different forms of punishment is fairly straightforward. It is 
harder to define what is meant by punishment itself. In its most simple form, 
punishment can be defined as ‘the infliction or imposition of a penalty as 
retribution for an offence.’ 745  Punishment is the normative response of a society 
to an individual who has broken the agreed legal codes of behaviour. When the 
court passes sentence over the offender, they are imposing the legally defined 
punishment for the crime. Going beyond a legal or normative definition of 
punishment however, Foucault views punishment itself as a type of power, as a 
method of controlling the individual citizen.746 Sentencing and imprisonment can 
thus be argued to be a method of controlling citizens and to maintain the power 
balance of elites in society. A recent example that could be seen is the creation of 
the criminal offence of squatting in England and Wales. Prior to 2012, squatting 
was a civil matter, but it is now considered to be a criminal offence.747  
In England and Wales, when sentencing offenders, magistrates and judges 
have to consider the five aims of sentencing, as detailed in the Criminal Justice 
Act 2003. These are: ‘the punishment of offenders’, the need to reduce crime, the 
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The Criminological Foundations of Penal Policy: Essays in Honour of Roger Hood (Oxford 
University Press, 2003) 85. 
745 Oxford Dictionaries ‘Punishment’ (Oxford Dictionaries, 2015) 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/punishment accessed 1 July 2015. 
746 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (Tr Alan Sheridan, Penguin 
Books, 1977) 23, David Garland Punishment and Modern Society (Clarendon Press 1990) 162 
747 Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 s144. 
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need for rehabilitation, the protection of the public, and the reparation of 
individuals affected by the crime.748 Ashworth highlights that at any one time, 
multiple competing demands are made when a judge or magistrate passes a 
sentence.749 In passing sentence, it is not possible to give equal weight to all of 
these competing demands, rehabilitation often takes second place to the aim of 
deterrence, if the judge has decided to ‘make an example’ of an individual.  
 The punishment of those that offend against society through an impartial 
criminal justice system is seen as vitally important in a civil society.  Boonin 
states that it is simple enough to give examples of legal punishment: such as fines, 
imprisonment and death in some jurisdictions.750 The term ‘punishment’ is used 
in a variety of contexts both legal and non-legal, including the use of non-criminal 
civil sanctions and within discussions over parenting.751 For the purposes of this 
thesis, ‘punishment’ will be considered as the formal response of the criminal 
justice system to a legally defined wrong, however that is defined. Similarly, the 
phrase ‘theories of punishment’ has been argued to be inaccurate. Rather than 
being theories of punishment, ‘retribution’ and ‘utilitarian’ theories of punishment 
could be more accurately described as justifications of the institution of 
punishment.752 
The majority of the leading judgments in the cases of Goodwin, Percy, 
Gerber, Mellor and Dickson all suggest that deprivation of the right to procreate 
                                                
748 Criminal Justice Act 2003 s142. 
749 Andrew Ashworth, ‘Sentencing’ in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds) The 
Oxford Handbook of Criminology (4th edn, Oxford University Press, 2007) 997. 
750 David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 3. 
751 For an example of a discussion of punishment within the context of parenting see Lawrence S 
Wissow, ‘Ethnicity, Income and Parenting: Contexts of Physical Punishment in a National Sample 
of Families with Young Children’ (2001) 6 Child Maltreatment 118. 
752 Antony Flew, ‘The Justification of Punishment’ (1954) 29 Phil 291, 297; Leo Zaibert, 
Punishment and Retribution (Ashgate, 2006) 1. 
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is a legitimate part of the punishment of imprisonment.753 Other penal systems 
and academics argue that the removal of freedom, and nothing more, is the only 
punishment explicitly imposed by imprisonment.754 Any restrictions that are 
imposed should only be the minimum necessary to achieve legitimate penological 
aims.755 This stance contrasts greatly from the USA, where indeterminate 
sentencing, even for non-violent offences, ‘three-strikes-and-you’re-out laws,’ 
‘Supermax’ prisons and novel methods aimed at publically humiliating and 
shaming of offenders are commonplace.756 Other aspects of the prison sentence, 
such as courses that attempt to deal with offenders’ behaviour, are not considered 
to be punishment but as rehabilitation. However, this difference may be 
meaningless to a prisoner who is coerced into complying with the regime. In 
addition, for prisoners who are sentenced to long periods in prison for public 
protection, the difference between the ‘punishment’ part of their tariff and the 
incarceration for public protection part may also seem artificial.  
To begin with, this chapter will start by considering punishment itself and how it 
is defined. It will then turn to investigate what general justifications support 
                                                
753 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1455 (1988) (Restriction of procreation is a valid method 
of punishment and is not cruel and unusual); Gerber v Hickman 103 F Supp 2d 1214, 1218 (2000);  
Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 620, 624 (2002) (imprisonment naturally deprives prisoners of 
their ability to associate with family and friends and deprivation of procreation did not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment); R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor 
[2001] EWCA Civ 472 para 62 (prisoners being unable to procreate is an ‘explicit consequence’ 
of imprisonment); Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd and Secretary of State for 
the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 20-21 (Secretary of State is entitled to limit 
rights under 8(2) in order to maintain public confidence in the prison system, who think prisoners 
should have their rights to procreation limited or removed).  
754 ‘Normalisation’ is the concept that prisons should reflect local communities with the same 
services such as health, education and benefits in order to minimise the negative effects of 
imprisonment. David Scott, ‘The changing face of the English prison: a critical review of the aims 
of imprisonment’ in Yvonne Jewkes, (ed) Handbook on Prisons (Willan Publishing, 2007) 55.  
755 Rec (2006) 2 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the European Prison Rules  
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 11 January 2006 at the 952 meeting of the Ministers' 
Deputies) Part I 3; Roy D King, Rod Morgan, with JP Martin, JE Thomas The Future of the 
Prison System (Gower, 1980) 36-39.                                                                                                                                                                     
756 Daniel P. Mears, Michael D. Reisig, ‘The theory and practice of supermax prisons’ (2006) 8 
Punishment & Society 33; James Q Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the 
Widening Divide between America and Europe (Oxford University Press, 2003) 56-57. 
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judicial punishment of offenders. Utilitarianism will be examined along with 
deterrence and incapacitation. Retributivism will then be discussed. Rehabilitation, 
although not strictly part of punishment will be considered next as it is often 
intertwined with discourses on punishment, and in some circumstances is used as 
a punitive tool in itself. Finally, legalistic justifications will then be examined.
  The chapter will explore whether these justifications support a removal of 
the right to procreate. There is nothing explicit in statute law of England and 
Wales, the Federal law of the USA, or the states laws of California or New Jersey 
that demands that prisoners be deprived of their right to procreate. The punitive 
aspects of punishment may arise from a source other than statute; it may be that 
custom or the norm that prison should be an unpleasant and austere place. It is 
doubtful whether many jurisdictions have ever undertaken an objective analysis 
of whether prohibition of procreation should form part of the punishment of 
imprisonment. Many studies of the effect of punishment on prisoners and family 
relationships concentrate on the effects on existing family ties and the more 
immediate pains of imprisonment, such as lack of autonomy, lack of control over 
one’s environment and lack of contact with family or loved ones. They do not pay 
any specific attention on how punishment affects prisoners developing new 
family relationships through procreation.  
The chapter will then conclude with an examination of what explanations 
exist to justify the punishment of prisoners by prohibiting their right to procreate, 
if they are not provided with by the justifications of punishment of deterrence, 
incapacitation and retribution. These justifications are for the rehabilitation of 
offenders, the deterrence of crime, and the punishment of the offender. One 
explanation refusing prisoners in the USA and England and Wales the right to 
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procreate could be due to the treatment of prisoners in the degraded status of 
prisoners and the history of treating prisoners with increased punitiveness and 
severity.757 
                                                
757 James Q Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between 
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Definitions of Punishment 
Before beginning an analysis of the specific aspects of prohibiting 
procreation as a part of punishment, it is useful to return to a basic definition of 
punishment to see what the essential elements are. Flew suggests that five 
elements are required to constitute punishment.758 The punishment must ‘be an 
evil, an unpleasantness, to the victim.’759 The punishment must be for an offence 
that had been committed by the person being punished, the person being punished 
must be the offender. The punishment must arise from human agency, and the 
punishment must be handed down from an agency or institution that has been 
invested with special authority to punish, such as a court.760 Other authors, such 
as von Hirsh take a similar approach but state it more simply: ‘Punishment 
…means the infliction by the state of consequences normally considered 
unpleasant, on a person in response to his having been convicted of a crime.’761 
Both of these definitions are uncontroversial: a law prohibits a certain activity, an 
individual disobeys that law, a legitimate authority finds him guilty of that breach 
and passes sentence.762 These definitions justify the punishment with reference to 
legal means, without exploring the underlying moral and utilitarian reasons that 
are often cited as justification. Mabbott argues that punishment is a purely legal 
matter, which itself is done for retributive reasons. The judgment for the wrong 
                                                
758 Antony Flew, ‘The Justification of Punishment’ (1954) 29 Phil 291, 293-294. These categories 
are also later reiterated in Stanley I Benn, ‘An Approach to the Problems of Punishment’ (1958) 
33 Phil 325,325-326; Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, ‘Prolegomenon to the Principles of 
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Books, 1988) 17. 
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760 ibid 294. 
761 Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice the Choice of Punishments: Report of the Committee for the 
Study of Incarceration (Hill and Wang, 1976) 35. 
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committed is a purely legal judgment, not a moral one. ‘A “criminal” means a 
man who has broken the law, not a bad man…’763 
Similarly, Boonin attempts to systematically analyse what punishment is 
in morally neutral terms. His definition of punishment includes a conception of 
‘authorized reprobative retributive intentional harm.’764 Boonin explains what he 
means by this: 
‘On the stronger version, P’s act a is a legal punishment of Q for offense o 
if and only if 
P is a legally authorized official acting in his or her official capacity and  
P does a because P correctly believes that Q has committed o and  
P does a with the intent of harming Q and 
P’s doing a does in fact harm Q and  
P’s doing of a expresses official disapproval of Q for having committed 
o.’765 
 
Boonin’s definition encapsulates a definition for punishment, which takes 
into account the actual practice of punishment, and the primary reason for the 
punishment that is the legally recognised and legally defined wrongdoing. Boonin 
also emphasises the intention requirement of the state to cause harm to the 
offender because of their legal transgression, which differentiates it from other 
kinds of harm, such compulsory quarantine because of illness or charges for a 
service.  
                                                
763 ibid 154. 
764 David Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge University Press, 2008) 23. 
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The Purpose of the Institution of Punishment: Why 
Punish? 
‘..the overriding purpose of the CJS is to reduce crime. Catching and 
punishing offenders deters crime and provides justice to victims.’766 This 
statement encapsulates two commonly held beliefs that justify the institution of 
punishment, as well as the punishment of offenders. One, punishment deters 
others from committing crime, and two, punishing an offender is essential in 
providing a just outcome to a victim of crime and to wider society. Punishment 
ensures that offenders get their ‘just deserts’, in order to exact retribution for their 
crimes. Utilitarian concerns such as deterrence and incapacitation, are not 
concerned with moral judgments. These justifications appear to be common sense 
and somewhat obvious; but when just deserts and deterrence are both considered 
together they can cause considerable conflict.  
One can consider the justification of punishment in two separate but 
related entities: firstly the justification for the institution of punishment, that is the 
general institution or system of rules, and then, secondly, the allocation of the 
punishments to individual offenders.767 Many accounts of punishment employ a 
mixed concept employing both retributive and utilitarian concepts. Rawls states 
that  
‘…one must distinguish between justifying a practice as a system of rules 
to be applied and enforced, and justifying a particular action which falls 
under these rules; utilitarian arguments are appropriate with regard to 
questions about practices, while retributive arguments fit the application 
of particular rules to particular cases.’768  
                                                
766 Ministry of Justice, Transforming the CJS: A Strategy and Action Plan to Reform the Criminal 
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Hart stated that when considering punishment, rather than merely 
considering the terms retribution, deterrence or rehabilitation, one should ask: 
What justifies the general practice of punishment? To whom may punishment be 
applied? How severely may we punish?’769 This may be one way of viewing what 
appears at first to be opposing justifications for punishment. Hart also supported a 
‘mixed’ approach, stating that:  
‘what is most needed is not the simple admission that instead of a single 
value or aim (Deterrence, Retribution, Reform or any other) a plurality of 
different values and aims should be given as a conjunctive answer to some 
single question concerning the justification of punishment. What is needed 
is the realisation that different principles (each of which may in a sense be 
called a “justification”) are relevant at different points in any morally 
acceptable account of punishment.’770   
The two approaches of deterrence and retribution and their effects on legal 
punishment will be considered next.771 
Utilitarian Justifications 
‘But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the 
principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be admitted in 
as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.’772 
Punishment, according to Bentham was an evil that should only be permitted if it 
prevented the greater evil of crime. This judgment was made according to the 
principle of utility, where an action provides greater happiness and benefit for 
society than if the action was not taken.773 Utilitarian justifications are often 
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viewed in opposition to retributive theories.774 Utilitarian, or consequentialist 
views, are forward looking, concerned over the prevention of future crime, not 
past conduct.775 In essence, the institution of punishment is justified because it 
improves the wellbeing of society by preventing crime by deterring criminals.776  
Benn argued that this justification works by the use of the threat of punishment to 
potential criminals, but that each time an offender is punished is ‘an admission of 
failure’ because for the individual being punished has failed to be deterred by 
punishment.777 However, von Hirsch argued that the measure for the effectiveness 
of deterrence should be the overall crime level, as deterrence may have a greater 
effect over the general population than the smaller group of incarcerated 
offenders.778 
Rawls argued that utilitarianism aims to create the greatest happiness for 
the greatest number in society justifies the use of punishment as an institution. He 
states that ‘utilitarian arguments are appropriate with regard to questions about 
practices, while retributive arguments fit the application of particular rules to 
particular cases.’779 
As well as the general justification of punishment of deterrence, 
supporters of the utilitarian approach also justify the use of punishment at the 
individual level. This is in effect justified by the social results of the punishment 
                                                
774 Kevin M Carlsmith, John M Darley, ‘Why do we Punish? Deterrence and Just Deserts as 
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rather than by the actions of the offender.780 Weiner et al break down this general 
aim of future crime prevention into specific categories. The first one of these is 
isolation of the offender, by removing them from society for a given length of 
time; imprisonment prevents them from committing further offences.781 Secondly, 
rehabilitation of offenders is seen to ‘open the eyes’ of the perpetrator which 
prevents recidivism.782 Thirdly, creating fear in the offender may prevent future 
crime because they are scared of undergoing another prison sentence.783 
Individuals who agree with this justification would support harsh prison 
conditions primarily for their deterrent effects, rather than their punitive effects.  
In addition to the specific criticisms of prohibiting procreation for 
utilitarian reasons, there are other, more general criticisms of a completely 
utilitarian justification of punishment. Because the punishment is justified by 
reference to future utility, it is assumed by some authors that the punishment of 
innocent people could be justified so long as the conviction is publicised and 
leads to an overall reduction of crime within society. Carritt argues that this can 
be justified by utilitarianism, stating that: ‘utilitarianism has forgotten rights; it 
allows right to a man because he is innocent or because he has worked hard…It 
thinks only of duties or rather of a single duty, to dump happiness wherever it 
conveniently can.’ 784 
Carritt is disparaging of the value of utilitarianism and the lack of 
protection it offers to the individual. In this sense he is correct, individual rights 
are of little concern to the utilitarian, Bentham famously stating that natural rights 
                                                
780 Jeffrie G Murphy, ‘Marxism and Retribution’ (1973) 2 Phil and Public Affairs 217, 219. 
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are ‘simple nonsense: natural and inprescriptable rights, rhetorical nonsense,- 
nonsense upon stilts.’785  
Rawls however argues that a truly utilitarian approach would not justify 
such an approach, stating that an institution that selected innocent people for 
punishment would not have any effective deterrent effects. He terms the 
institution ‘telishment’ and imagines how it may operate if it is accepted that 
people may be punished or ‘telished.’ As well as the concerns about discretion, 
Rawls argues that people would wonder whether a person punished by the 
criminal justice system should be pitied or not because they may have been the 
victims of telishment. This would lead to an undermining of the system of 
punishment as a whole.786  When an individual is punished by a court for a wrong 
that they have not committed, whether by the process of telishment or wrongful 
conviction, then the injury meted out to them cannot be considered to be 
punishment. Boonin argues that only the guilty can suffer punishment, as only 
guilty people can require the reprobative requirement to be fulfilled.787 Quinton 
also argues that the innocent cannot be punished, but suffer some other harm, as 
following the established legal rules of punishment requires that the person being 
punished is guilty of the offence.788 
Another criticism levelled at a utilitarian justification of punishment is that 
it allows too much discretion to officials. von Hirsch argues that judges possess 
wide discretion in sentencing, which leads to disparate punishment between 
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offenders. In the past this approach been justified by reference to predictive 
restraint and the need to rehabilitate.789 Whilst discretion comes under the 
question of how severely one should punish, the underlying justifications 
themselves rely upon utilitarian principles. Andrew von Hirsch argues that this 
discretion should be limited by proportionality.790 However, Rawls argues that if 
judges follow appropriate rules within a utilitarian framework, their discretion is 
limited. He states that in similar cases the rules have to be applied, and only in the 
case of novel circumstances is one required to make a decision based upon 
utilitarian principles.791 In the circumstances where rules are used consistently for 
a specific situation, Rawls refers to them as a practice, which itself is defined by 
certain rules.792 The use of practices predefines the action of the state actor (e.g. 
judges in sentencing) thus reducing the use of discretion.793 The main issue that 
some academics have with judicial discretion is that sentencing decisions based 
upon utilitarian principles are unjust because their decision is made based upon 
societal concerns, not because of the actual past behaviour of the offender.794 In 
some cases, however, judges are granted wide discretion by the legislature and so 
may use utilitarian principles or whatever other principles they see fit to decide 
what punishment to grant to particular offenders. One of the arguments used by 
the UK Government in both Dickson and Mellor was that prohibiting procreation 
was justified by the need to deter potential criminals from committing crime. This 
argument supports an austere and harsh prison system, in which lack of contact 
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with one’s family leads to the existing offender to be deterred from committing 
future crimes. Inability to procreate could be argued to form part of the overall 
regime of harsh punishment. Arguably it forms a small part of the visible 
deterrent of punishment, as the prison is the public symbol of the power of the 
state to punish. Physical means of punishing offenders are no longer acceptable 
methods of punishment. It does however seem far-fetched to suggest however that 
potential criminals may be deterred from offending by the knowledge that they 
may be imprisoned and thus prevented from starting a family. As for other 
utilitarian concerns, the justification provided by punishment for the 
incapacitation of offenders is not served by removing a prisoner’s ability to have a 
child. The imprisonment, of an individual, the removal of a person to a place of 
residence against their will is what incapacitates a prisoner, preventing them from 
committing crime, rather than the prevention of them having children. Many 
jurisdictions allow prisoners access to private visits, during which they may 
procreate, but they are still effectively prevented from leaving the prison to 
commit further crimes. If disruption to the prison regime is the utilitarian 
justification for removing the right to procreate, then this can be countered with 
the use of assisted reproductive technologies (ART) thus removing the need for 
prisoners to have access to private visits with their partner.  
Prohibiting procreation is not justified by reference to utilitarian 
justifications of punishment, when one considers the weak arguments offered by 
deterrence and incapacitation. When considering the specific questions of whom 
and how we punish, restrictions upon procreation may be only be justified by 
utilitarian reasons in a few offender’s cases, such as those who are being punished 
for murdering a child, or for abusing a child. It could be argued that society would 
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benefit from preventing a child abuser from begetting a child that may be then 
abused or murdered. However, one has to be extremely cautious about using this 
argument. One could argue on utilitarian grounds that preventing all prisoners 
from procreating would increase society’s overall happiness, as the prisoner is in 
prison and allowing them to procreate is creating a single parent family. This was 
the justification used by the judges in both Mellor and Dickson. Lord Phillips 
argued that whilst many single parents do raise children successfully, children do 
better with two parents.795 Preventing prisoners from procreating however appears 
to be repeating the arguments used by those who supported the sterilisation of 
prisoners such as Skinner. 
Another final criticism of utilitarianism is that it does not recognise the 
rights of the individual.796 ‘What the utilitarian theory cannot capture, I would 
suggest, is the notion of persons having rights. And it is just this notion that is 
central to any Kantian outlook on morality.’797 Murphy argues that the right to 
punish an individual should not depend upon the social utility of that punishment, 
but whether one has the moral right to punish. This is the basis of retributive 
justification of punishment, which will be considered next. 
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Retribution 
‘Judicial Punishment can never be used merely as a means to promote 
some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society, but instead it must in 
all cases be imposed on him only on the ground that he has committed a crime.’798 
According to Kant, punishment is justified solely by the act of the 
offender. The person has committed a wrong and so deserves to be punished. 
Justice is served when all crimes are punished every time they are committed and 
the offender is deprived of the advantage gained by the crime.799  The punishment 
is justified by a ‘morally obligatory norm of conduct.’800 Any other effects of 
punishment such as deterrence, rehabilitation and desistence from crime are 
incidental. In this way, it is the opposite to utilitarian justifications of punishment. 
It is backward looking, considering what the offender has done, not what may 
happen in the future.801 Retribution itself can mean two things, just deserts, and 
retaliation.  These are sometimes seen as a continuum of the same concept; 
however, Gerber and Jackson argue that their ideological basis is different.802 Just 
deserts, or proportionate punishment is justified by the basis that Kant justifies 
punishment: that the offender has committed a crime.803 The root of the meaning 
is in the word ‘deserts’, the offender ‘deserves’ to be punished.804 
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Weiner et al characterises punishment as maintaining a social equilibrium; 
the offender has to pay an equal debt for the harm caused by their action.805 Some 
countries may take this quite literally, in that a murderer pays for their crime by 
losing their own life.806 Strictly applied, the principle means that punishment 
would only be judged according to the severity of the wrong. In practice, many 
jurisdictions make a decision based upon many factors, such as the culpability or 
mens rea of the offender as well as any other mitigating or aggravating factors.807 
According to the scheme outlined by von Hirsch, equality would be maintained 
by ‘the commensurate deserts principle’ whereby all defendants, impoverished 
and affluent would be treated the same.808 He argues that this is more just than 
utilitarianism, which could allow for greater discretion and wide disparities in 
sentencing between offenders who have committed the same offence. 
Commensurate deserts, proportionate deserts or just deserts is based upon equity 
‘severity of the punishment should be commensurate with the seriousness of the 
wrong.’809  The difficulty lies in quantifying how much suffering should be 
caused by the punishment in order to repay the wrong committed by the offender.  
The second justification for retribution is expiation or making the offender 
suffer.810 This is based on the idea that ‘the victims or society at large obtain 
satisfaction from the suffering of another.’811 This justification appears to be what 
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drives the desire for extremely punitive sanctions in the USA, such as 
indeterminate sentences for non-violent drugs offences and the death penalty.812 
Other developments, such as super maximum or ‘super max’ prison facilities also 
reflect increasingly punitive measures, which not only isolate prisoners from one 
another, but also actively restrict human contact with prison staff.813  Retribution 
for retaliation means not just making things even again, but using the suffering 
caused by punishment to retaliate.814 Expiation and the desire for revenge, were 
found by McKee and Feather to be linked to aspects of vengeance and 
incapacitation, and negatively linked to rehabilitation.815 Dolinko links the 
resurgence of ‘born-again retributivism’ to the continued support that the death 
penalty holds in the USA.816 Basing punishment upon revenge could be seen to be 
the opposite of justice.817 However, there is an acceptance within legal institutions 
that society demands retribution for the crimes committed against society.818 The 
limit placed on the retribution exacted by punishment varies according to the 
jurisdiction and depends upon the offence committed. Many jurisdictions view 
imprisonment itself as the punishment. In contrast to this, proportionate 
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punishment that provides ‘a buffer against the negative effects of revenge.’819 
This does not mean that the punisher cannot make a moral judgment against an 
offender. One reason for using punishment as opposed to another form of social 
control is to display censure, in order to communicate to the offender that their 
conduct is wrong.820 Application of blame forms an important function of 
punishment. 
One criticism that can be made of Kant’s view of retributivism is that 
citizens themselves do not consent explicitly to any laws. In effect, Kant 
‘substitutes’ collective consent for individual consent.821 This, according to 
Bender is because Kant was an ‘institutional positivist’ who thought that for 
consent to have any meaning it had to be part of a legalised method of expressing 
and enforcing that consent.822 Thus, democracy fulfils the consent requirement.823 
It could be argued that the basis for justifying punishment under a retributive 
scheme of punishment is a moral one: the offender has somehow gained an unfair 
advantage over the victim and this creates the moral right for the punisher to 
punish the offender. 
Quinton states however, that: ‘retributivism, properly understood, is not a 
moral but a logical doctrine, and that it does not provide a moral justification of 
the infliction of punishment but an elucidation of the use of the word.’824 He 
views retributive theory, which states who should be punished and by how much, 
as ‘annulment theory’ essentially utilitarian in origin.825 This argument, that the 
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punishment must fit the crime does not always work because it is not always 
possible to find punishments to fit the crime. Restricting the right to have children 
is a very severe punishment if one is incarcerated for life and will never be 
released. It could be argued that this punishment, on top of the restriction 
involved in being incarcerated is done primarily to enhance the punitive and 
expiation aims of the punishment. It some cases, such as prisoners who are 
convicted of abusing or killing children, restricting them from having children 
could be argued to be a proportionate punishment in response to their crime. 
However, this could be explicitly stated as part of their sentence by the judge at 
the time of sentencing. Restricting an individual who has been convicted of 
offences unrelated to child abuse or killing could be argued to a disproportionate 
punishment. Andrew von Hirsch argues that adopting an approach to punishment 
that respects the autonomy of the individual, ‘of the kind which such persons 
should accept, as a way of assisting them to resist their own temptations, in a 
manner that respects their capacity for choice.’826 Proportionality is important in 
determining how much an offender should be punished. This is termed by von 
Hirsch as ‘commensurate deserts’ and the restriction of a prisoner’s family life 
during prison could continue to have effects long after they are released from 
prison.827 When considering this, it is important to ensure that the punishment 
given to prisoners is proportionate to their crime. 
Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation can be defined as ‘any measure taken to change an 
offender’s character, habits, or behavior patterns so as to diminish his criminal 
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the Study of Incarceration (Hill and Wang, 1976) 75. 
 
 
207 
propensities.’828 Whilst not generally considered to be part of the punishment of 
imprisonment, rehabilitation could be viewed as punishment by offenders, who 
are obliged to engage with compulsory courses. Opportunities are provided for 
rehabilitation in prison because it is an essential ‘administrative’ measure that can 
reduce recidivism and help improve the future potential of offenders. Some 
prisoners can find these measures beneficial and engage with opportunities 
provided by the prison, whilst others could resent being coerced into taking part 
in activities that they view as punishment. Robinson takes this concept one step 
further.  She argued that following the government reforms in England and Wales, 
which removed the requirement for probation officers to hold a social work 
qualification and created the idea of ‘rehabilitation as punishment.’829  
Rehabilitation itself has regained prominence, in part due to the rise of 
utilitarian, managerial and expressive accounts of penology.830 Robinson argues 
that within the UK, the rehabilitative approach has gained legitimacy because the 
government has taken an increasingly utilitarian approach, claims to ensure the 
best outcome for the largest number of prisoners, whilst protecting the public.831 
This late modern evolution of rehabilitation is not concerned with welfare but risk 
management. Rehabilitation can be seen as part of an approach to penology that is 
actuarial or managerial in origin.832 It has the modest aim of managing risk, with 
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prisoners being assessed and managed by reference to assessments of their group 
characteristics, as opposed to a completely individualised assessment.833 There is 
a moral dimension highlighted by Robinson however, that focuses on personal 
responsibility, and choices made by the offender.834 This approach engages with 
the offender as a moral actor, separate from utilitarian concerns. Rehabilitation 
becomes part of the process of enabling the prisoner to make positive choices. 
When one considers this point, it is difficult to see how preventing a prisoner 
from procreating would promote his rehabilitation when it has been shown that 
recidivism rates reduce when prisoners released back into the community with the 
support of family are less likely to offend than those without support.835 
Legalistic Justifications of Punishment 
Mabbott states that deterrence and reform, whilst good in themselves, are 
not reasons for punishment, but are instead ‘additional goods’ which arise from 
the punishment of the offender. He states ‘the only justification for punishing any 
man is that he has broken a law.’836 This alternative view of punishment takes a 
purely legalistic approach. If a person breaks a rule, then it is this alone that 
provides the justification for punishing them. This rather narrow interpretation of 
punishment refers to the allocation of punishment itself to a particular offender, 
rather than to a more general justification of the system of punishment. The state 
itself makes no moral judgment about offenders.837 It is necessary to have 
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punishment to ensure that that all individuals can live in a society with controlled 
levels of crime.838 This is in direct contrast to the retributive account that makes a 
moral judgment of the individual who commits crime. Some authors, such as 
Binder have also tried to recast punishment not as a moral question, but as 
‘theories about politically legitimate institutional action rather than as theories 
about morally correct individual action.839 Nino supports the view that 
punishment is a coercive legal measure that is used in times of extremis, for social 
protection. He includes measures for infectious diseases, confinement the 
mentally ill for safety and requisition of supplies and buildings during wartime 
during this definition. In this way, punishment becomes a method of social 
protection, to which individuals all consent, comparing this kind of consent to 
other forms of legal consent such as in contract law.840 By giving voluntary 
consent to a contractual obligation, one provides the justification for enforcing 
it.841 Nino argues ‘The individual who, for instance, consents to undertake some 
legal obligation is, in principle, morally obliged to do the act which is the object 
of that obligation.’842 He then highlights that an offender consents to be punished 
because he has assumed a legal responsibility to not act in a way that contravenes 
the law. 843 This is justified by the benefits and burden distribution in society, in 
which the offender enjoys the protection of the law, and so accepts the risk of 
being punished, in a similar way to the voluntary assumption of risk in tort law.844 
Instead of taking Kant’s view that punishing people respects their autonomy 
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because they are not ‘mere things’ to be used, Nino claims that the law relies 
upon autonomy by making the individual liable for their crime because of the 
‘free and conscious undertaking of it.’845 This approach does assume that all 
crime is a considered decision, which itself is flawed. It also assumes that the 
offender has made the decision to commit a crime with the full cognizance of the 
punishment that awaits them. However, many things are currently included within 
the package of the punishment of a prison sentence, such as losing the ability to 
have children. The offender may not even realise how seriously an offence will be 
punished.  
Duggan provides another view to how punishment can be justified from a 
fair play perspective. The justification has to be provided at two levels, 1) What 
justifies punishment ‘as a social practice’ and 2) what justifies punishing an 
individual.846  Society requires cooperation, and occasionally this requires 
individuals to do things that can be burdensome, so coercion is required to ensure 
that everyone cooperates.847 In one sense this justification is utilitarian because it 
appeals to the individual desire to avoid painful consequences. In another sense 
however, the basis behind it is retributive as it appeals to the rule that one person 
should not take advantage of others by breaking the law.848  
Factors Affecting the Application of Punishment 
The principles that guide and underpin sentencing are in effect the same 
principles that underpin legitimate penological aims. Prisons themselves also aim 
to protect the public, rehabilitate offenders, act as a measure of deterrence, and 
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ensure that offenders receive their ‘just deserts.’ In developing penal policy, many 
countries may want to limit a prisoner’s human rights to promote penological 
aims. Thus, a prisoner’s right to a private and family life is often subordinate to 
the need to promote discipline within the prison and maintain public confidence 
in the system of punishment. In order to exact an ‘adequate’ punishment, 
prisoners have little control or autonomy over their daily lives. Those in authority 
rule every aspect of the prisoner's existence. Whilst this may make prison a 
sufficiently unpleasant and punishing experience, it does not serve to rehabilitate 
the offender, depriving them of the opportunity to take responsibility for their 
own lives or decisions. Garland makes the point that all public institutions such as 
schools, and hospitals as well as prisons only partially achieve the multiple aims 
and objectives that they have.849 Foucault argues that prisons ‘fail’ in that they 
produce more delinquents than criminals than they reform, but Garland argues if 
one takes a more realistic approach to penological aims, then prisons can be seen 
as very successful.850 Prisons succeed very well at incapacitating those judged to 
be dangerous or harmful to society. Prisoners themselves are defined as abnormal, 
different to law-abiding members of society who deserve punishment, not the 
chance to start a family.851 They are seen as legitimate subjects for harsh and 
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punitive treatment. In the arena of sentencing, punitiveness would be require the 
excessive use of pain for the offender, either physical or emotional, above and 
beyond that which is proportionate to the crime.852 This punitiveness can be 
exercised at the individual level in relations between staff and prisoners, in the 
conditions prisoners are kept it, and in the way the overall prison regime controls 
prisoners. Matthews argues that in British prisons at least, conditions have 
improved for offenders, which disproves the ‘myth’ of punitiveness in the UK.853 
The improved conditions that are present within the UK under the Incentives and 
Earned Privileges Scheme (IEPS) have reduced the physical pains of 
imprisonment for some prisoners. The scheme is designed however to punish 
those who break prison rules by reducing them to basic living conditions. It is still 
a form of coercion and prisoners still keenly feel its effects.854 Prison is intended 
to be punitive, as many of these improvements are a privilege, not a given right 
for every prisoner.855 In a Green Paper from the Ministry of Justice, the need for 
prison to be a place of punishment is reiterated: ‘A prison sentence provides 
immediate and tough punishment.’856  An overly punitive penal system would 
leave little room for the possibility of prisoners planning to become parents whilst 
serving the prison sentences. Within the USA, many prison regimes and 
punishments are designed to be humiliating by the prison authorities and serve no 
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legitimate penological purpose.857 Matthew’s argument that these examples are 
limited and exceptional is unconvincing when incarceration rates continue to 
increase, and many different sources demonstrate both punitive opinions held by 
both the general public and officials such as politicians.858 Bottoms first coined 
the phrase ‘populist punitiveness’ in reference the effects of various influences 
over sentencing practice.859 He was not merely referring to public opinion 
regarding sentencing, but used the phrase ‘to convey the notion of politicians 
tapping into, and using for their own purposes, what they believe to be the 
public’s generally punitive stance.’860 In this interpretation, sentencing policy is 
driven by a need for the politician to be seen to be fulfilling the public’s desire for 
punitiveness, thus increasing their chances for election. This can lead to 
politicians adopting policies that they feel would be popular with the general 
public, even if privately they think it is not the most appropriate response to the 
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situation.861 Bottoms also describes is how politicians adopt a ‘twin-track 
approach’ to sentencing, in which there is a drive to incarcerate serious offenders 
for longer periods, whilst reducing sentence lengths for less serious offences.862 
The perceived desire of the population for a tougher approach to crime and prison 
would make the provision of reproductive assistance to many prisoners 
problematic, as it would be extremely unpopular with the majority of the 
electorate.  
Having a punitive view does not necessarily exclude a belief in 
redemption, as one can favour long and harsh sentences for other reasons, such as 
to deter potential offenders and to incapacitate the actual offender.863 In the 
context of prisoner reproduction this could mean that some support for prisoners 
having children may exist if it could be shown that it increased the likelihood of 
encouraging desistence and showed that prisoners were conforming to social 
expectations of being a good parent. However, a sizeable portion of Maruna and 
King’s sample believed that offenders were both evil and irredeemable, reflecting 
a view of prisoners as a dangerous other.864 This portion of the population are 
unlikely to view prisoners having children as compatible with a belief in harsh 
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punishment and may even view it as a way of offenders propagating their social 
deviancy to the next generation, thus continuing a social ill. 
Prison, Degradation and the Purpose of Punishment 
Arguments given by the relevant states and judiciary in favour prohibiting 
procreation as part of a prisoner’s punishment are weak and appear to be 
unsupported by statute law. They rely upon the ‘consequences’ argument: that 
removal of the right to procreate is a natural consequence of imprisonment and 
that imprisonment is a consequence of the individual prisoner’s offending. In 
other words, they are the authors of their own misfortune, and being unable to 
procreate is a legitimate part of that misfortune. There is no statutory basis to the 
prohibition of procreation, unlike the general prohibition on voting.865 This leaves 
the question of where the justification lies for continuing to prohibit procreation 
lies. It may be that these practices are not properly questioned and so continue 
unchallenged. There is little appetite to reform the approach of the courts and 
prison authorities in this area. It could be that prohibition on procreation has 
simply arisen as a consequence of the harsh prison regime that developed in 
England and Wales and the USA in the nineteenth and late twentieth century. As 
there are no ready legal justifications for the practice of stopping prisoners from 
becoming parents, it then becomes necessary to examine what other reasons may 
exist to continue to perpetuate these policies. One explanation may be the 
persistence of degradation and humiliation in the system of punishment, 
especially within the USA. 
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 To examine the effect and role of degradation within punishment it is 
important to return to imprisonment and examine ‘what’ imprisonment itself 
entails.  Imprisonment is defined by von Hirsch as ‘collective residential 
restraint.’866 The prisoner is kept against their will in a place not of their choosing, 
the place is residential and becomes the prisoner’s main or only place of residence. 
It is collective because the prisoner has to live with people who are not members 
of his family. He is restrained from leaving and socialising with whom he wants, 
when he wants. Nothing ‘extra’ is included in the von Hirsch definition of 
imprisonment, such as solitary confinement or physical torture, deprivation of 
sleep or humiliating rituals. He argues that dignity in prison is important, and that 
punishment should respect the inherent dignity of the individual prisoner, 
regardless of the offences they have committed.867 The offender is to be punished, 
or ‘censured’ as von Hirsch terms it, not humiliated.868 Being ‘censured’ or 
punished legitimately make the offender feel shame at their actions as an 
autonomous moral individual.869 Humiliation on the other hand creates shame not 
at their crime, but at the process of making them feel like inferior persons.870 The 
aim of a decent prison regime, if it must exist, is to attempt to retain the dignity of 
the offender.871  
The question may be then raised as to why prison regimes continue to be 
so punitive and humiliating. One answer may be the concepts of blame and guilt, 
which are seen to justify the treatment of offenders in humiliating ways. Some 
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accounts of punishment involve blame being directed to the offender, and thus 
guilt is attributed to them. As explored earlier, blame is an important part of the 
process of punishment and, as many authors argue, justifies the punishment given 
to the offender. When blame is attributed to an offender, then so is guilt. In a 
formalised system of criminal punishment, guilt is attributed and established as 
part of the court system. As well as punishment being justified as a ‘rebalancing’ 
of the advantage taken by the offender, harsh punishment could also be seen as 
the expression of a desire for a society seeking atonement for guilt from the 
offender. This may be one of the reasons that a punitive penal system has evolved 
in the USA, and to some extent, England and Wales based upon harsh and austere 
prison conditions. Whitman, in his comparative study of American, French and 
German penal systems, makes the point that central to the concept of punishment 
is the concept of degradation.872 He states that ‘degradation is at once one of the 
most obvious aspects of punishment and one of the most neglected. It is clear that 
offenders feel punished partly because they feel degraded.’873 The processes of 
debasement and degradation serve other purposes rather than just to punish. 
Goffman, although referring to mental institutions, states that the process of 
institutionalisation of the individual begins by removing their sense of self, 
mortification of the individual and the removal of their sense of identity.874 This is 
done to make the individual more compliant to the regime and these ideas can 
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also apply to imprisonment. Clemmer also notes similar processes in the 
assimilation of the prisoner into the prison:  
‘The first and most obvious integrative step concerns his status. He 
becomes at once an anonymous figure in a subordinate group. A number 
replaces a name. He wears the clothes of the other members of the 
subordinate group. He is questioned and admonished.’875  
The prisoner is being placed in a subordinate position as part of their 
punishment, but both patient and prisoner are being subdued in order to create a 
more compliant member of the ‘inferior’ group. This is the continuation of a 
practice that was instigated by the penal reformers of the late nineteenth century 
in which the tread wheel and humiliating uniforms and prison routines were 
designed to degrade the prisoner.876  
Whitman argues that the current drive towards punitiveness in prisons is 
also due in part to the ‘harshness’ of American culture, racism and evangelical 
religion.877 Some evidence of these practices can be seen in prison sentences in 
the USA and to a lesser extent in England and Wales. Some prisons in the USA 
require prisoners to wear bright and humiliating clothes, and some states have 
introduced chain gangs and boot camps.878 Some solitary confinement regimes 
deprive prisoners of all physical human contact, even automating the opening of 
doors to reduce the contact the prisoner has with a human being.879   
                                                
875 Donald Clemmer, The Prison Community (First Pub 1940, 1966 Holt, Rinehart and Winston) 
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876 Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and Sanctions (Clarendon Press, 1993) 80. 
877 James Q Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between 
America and Europe (2003, Oxford University Press) 7. 
878 One example is Sheriff Joe Arpaio requires all male prisoners to wear black and white striped 
convict uniforms and pink boxer shorts in Maricopa County Arizona, as well as be incarcerated 
under canvas. Tim Mak ‘Arizona's Tent City Jail: Where prisoners wear pink underwear, eat 
meatless meals and swelter in the 120-degree heat’ (Washington Examiner, 8 April 2014) 
<http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/tent-city-jail-where-prisoners-wear-pink-and-swelter-in-
120-degree-heat/article/2546924> accessed 31 March 2015. 
879 Jesenia Pizarro, Vanja M. K. Stenius, ‘Supermax Prisons: Their Rise, Current Practices, and 
Effect on Inmates’ (2004) 84 Pri J 248. 
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It may be seen as puzzling that a country, which on the surface has many 
markers of an egalitarian society, such as an absence of hereditary titled privilege 
and a strong written constitution, can promote more degrading punishment than 
other countries. Whitman argues that it is the lack of an aristocratic element in the 
USA, which provides the clue as to why it has developed a degrading system of 
punishment. Countries, such as France and Germany made a commitment to 
abolishing the distinction between low and high status offenders, such as high 
status offenders being beheaded, whilst those of a lower status were hanged.880 
Over time, these high status punishments replaced low status punishments, whilst 
America abolished high status treatment for all, levelling down.881  
Restricting prisoners from having children could also be seen as a result of 
the desire for authorities to create punitive regimes and in some circumstances, 
humiliating regimes, thus reinforcing their lower status. Whilst this may not be as 
prominent in England and Wales as it is in the USA, certain aspects of the penal 
regime are designed to make prisoners feel their inferior status. Prison authorities 
in England and Wales would deny that any of the restrictions placed upon 
prisoners are designed to humiliate and degrade, but requiring an individual who 
wants children to submit to public scrutiny for permission to become a parent 
could be argued to be humiliating. Even in the case of male prisoners, where the 
practical logistics of AI places a minimal burden on the prison, a prisoner is still 
required to submit to intrusive and extensive examination of their motives to 
become a parent to a Government Minister. This is often justified by stating that 
the restriction of the ability to have children is part of the punishment of 
                                                
880 James Q Whitman, Harsh Justice: Criminal Punishment and the Widening Divide between 
America and Europe (2003, Oxford University Press) 9. 
881 ibid 10. 
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imprisonment. If one returns to the framework sketched by von Hirsch, of a penal 
system that is limited to physical incarceration alone, which are designed to 
censure and not humiliate, then it could be argued that these restrictions go 
beyond that which is required to censure prisoners. 
Punishment and Civil Death  
The concept of civil death, where the law treats individual prisoners as if 
they are actually dead, originally arose in English common law. An individual 
convicted of a felony or treason received the death penalty and was considered to 
be dead in the eyes of the law.882 This medieval doctrine of attainder, along with 
slavery, argues Dayan, has enabled the law to conceive of the modern prisoner as 
someone who is dead in law, but still exists in living, breathing form.883 Attainder 
meant that the offender’s blood was considered tainted. Legally this meant that he 
could no longer inherit property or pass it to his heirs, the condemned person’s 
property passed to the state. As the prisoner was dead in the eyes of the law, the 
law no longer protected him, he could not enter into contracts or stand in court. 
Civil death was not the punishment itself, the execution of the prisoner was the 
punishment, civil death reflected the prisoner’s status of condemned. This 
allowed for his property and effects to be settled prior to death.884 Within England 
and Wales, the law of attainder was removed by statute in 1870.885 The US 
                                                
882 Anonymous, ‘Note: Civil Death Statutes Medieval Fiction in a Modern World’ (1937) 50 Harv 
L R 968, 969. 
883 Colin Dayan, The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons 
(Princeton University Press, 2011) 49; see also William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of 
England: Book the Fourth (4 edn, Oxford, 1750, digitised on Internet Archive) 373-374. 
<https://ia902705.us.archive.org/0/items/commentariesonla04blac/commentariesonla04blac.pdf> 
accessed 20 June 2015. 
884 Susan N Herman, ‘Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in 
Dialogue (1998) 77 Or L Rev 1229, 1238; Harry David Saunders, ‘Civil Death: A New Look at an 
Ancient Doctrine’ (1970) 11 Wm & Mary L Rev 988, 990. 
885 Forfeiture Act 1870 s1.  
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Constitution also prohibits Bills of Attainder.886 Some principles of civil death in 
England and Wales survive in the form of the disenfranchisement of prisoners 
whilst serving their sentence and prohibition from standing for public office.887 
Prisoners in the USA have greater limitations placed on them. In many states, 
prohibitions on voting extend after their sentence, either requiring the offender to 
fulfil a time period after release before voting again, or by barring the ex-prisoner 
from voting for life.888 In New York and Rhode Island, prisoners sentenced to life 
are classed as having died a civil death, with the exception that they can sue in 
court.889  
Even though prisoners are no longer seen as legal slaves, they ‘are not 
quite seen as full-fledged human beings either.’890  In other words, prisoners 
occupy a space as a kind of inferior citizen. Whilst this is a departure from the 
status of the prisoner as a ‘slave of the state’ as described in Ruffin, there are still 
barriers to prisoners becoming parents created by a prisoner’s treatment as less 
than a citizen.891 Whilst incarcerated, prisoners lack the rights normally associated 
with citizenship, the ability to earn a living in comparable conditions to those 
                                                
886 Legislative Bills of Attainder are prohibited under US Const. Art. 1 Sec. 9. State Bills of 
Attainder are banned under US Const. Art. 1 Sec. 10. 
887 Prisoners cannot vote, see Representation of the People Act 1983 s3(1); Hirst v United 
Kingdom (no 2) (2006) 42 EHRR 41 para 22. Current prisoners and former prisoners who have 
served more than 12 months in prison cannot stand for election to Parliament, see Representation 
of the People Act 1981 s1. 
888 There are estimated to be 5.3 million people are disenfranchised in the USA because they have 
a criminal conviction and that 4 million of these are living in the community outside of prisons. It 
is also estimated that one in seven African American males are disenfranchised because of a 
felony conviction. Kentucky and Virginia remove the vote permanently from all people convicted 
of a felony, and a further eight states remove the right to vote permanently from some categories 
of offenders. In 20 other states, the right to vote is only restored once probation and parole have 
been completed. Erika Wood, Restoring the Right to Vote (Brennan Center for Justice, 2009) 3; 
Susan Easton Prisoners' Rights: Principles and Practice (Routledge, 2011) 231. 
889 New York Civil Rights - Article 7 - § 79-A Consequence of Sentence to Imprisonment for Life; 
State of Rhode Island General Laws, Title 13 Criminals- Correctional Institutions Chapter 13-6 
Loss of Rights by Prisoners, 13-6-1 Life Prisoners Deemed Civilly Dead. 
890 Susan N Herman, ‘Slashing and Burning Prisoners' Rights: Congress and the Supreme Court in 
Dialogue (1998) 77 Or L Rev 1229. 
891 Ruffin v Commonwealth, 62 Va. 790, 796 (Va. 1872).  
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outside in free society and the right to vote.892 Prisoners are thus disabled in many 
ways from being an active parent by the state. As well as physical confinement 
precluding many prisoners from actively caring for existing or future children, 
enforced idleness through solitary confinement or poorly paid prison work 
prevent prisoners from financially contributing to their children either. Many 
countries attempt to minimise the ‘collateral effects’ of imprisonment, allowing 
prisoners to retain continued access to the social security system, so that their 
benefits are retained on release from prison.893  
Links between slavery and imprisonment and consequent civil death are 
not a coincidence.894 Patterson highlights that in many societies from the Middle 
Ages until the nineteenth century, some prisoners were held as penal slaves and 
put to work.895 Whilst England and Wales is not exempt from the effects of 
racism within the criminal justice system, the prominent position of slavery 
within the consciousness of the USA creates even further reaching effects for 
minority populations.896 The USA continues to suffer the direct effects of racial 
segregation and the past history of slavery at a fundamental level.897 With high 
                                                
892 In Maine and Vermont prisoners can continue to vote whilst serving prison sentences. This is 
prohibited in all other states. Jean Chung, ‘Felony Disenfranchisement: A Primer’ (The Sentencing 
Project’ April 2014) 
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/fd_Felony%20Disenfranchisement%20Primer.pdf 
accessed 20 June 2015.  
893 Vivien Stern, ‘Prisoners as Citizens: A Comparative View’ (2002) 49 Probation J 130, 134 
135. Stern notes Russian prisoners continue to accrue and maintain their social security benefits 
whilst serving their prison sentence and prison work in Poland allows prisoners to continue to 
accrue pension and workers’ rights. More generally, countries such as Norway use the ‘import’ 
model, which means that prisoners are entitled to the same services as all free citizens.    
894 Colin Dayan, The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons 
(Princeton University Press, 2011) 57-63; Susan Easton, Prisoners’ Rights: Principles and 
Practice (Routledge, 2011) 21. 
895Penal slavery was practiced in Spain, France, Italy and Russia. Orlando Patterson, Slavery and 
Social Death: A Comparative Study (Harvard University Press, 1982) 128. 
896 Jean N Shklar, American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion (The Tanner Lectures on Human 
Values, Harvard University Press, 1991) 48. 
897 Chain gangs, reminiscent of slaves working on plantations are increasing in popularity in the 
USA. Browne compares these modern developments to the convict leasing system in operation 
after the abolition of slavery in 1865. See Jaron Browne, ‘Rooted in Slavery: Prison Labor 
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levels of incarceration in the USA and a bias towards imprisoning African 
American and Hispanic people, it could be argued that any restriction on prisoners 
having children or maintaining a relationship with their existing children will 
have a disproportionately negative effect on minority populations.898 Patterson 
terms the process through which slaves become civilly dead is through the 
process of ‘natal alienation.’899 He states ‘I prefer the term “natal alienation” 
because it goes directly to the heart of what is critical in the slave’s forced 
alienation, the loss of the ties of birth in both ascending and descending 
generations.’900 Whilst prisoners are not in the position of slaves in the sense that 
they are completely restricted from knowing about their ancestors and family 
members, it could be argued that prisoners experience some form of natal 
alienation when incarcerated. Access between prisoner and family member is 
limited, restricted and defined by the prison authorities. The ability to procreate is 
most circumstances is removed, prisoners are unable to continue their family line 
once they are incarcerated. Visits, rather than being viewed as a human right, are 
seen as a privilege to be given as a reward for good behaviour and removed for 
bad behaviour.901 Nagel compares the slave who loses the right to their children 
when they are sold off into slavery to the prisoner who loses custody and parental 
                                                                                                                                
Exploitation’ (2007) Race Poverty & Environ 42. 
898 Nearly 3% of the total black male population of the US (all ages) was incarcerated on 
December 31, 2013.  This compares to 1% of Hispanic men resident in the US and 0.5% of white 
men. See E. Ann Carson, Bureau of Justice Statistics Prisoners in 2013 (Office of Justice 
Programs, 2014) 8. 
899 Orlando Patterson, ‘Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study’ (Harvard University 
Press, 1982) 7. 
900 ibid. 
901 Joseph Murray, ‘The effects of imprisonment on families and children of prisoners’ in Alison 
Liebling, Shadd Maruna, (eds), The Effects of Imprisonment (Routledge, 2005) 454; Alice Diver, 
‘The ‘Earned Privilege’ of Family Contact in Northern Ireland: Judicial Justification of Prisoners’ 
Loss of Family Life’ (2008) 47 How J 486. 
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rights over their children.902 Individual prisoners may be prevented from either 
having children or from maintaining a relationship with their existing children, 
and so natal alienation occurs. 
The desire to remove rights from prisoners, especially those convicted to a 
life sentence or a death sentence appears to stem from the notion that a person 
‘lacks the right to himself.’903 The life-sentenced prisoner is being punished by 
being treated as though they are dead whilst still physically alive.904 Whilst it 
could be argued that prisons in England and Wales may not operate such under 
such a punitive system as the USA, prisoners are still denied the ability to start 
under the same principle that they do not have the right to parent, develop 
families and relationships. Kirkley argues that the right to procreate should not be 
granted to any prisoners, especially those serving life sentences, citing civil death 
as one of justifications.905  
Kirkley may mean the phrase ‘life term’ to only mean individuals who are 
serving a ‘whole life’ tariff for especially grievous crimes and will never be 
released from prison. In the USA, the number of ‘whole life’ sentences is larger, 
as in many states it is the ‘lesser’ sentence for homicide or murder, with the most 
heinous crimes being punished with the death sentence.906 If, as Kirkley suggests, 
a line is drawn between those serving a life sentence and those who are not, this 
leads to further issues. If a prisoner has the prospect of being released on licence 
                                                
902 Mechthild E Nagel, ‘Patriarchal Ideologies and Women’s Domestication’ in Mechthild E 
Nagel, Anthony J Nocella II, (eds) The End of Prisons: Reflections from the Decarceration 
Movement (Rodopi, 2013) 164. 
903 Colin Dayan, The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons 
(Princeton University Press, 2011) 57. 
904 ibid. 
905 Rachel Michael Kirkley, ‘Prisoners and Procreation: What Happened Between Goodwin and 
Gerber? (2002) 30 Pepperdine L Rev 93, 119. 
906 In the USA in 2012 there were 49,000 prisoners serving a whole life tariff compared with 49 in 
the UK. Ashley Nellis, assisted by Jean Chung, Life Goes On: The Historic Rise of Life Sentences 
in America (The Sentencing Project, 2012) 16. 
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at some stage, and thus ‘redeemable’ then this arguably justifies procreation being 
permitted on rehabilitative grounds. To take the idea of civil death further, one 
may ask whether those prisoners serving a whole life tariff are considered so 
irredeemable, corrupt and evil that they are deemed to have died a civil death, 
which requires removal of their right to procreate. It could be argued that in 
specific circumstances, where prisoners have been convicted of harming children, 
or worse, killing them, that their tariff in prison specifically excludes their right to 
procreate based upon a proportionate assessment of the punishment that they 
should suffer.   
This concept of civil death becomes even more pronounced in the case of 
prisoners sentenced to death. The case of Anderson v Vasquez, raises the question 
of whether those on death row should be allowed to become parents, even in the 
face of their own, usually inevitable deaths.907 Whilst many prisoners languish on 
death row negotiating the appeals process for years, it would also be possible that 
a person on death row may predecease the conception and birth of his child, or die 
shortly after birth. Many may question whether someone should become a parent 
with the knowledge that the only possible type parenthood open to them would be 
genetic reproduction, as they would not be able to care for the child. In the case of 
female death row prisoners, some have suggested that allowing them to have 
children could lead to some prisoners delaying their sentence by becoming 
pregnant and having a child.908 A prisoner may be sentenced to death for 
                                                
907 Anderson v Vasquez 827 F Supp 617 (1992). The case concerned death row sentenced 
prisoners who were claiming that they should be allowed access to conjugal visits from their 
partners, and if this was not allowed then they should be allowed to provide semen so that their 
partners can become pregnant. The case is not considered legal authority on the question of 
whether prisoners have the right to access AI facilities because the prisoners failed to exhaust their 
grounds of appeal through the prison avenues first.  
908 Goodman argues that female death row prisoners could potentially ensure they are pregnant 
until they pass the menopause. Ellen Goodman, ‘And Now, The Right to Keep Genes in Pool’ St. 
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murdering a child, and allowing that prisoner to procreate via AI would be 
morally repugnant to many.  
The loss of the ability to have children when in prison may not just 
adversely affect prisoners killed by the state or those sentenced to prison for their 
whole life. The continuing collateral consequences of imprisonment can last far 
longer than an initial prison sentence.909 This loss of rights has been termed as the 
‘new civil death.’910 Losing the ability to have children whilst in prison could also 
be included as one of these continuing collateral consequences of imprisonment, 
especially in the case of women who undergo the menopause when incarcerated, 
thus losing the opportunity to have children naturally. Thus restrictions on 
procreation can potentially affect all prisoners and their partners, not just those 
sentenced to life. 
                                                                                                                                
Louis Post-Dispatch (Missouri, 12 January 1992) Everyday Magazine 2C. 
909 Chin GJ, ‘The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass Incarceration’ 
(2012) 160 U Pa L Rev 1789, 1791. 
910 ibid 1792.  
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Summary 
The question of what is punishment, how it should be defined and justified 
are problematic and difficult to answer. Traditionally, two main strands of thought, 
utilitarianism and retributivism have all been used at one point been used to 
justify punishment in general and imprisonment more specifically imprisonment 
as a method of punishment. 
Hart’s definition of punishment provides a useful starting point for 
considering state sanctioned punishment within the criminal justice system. It 
states that the punishment must be unpleasant, it must have official legitimacy, 
usually in the form of a judicial court, and it must be in response to an offence 
committed by the offender. This account of judicial punishment is fairly 
uncontroversial; the offender commits a crime against the law and is punished by 
an officially recognised body. The controversy arises in the justification of the 
institution of punishment, and the seemingly opposed justifications of 
utilitarianism and retributivism. 
The utilitarian account of punishment is forward-looking; it is justified by 
the consequences of the punishment, such as the deterrent effect of the 
punishment and the reduction in crime. On the other hand, the retributive account 
of punishment is backwards looking, justified solely by the offence that the 
offender committed. Some authors, such as Rawls have attempted to provide a 
mixed account of punishment which takes into account both utilitarianism and 
retributivism. It could be argued that this makes sense on one level, that utilitarian 
concerns justify political interventions that create punishments for crime, whilst 
on an individual level offenders are punished because they have wrongly 
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infringed on another person’s rights, in effect, using them as a means to an end. 
Retributive punishment aims to redress the imbalance between offender and 
victim. This does not provide a complete account, however as it does not take into 
account strict liability offences, or actions that may be morally wrong, but are 
legally permissible.  
When one examines the practical expression of punishment, such as 
imprisonment and community sentences that involve offenders being publically 
punished, it can be seen that retributive justifications are of more importance to 
government bodies. The primary moral justification for the punishment does not 
arise from the fact that society needs to be protected from an offender, but 
because they have done something wrong. Some mentally ill patients are 
incarcerated against their will, but their hospitalisation, whilst arguably 
stigmatised, does not carry the shame and stigma of prison. Utilitarian 
justifications are also important, but are secondary to this one consideration. 
Andrew von Hirsch refers to this as ‘censure’ although some retributivists take 
punishment to equate with humiliation. This is evidenced by expressions of 
punishment, mainly in the USA, which are primarily designed to humiliate the 
offender, to dehumanise them and remove their human dignity. 
As the ‘punishment’ part of a prison sentence is the physical incarceration 
of the individual prisoner, it could be argued that preventing the prisoner from 
procreating is not an explicit part of the punishment that is meted out to them. 
Whilst there are rules enacted in legislation and policy documents that explicitly 
state the parameters of the punishment (such as the duration of the prison 
sentence) there are other aspects of the prison regime, which are left to local 
prison authority discretion.  
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Prohibition of procreation is not adequately justified by any of the 
conventional arguments used to justify punishment in general. If one considers 
utilitarian justifications, then few prisoners are deterred from crime by the 
specific knowledge that should that they be caught, they will be prevented from 
having children. This may not even be general knowledge for many offenders, 
and may only become a concern after many years of childless incarceration. From 
a more practical perspective, prisoners having children does not endanger society 
itself, especially as ART can facilitate reproduction without intercourse. 
Rehabilitation, another concern of utilitarianism, may be enhanced and not 
stunted by prisoners who have strong links with family members who give them 
additional reasons to desist from crime. 
From a retributive perspective, if society is aiming to move beyond 
humiliation to ‘commensurate deserts’ and ‘censure’ then punishing prisoners by 
simply stating that they cannot have children is also unjustified except in a few 
cases where prisoners have abused or murdered children. In the USA and in 
England and Wales, prison means far more than simple incarceration in a place 
against the prisoner’s wishes. Although it depends upon the institution itself, there 
is wide evidence that the aim of many regimes is to humiliate with uniforms that 
denote inferior status of the prisoner, making them out as ‘other.’ This 
debasement or degradation may be the real reason that prisoner procreation 
continues to be prohibited, even if this is not explicitly expressed by any statute 
law or case law.   
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Chapter Eight: Reproduction and 
Parenting Outside of Prison 
Introduction 
How children are raised is of primary importance not just to children, but 
also to society in general. Parents in particular are often judged on how well or 
how badly they raise their children. Offending behaviour is often blamed on poor 
parenting and ‘troubled families’, and was thought to be one cause of the unrest of 
the riots of 2011, which affected London and other British cities.911  
This chapter begins with an examination of the normally private sphere of 
reproduction and what is required to become a parent, including whether legal 
regulation is justified at the stage of conception. To appreciate the challenges that 
may face prisoner parents as well as how reproduction itself may be regulated, it 
is necessary to examine reproduction in free society. The right to procreate within 
free society is given strong protection because of the value given to privacy and 
autonomy. However, any putative parent who requires licensed fertility treatment 
in England and Wales and in some US states will be required to satisfy a test, 
which determines their suitability as parents.912 Legal restriction of an 
individual’s right to procreate is generally limited to a small number of cases in 
the USA where non-procreation has been made a condition of parole.913 In a small 
group of people a court may also decide it is in their best interests to be sterilised 
                                                
911 The Riot Communities and Victims Panel found in their survey of the evidence that many 
family backgrounds of the rioters, whilst not as troubled as those identified by the Troubled 
Families Programme set up by the UK Government in the aftermath of the riots, still had 
problematic backgrounds. Riot Communities and Victim’s Panel, After the Riots: The final report 
of the Riots Communities and Victims Panel (Riots Communities and Victims Panel, 2012) 37-39. 
912 For more details of assisted treatment in England and Wales see footnote 672. David Adamson, 
‘Regulation of Assisted Reproductive Technologies in the United States’ (2005) 39 Fam L Q 727. 
913 One example is State v Oakley 2001 WI 103 (2001). 
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as they are mentally disabled and would not be able to cope with the realities of 
pregnancy and parenting.914 
The chapter will then turn to the right to rear or parent. In contrast to the 
strong private autonomy protection of the right to procreate, parenting itself is 
more subject to legal regulation. Rules providing a minimal threshold of expected 
care exist to protect children from negligent and abusive parents. On the other end 
of the scale, ideal and expected standards of parenting are high, and are often 
described as unrealistic and intensive.915 This has the knock-on effect of only 
those parents who conform to these standards being seen as fit parents. The 
language of risk and child welfare is used to describe children that are not at risk 
of child abuse.916 
Next, the role of mothers and fathers will be considered. Parenthood itself 
is still seen as a gendered activity, with the majority of the childcare seen as the 
responsibility of the mother.917 Traditional standards of fatherhood view the ‘good’ 
father as a financial provider, with the mother acting as gatekeeper to a closer 
relationship with children.918 This is reflected in law by the special protection 
given until very recently, to heterosexual and monogamous unions in the UK.919  
                                                
914 One example from England and Wales is the case of Re F (Mental Patient: Sterilisation) 
[1990] 2 AC 1. 
915 Charlotte Faircloth, ‘Intensive Parenting and the Expansion of Parenting’ in Ellie Lee, 
Charlotte Faircloth, Jan Macvarish, (eds) Parenting Culture Studies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 
25-37. 
916 Diane M Hoffman, ‘Risky Investments: Parenting and the production of the ‘resilient child.’ 
(2010) 12 Health, Risk & Soc 385. 
917 Sharon Hays, The Cultural Contradiction of Motherhood (Yale University Press, 1996) 8. 
918 Donald Woods Winnicott, The child, the family and the outside world (Pelican, 1964) 115; 
David Pepinoe, ‘American Family Decline, 1960- 1990: A Review and Appraisal’ (1993) 55 J 
Marriage & Fam 527, 528. 
919 Martha Albert Fineman, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and Other Twentieth 
Century Tragedies’ (Routledge, 1995) 15. Same sex civil partnerships became legal in England 
and Wales in 2004 with the passage of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. Same sex marriages 
became legal in 2014 with the passage of the Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Act 2013. In the USA, 
states are compelled to legalise same sex marriages and recognise marriages from other states. 
under the Fourteenth Amendment Obergefell v Hodges 576 U. S. ____ (2015) (Decided 26 June 
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Autonomy and the Right to Procreate. 
Deciding whether or not to have children is one of the most personal, and 
sometimes, one of the most difficult decisions an individual can make.  It can 
affect every aspect of an individual’s life, altering their role within their social 
sphere as well as within society as a whole. There are many reasons behind why a 
person decides to have a child. Parenthood can mark the beginning of ‘adult life’ 
for some, with the responsibility that comes of being sole carer of a vulnerable 
infant. It marks the creation of a family, and in some circumstances cements a 
relationship with their life partner. The right to beget a child is in essence the right 
to create new life, to create an embryo that will be born. Most children are 
conceived naturally through sexual intercourse. Individuals have the right to 
choose their sexual partner, the right to marry the partner of their choice and the 
right to found a family with the partner of their choice. The state does not pry into 
the many reasons people have for procreating, providing that they do not require 
fertility treatment that is governed by the state.920 Whilst the care of children is 
subject to certain legal and social controls, the state itself has little interest in 
preventing competent and consenting adults from becoming parents. Many 
different ‘arrangements’ that may fall outside legally regulated fertility treatment 
are considered a private matter, regardless how ‘undesirable’ they may be.921 
Individuals, who smoke, take illegal drugs, abuse alcohol and are on state benefits 
                                                
920 Emily Jackson, ‘Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 65 MLR 176. 
921 See footnote 672. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Guidance requires a clinician 
to make judgments about the suitability of the potential parent, including whether they have a 
criminal background and whether they have a history of drug or alcohol abuse. Emily Jackson, 
‘Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle’ (2002) MLR 176; Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority Code of Practice (Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 8th ed, 2009, 
revised April 2015) para 8.10. Surrogacy itself is also controlled to some extent by the Surrogacy 
Arrangement Act 1985 2(1), which in the UK prevents the commercialisation of the surrogacy 
arrangement and prevents it from turning into an enforceable contract. 
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can have children with no restrictions made upon their fertility. Children can be 
born to individuals who are not in a relationship with one other, or who have 
made private AI arrangements.922 Even though these people may not be in the 
ideal situation to start a family, the state still does not interfere with competent 
adults who want to have children. To do so would be an unjust interference with 
the autonomy of the person and legally very difficult to regulate. Conception, 
pregnancy and to some extent, parenthood, are well within the private domain and 
central to the personhood of the individual. Jackson states that individual 
reproductive autonomy should be respected so long as is not ‘incompatible with 
other more important social values’.923 The liberal view is that a competent 
individual is free to use their body in whatever way they wish, which includes 
exercising their reproductive choice.924 Some authors argue that reproductive 
autonomy is central to the individual’s ability to live a decent life. Restriction of 
the ability to control reproductive capability prevents an individual from 
conducting their life according to their own beliefs and wishes.925 It is inaccurate 
however, to claim that a person has an absolute right to reproduce. There are legal 
restrictions on ‘absolute’ reproductive autonomy in place: for example, incest and 
                                                
922 Within England and Wales there are concerns about unlicensed sperm donation where private 
individuals make arrangements for donation. Women are at risk of abuse from men insisting on 
having sexual intercourse, as well as disease transmission. Male donors remain financially 
responsible for any children that may result. Whilst individual private arrangements are not illegal, 
distributing sperm without a license from the HFEA is. See Thelma Etin, ‘Sperm websites 
addressing growing demand for donors?’ (BBC, 12 October 2010) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-
england-11344661 accessed 22 April 2015; Ciaran Jones, ‘Revealed: The ‘frightening’ world of 
unregulated internet sperm donation sites’ (Wales Online, 19 January 2014) 
<http://www.walesonline.co.uk/news/wales-news/frightening-world-unregulated-internet-sperm-
6520753> accessed 22 April 2015.  
923 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2001) 9. Jackson refers to this autonomous decision as a ‘self-regarding’ decision, not 
subject to public scrutiny. Emily Jackson, ‘Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare 
Principle’ (2002) 65 MLR 176, 182.  
924 ibid 2; Harry Brighouse, Adam Swift, ‘Parent's Rights and the Value of the Family’ (2006) 117 
Ethics 80. 
925 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2001) 7. 
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sexual intercourse with a minor are both criminal offences in the UK and in the 
USA.926 It is more accurate to describe a right to beget as a right to have a child 
from state interference, subject to the legally necessary restrictions on consent and 
consanguinity. There is no positive obligation upon the state to promote 
reproduction as a right.927 Rather, it is a negative right that should not be 
interfered with.928 For example, Article 12 does not give claimants a positive right 
to assistance with reproduction.929 It was drafted to enable people to marry and 
found a family without fear of being sterilised or limited in their reproductive 
choices in the aftermath of Nazi atrocities in World War II. As Deech 
acknowledges, many of the Articles are now interpreted in ways far removed 
from the intentions of the original drafters.930 This could be argued, however, to 
be how a human rights document should be used, as it is interpreted to reflect the 
current realities and aspirations of human rights provision in the 21st century. 
Deech argues there is no positive right to have a baby in UK law, as there is no 
corresponding legal responsibility to ensure access to medical treatment for 
infertility if a couple is unable to conceive naturally.931 The right to choose not to 
have children is a matter of personal autonomy over what happens to one’s own 
                                                
926 Sexual Offences Act 2003 s64- 65. The ECtHR ruled that the domestic law of Germany and 
other member states that outlaw consanguineous relationships between siblings is permissible 
under the doctrine of appreciation in pursuit of a legitimate aim, which is the protection of family 
life. The Court therefore found there had been no breach of Patrick Stübing’s Article 8 right to a 
private and family life when he was imprisoned for having sexual intercourse with his sister. 
Stübing v Germany (2012) 55 EHRR 24. The minimum age of consent in the UK is 16. In the 
USA it varies from 16 to 18 depending upon the state. See Kate Sutherland, ‘From Jailbird to 
Jailbait: Age of Consent Law and the Construction of Teenage Sexualities’ (2003) 9 Wm. & Mary 
J Women & L 313. 
927 Mary Warnock, ‘The Limits of Rights-based Discourse’ in JR Spencer, Anje Du Bois-Pedain 
(eds), Freedom and Responsibility in Reproductive Choice (Hart Publishing, 2006). 
928 David Archard, Children, Rights and Childhood (2 edn, Routledge, 2004, 2010 reprint) 138. 
929 Human Rights Act 1998 Schedule 1 Art 12. 
930 Ruth Deech, ‘Human Rights and Welfare’ (Gresham College, 11 May 2009) 
<http://www.gresham.ac.uk/lectures-and-events/human-rights-and-welfare> accessed 31 March 
2015. 
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body. To have a child involves the creation of a human being and with it come 
serious implications. The right to choose to use contraception argue O’Neill and 
Archard is not the same thing as the right to have a child.932  
Western societies place a high importance upon individual bodily 
autonomy; including respect for the right for competent adults to procreate. To 
remove this right by force would be seen as the ultimate infringement of personal 
autonomy. Robertson argues that a right to reproduce comes from the right to 
procreative liberty. He states ‘procreative liberty is the freedom to either have 
children or to avoid having them.’933 Quigley argues that this argument stems 
from the view that all people have a general right to liberty.934 Robertson argues 
that reproducing is central to the identity and culture of many people, and if the 
right is to be controlled or restricted, it must be for a legitimate reason. The 
presumption that people possess the right to procreate should remain high.935 
Other authors argue that the right to reproductive autonomy is rooted in bodily 
autonomy, and as one is entitled to do whatever one wants with their body, they 
are also entitled to have children. The Fourteenth Amendment protects privacy 
and individual freedom. The protection of individual freedom, argues Dworkin, 
also extends to the protection of procreative autonomy when deciding whether to 
abort a foetus.936 This is a right rooted in the importance of ‘individual human 
dignity: that people have the moral right- and the moral responsibility-to confront 
                                                
932 David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (2 edn, Routledge, 2004, 2010 reprint) 138; 
Onora O'Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2002) 61. 
933 John Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies (1994, 
Princeton University Press) 22. 
934 Muireann Quigley, ‘A Right to Reproduce?’ (2010) 24 Bioethics 403, 404. 
935 John Robertson, Children of Choice: Freedom and the New Reproductive Technologies 
(Princeton University Press, 1994) 22. 
936 Ronald Dworkin, Life’s Dominion: An Argument About Abortion, Euthanasia, and Individual 
Freedom (Vintage, 1993) 166. 
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the most fundamental questions about the meaning and values of their own lives 
for themselves.’937  
Whilst Dworkin used this argument in support of the right to abortion, 
Harris states that it also extends to choices made about procreation. His stance on 
procreative autonomy is strongly in favour of the individual making choices for 
themselves, even if this causes ‘offence.’938 Harris then states that this reasoning 
can justify the use of controversial technologies such as cloning oneself in order 
to have a child, or using the gametes from a dead spouse.939 However, as Archard 
states, abortion and procreation decisions are different. Abortion is about 
primarily about personal autonomy, deciding what happens to one’s own body. 
Procreation is concerned with making a positive decision to create new life that 
will become external to it’s mother’s body. Archard states for this reason ‘the 
right to bear children is not the simple corollary of the right not to bear 
children.’940  Floyd and Pomerantz argue, the body can be seen as ‘an owned 
object’ and as such it follows from that premise that a person is free to create new 
life.941 They do go on to argue however that it is not justifiable to treat the child as 
a mere appendage of the woman’s body, instead of as another individual with 
their own moral rights.942  Archard disagrees however, and views the right to 
beget children as having different qualities to the right to not beget them.943 
Archard states that the right to refuse to have children relates to self-determinism, 
the right to decide what happens to one's own body. This is different, he argues to 
                                                
937ibid. 
938 John Harris, ‘Rights and Reproductive Choice’ in John Harris, Søren Holm (eds) The Future of 
Human Reproduction: Ethics, Choice and Regulation (Clarendon Press, 2000) 36. 
939 ibid. 
940  David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (2 edn, Routledge, 2004, 2010 reprint) 138. 
941 SL Floyd, D Pomerantz, ‘Is there a Natural Right to Have Children?’ in Peg Tittle, (ed) Should 
Parents Be Licensed? Debating the Issues (Promethieus Books, 2004) 230. 
942 ibid 231 
943 David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (2 edn, Routledge, 2004, 2010 reprint) 138. 
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begetting children, which is the right to bring another human into existence.944 
This is a conditional right, which means that the putative parent should consider 
the responsibility that rearing a child entails.945 Robertson, however views 
reproductive autonomy as an extension of the right to self-determinism, which 
applies equally to having children as well as not having them.946 Archard 
represents a view of responsible parenthood, which could be argued to be the 
ideal situation, in which every child is wanted and planned for. This isn’t the 
reality for many parents however, who do not plan to conceive. It may be more 
accurate to conceptualise voluntary procreation deriving from individuals 
exercising their autonomy to procreate or have sexual intercourse. They are 
exercising free choice over how to use their own bodies, without specifically 
considering the child that may result from sexual intercourse. In the case of 
prisoners, in most cases in the USA and in England and Wales, they are prevented 
from having heterosexual sex so the only avenue left open to them is through the 
use of AI.947 This means that any child born to a prisoner who cannot have sexual 
intercourse would result from a conscious decision to have a child. There may be 
criticism of the reasons behind why a prisoner may wish to have a child and 
whether the prisoner has selfish reasons, which fail to consider the needs of their 
putative child first. Under the current regime in England and Wales, prisoners are 
                                                
944 ibid.  
945 ibid 139. 
946 John A Robertson, ‘Procreative Liberty’ in Peg Tittle (ed) Should Parents Be Licensed? 
Debating the Issues (Promethieus Books, 2004) 214. 
947 The Howard League for Penal Reform concluded that prisoners do have consensual sex with 
other prisoners whilst imprisoned through their research with former prisoners. See Alisa Stevens, 
Sex in prison: Experiences of former prisoners (Howard League for Penal Reform, 2015) 1. There 
is no specific rule which prohibits consensual sexual intercourse between prisoners see National 
Offender Management Service, Prison Service Instruction 47/2011 Prisoner Discipline 
Procedures (Ministry of Justice, 2011, updated 2013) 1.76 If seen by a third party however, they 
could be disciplined under PR 51 (20) / YOI R 55 (22). Sexual intercourse with partners outside of 
the prison is prohibited. For details of private or conjugal visits in the USA see footnote 653. 
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required to justify why they should be allowed AI treatment, in a way that those 
accessing fertility treatment are not required to do.948  
Fertility Treatment 
For some people, the desire to have children stems from a deep biological 
drive, with infertility and involuntary childlessness causing intense frustration and 
distress.949 If a couple or an individual in England and Wales requires licensed 
fertility treatment to achieve conception, then they lose the right to privacy that 
individuals enjoy when conceiving their child through sexual intercourse.950 In 
this situation, those seeking treatment are required to satisfy the child welfare 
requirements, in effect the treating clinicians have to judge whether those to be 
treated will be good parents.951 Jackson has argued that the decision to reproduce 
is a private one and it is inappropriate to require potential parents to satisfy the 
‘child welfare’ requirement before beginning treatment.952 Putative parents who 
require IVF are forced to justify their suitability to parent in a way that 
individuals procreating naturally are not. This child welfare requirement is similar 
to Victoria in Australia, which prohibits access to IVF treatment for those 
                                                
948 See Appendix for the conditions that prisoners have to satisfy to apply for AI. The welfare of 
the child requirements for AI do not ask the putative parents to say why they want a baby, but are 
to ensure that they do not have a history of abusing children or could give cause for concern for 
the safety of children born as a result of treatment. See Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Authority Code of Practice (Human Fertilisation and Embryology, 8th ed, 2009, revised April 
2015) para 8.10. 
949 One example is McQuillan et al’s study of a random sample of 580 American women showed 
that infertility linked with involuntary childlessness caused significant distress. Julia McQullian, 
Arthur L Griel, Lynn White, Mary Casey Jacob, ‘Frustrated Fertility: Infertility and Psychological 
Distress Among Women’ (2003) 65 J Marriage & Fam 1007. 
950 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, ‘your fertility treatment options’ (Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 5 August 2014) http://www.hfea.gov.uk/fertility-
treatment-options.html accessed 25 April 2015. 
951 See footnote 672. The treating clinician has to have regard to the welfare of any children born 
to those treated for infertility. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority ‘Welfare of the 
Child and Patient History Form’ (Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority, 2010). 
952 Emily Jackson, ‘Conception and the Irrelevance of the Welfare Principle’ (2002) 65 MLR 176, 
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convicted of sexual or other serious offences, even after their release from 
prison.953 
In the USA, access to treatment varies from state to state, and is usually 
not covered by healthcare insurance.954 There is very little legal regulation in the 
USA governing access to fertility treatment, at either state or federal level.955 The 
Federal Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act passed in 1992 
requires that data for all IVF cycles performed in the USA are collected and 
published, allowing for clinic comparisons to be made.956 Section 3 of the same 
Act requires that the Secretary of Health and Human Services in conjunction with 
the Center for Disease Control devise a model program for certifying embryo 
laboratories.957 Adoption of this certification scheme on a state level is optional 
however. All medical centres that deal with gametes and embryos are required to 
register with the Food and Drug Administration.958 Access to IVF treatment and 
the number of embryos that can be transferred to women varies from state to state. 
Right to Bear 
The right to bear can only extend to those who are biologically female, as 
only those who are biologically female can become pregnant.959 Pregnancy is 
                                                
953 The Assisted Reproductive Treatment Act 2008 s14 (1) (i) (ii) (State of Victoria, Australia) 
prohibits the provision of assisted fertility treatment in the case of a criminal conviction for a 
serious sexual or violent offence in either the woman seeking treatment or the partner who is being 
treated with her at the same time. See Patient Review Panel v ABY & ABZ [2012] VSCA 264. 
954 Michelle Andrews, ‘Health law could affect fertility treatment coverage’ (NBC News.com, 26 
January 2011) http://www.nbcnews.com/id/41254553/ns/health-health_care/t/health-law-could-
affect-fertility-treatment-coverage/#.UDeUI0RreJU accessed 1 July 2015. According to Andrews, 
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955 Melinda B Henne, M Kate Bundorf, ‘Insurance mandates and trends in infertility treatments’ 
(2008) 89 Fertility & Sterility 66. 
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958 Code of Federal Regulations Title 21 Part 1271 Human Cells, Tissues, and Cellular Tissue-
Based Products; Subpart B Procedures for Registration and Listing revised 1 April 2014 (USA). 
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who retain their female sexual organs can also become pregnant and carry that pregnancy to term. 
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seen by many cultures as a pivotal moment in the life of a woman. There are 
feminist critiques of pregnancy and childbirth that describe it as a horrific 
experience. The feminist Firestone describes childbirth as a ‘barbaric’ experience, 
akin to ‘shitting a pumpkin.’960 Part of the negative response to the prospect of 
pregnancy and motherhood during the second-wave of feminism could have been 
due to feminists at the time rejecting mothering entirely as a patriarchal trap.961 
More positively, there are feminist accounts of pregnancy and childbirth that 
reclaim it as a positive and empowering experience.962 One example of a more 
positive outlook is that of de Marneffe’s who states that the ‘women’s desire to 
have children has survived the vagaries of feminist suspicion and is now fully 
respectable and in public view.’963  Whilst de Marneffe argues that the desire to 
have children is not contentious, the desire to want to actively care for them is 
taboo. For women in free society to admit that she wishes to ‘stay at home’ to 
look after her children is ‘embarrassing.’964  As such, de Marneffe is reacting 
against the matrophobia that was evident from other authors such as Firestone. 
Gender becomes prominent in the debate between maternal and foetal 
rights, especially when there is conflict between the actions of the pregnant 
woman and the foetus. Jackson notes that many feminists have argued for a ‘de-
medicalisation’ of pregnancy, with some viewing the increasing medicalisation of 
                                                
960 Shulasmith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex: The case for feminist revolution (Bantam Books, 
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961 D Lynn O’Brien Hallstein, ‘Conceiving Intensive Mothering’ (2006) 8 J Assoc Res Mothering 
96, 103 Andrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution (Virago, 
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childbirth as another example of male control over women’s bodies.965  Although 
there is evidence of a number of situations where the behaviour of pregnant and 
parturient women is controlled through a variety of social methods, there are very 
few legal requirements for women to behave in a certain way to ensure the health 
of her foetus.966 Whilst there are certain legal conflicts over what behaviour is 
morally acceptable for pregnant women, there is no legal foundation to govern the 
desired behaviour for the benefit of the foetus. In England and Wales, women 
cannot be forced to give up smoking, or drinking to excess.967 In the USA some 
states have enacted laws to protect foetuses that have died as a result of a pregnant 
woman’s actions.968 This is not controlling pregnant women’s behaviour directly 
however, as it retrospectively punishes women after the foetus has died. Likewise, 
pregnant women cannot be forced to undergo a forced caesarean section even if 
their refusal could lead to the death of themselves or their foetus.969  
                                                
965 Janet Gallagher, ‘Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong With Fetal Rights’ (1987) 
10 Harv Wom LJ 9; Emily Jackson Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy 
(Hart Publishing, 2001) 130.  
966 For an account of births in the USA where medical staff are alleged to deny women the right to 
make informed decisions about their care by abusing them, see Henci Goer ‘Cruelty in Maternity 
Wards: Fifty Years Later’ (2010) 19 J Perinatal Education 34.  
967 The Court of Appeal ruled late in 2014 that a child cannot gain compensation from the 
Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority for damage caused by her gestational mother’s 
excessive drinking. The child suffered severe Foetal Alcohol Spectrum Disorder and tried to claim 
her mother’s drinking was a crime of violence under the section 23 of the Offences Against the 
Persons Act 1861. CP (A Child) v CICA [2014] EWCA Civ 1554.  
968 Emily Jackson, Regulating Reproduction: Law, Technology and Autonomy (Hart Publishing, 
2001). Lorna Weir details how in the USA and Canada how foetuses have been recast in need of 
protection from the 1980’s. Lorna Weir, Pregnancy, Risk and Biopolitics: On the Threshold of the 
Living Subject (Transformations) (Routledge, 2006) 148. There is some evidence in the USA that 
women are convicted of foetal homicide when their babies were born and died as the result of 
attempted suicide, and cocaine addiction. See Ed Pilkington, ‘Outcry in America as pregnant 
women who lose babies face murder charges’ (The Guardian, 21st June 2011). 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/24/america-pregnant-women-murder-charges accessed 
25 April 2015. 
969 A caesarean section operation which is carried out against the consent of the woman constitutes 
a battery or unlawful touching in England and Wales (St Georges NHS Trust v S [1998] 3 WLR 
936, 967 where a woman that was subjected to a caesarean section against her will was found to 
have been the victim of an unlawful trespass against her person). In the USA, the tragic case of 
Angela Carder who was subjected to an unwanted caesarean section against her consent whilst 
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wishes of pregnant woman first. See Re AC 573 A.2d 1235 (1990). 
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Right to Rear  
Once the putative child has been conceived and birthed, the next right to 
consider is what O'Neill terms the ‘right to rear.’970 Biologically reproducing does 
not necessarily grant biological parents the right to rear the child.971 A prisoner 
may claim the right to beget a child, but the physical limitations of imprisonment 
may prevent them from parenting. Some people are given the right to rear by 
adoption, for example. She terms this as a ‘duty to bear responsibly’ and this is 
duty is especially pertinent to prisoners.972 Some authors go even further, 
suggesting that parents themselves should be licensed. LaFolette, in his classic 
paper ‘Licensing Parents’ and in his later paper revisiting the issue, argues that 
parents hold such a responsible position over such vulnerable subjects, that they 
should be licensed like doctors or other professionals.973 This legal regulation 
would flow from accepted minimum standards of parental knowledge and 
competence, using professional models of regulation as a framework. Putative 
parents would need to pass competency tests to ensure that they meet minimum 
standards before they are licensed. This would have a massive impact upon the 
western liberal notion of privacy within family life, which views the decision to 
have and rear children a private decision, and one which the state should only 
interfere with when the care the children receive falls below a legal minimum 
standard.974  Filtering out those who show child-abusing tendencies through 
licensing could reduce child abuse. This approach may seem far-fetched and 
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outside the realms of conventional discourse on parenting and rights. In a similar 
vein to LaFollette, Cassidy supports the self-vetting of potential parents, stating 
that those judge themselves to be less than ‘excellent’ potential parents should 
make the active decision to refrain from parenting at all.975  This contrasts greatly 
with the accepted level of ‘good enough’ parenting and goes far beyond a 
minimum threshold of acceptable parenting.976 However, the policy of restricting 
access to AI for prisoners in England and Wales could be seen as a form of 
licensing. The relationship of the potential parents is examined, along with their 
suitability for parenthood, their ability to support the potential child and the 
availability of support for the ‘free’ parent outside of the prison.977  
Parenting, as opposed to procreating, gives less emphasis to autonomy, as 
the competing rights and needs of the child have to be weighed against the parent. 
The state can step in to remove the child if the minimum threshold of care is not 
being met. Historically, the domestic sphere was delineated as private, and so not 
subject to legal regulation, as this was not politically desired.978 Children were 
viewed as property, and had few, if any legal rights.979 In general, there is no set 
‘state’ method for parenting, as it is expected to be diverse within a modern 
society.980 Winnicott’s concept of the ‘good enough mother’ (or in more modern 
terms the ‘good enough parent’) is not a perfect mother, but one that meets her 
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infant’s needs and adapts as the child grows.981 In contrast to this, there is the 
development of ‘intensive mothering’ in which caring for the child is seen as the 
main responsibility of the mother. The work of mothering is seen as ‘child-
centered, expert-guided, emotionally absorbing, labor-intensive and financially 
expensive.’982 
Parents are granted wide discretion to decide to educate their child at 
home, or at selective schools if they do not wish to use the state school sector. 
Parents can insist that their children are bought up in their own religion if desired.  
This autonomy is not absolute however, and if parental behaviour or decision-
making is detrimental to the health or wellbeing of the child the state can 
intervene. An example of this is the English case of Neon Roberts, in which his 
mother refused to allow him to receive radiotherapy to treat a brain tumour, and 
wanted to try alternative therapies first. Without immediate medical treatment, 
doctors treating Neon Roberts stated that he would die.983 Mr Justice Bodley ruled 
against the wishes of his mother, ordering that Neon should start radiotherapy as 
soon as possible. The courts in England and Wales emphasise the responsibilities 
that parents have, rather than their rights.984 In the USA, Federal legislation was 
passed to ensure the welfare of children, limiting the absolute control that parents 
have over their children, although the primary responsibility for child welfare 
remains at state level.985 The first Federal legislation passed to ensure the welfare 
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of children was the Child Abuse and Prevention and Treatment Act in 1974. This 
has subsequently been amended numerous times to take accounts of identified 
changing needs.986 
Masson identifies that people who beget children are considered to be 
parents even if they have no parental responsibility for their child. Situating her 
definition within English law, she states that parenthood covers three interrelated 
concepts: ‘being a parent’, ‘having parental responsibility’ and having Article 8 
rights under the ECHR.987 There are a large variety of people who come under the 
term parent who do not live fulltime with their children. Some parents share 
custody of their children with a person that they do not live with, so that their 
children will live in two places. Some parents have no custody of their child, may 
or may not have contact with their child and do not have parental responsibility. 
They are, nonetheless, still given the label ‘parent.’ Some children may reside in 
single-parent families. Single-parent families are created in many ways: divorce, 
separation, and death of one of the parents. In some cases becoming a single 
parent is not forced on an individual by circumstance but may be actively chosen: 
a person may adopt, or engage the services of a surrogate, or may use AI in order 
to achieve a pregnancy.  
Another strand of the debate relevant to parenting and intensive parenting 
is the concept of risk. This has been used as a construct from which to understand 
childhood and parenting. The concept of risk has moved away from being used to 
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develop strategies to protect children who are in danger from abusive parents or 
suboptimal living conditions, and is now being used to refer to all children.988 
Parents themselves can be seen as sources of risk if they cannot cope with the 
stresses of parenting.989 Hoffman’s exploration of how to develop resilience in 
children in all families, not just those deemed ‘at risk’ shows this wider trend 
towards ‘intensive parenting’ which demonstrates a ‘cultural and class bias’ 
towards a middle class parenting ethos.990 Parenting itself is seen as a ‘risky 
business’, and if one gets it ‘wrong’ than this can have life-changing and 
devastating consequences for the child in question.991 Avoiding risk is seen as an 
important part of responsible parenting. Misjudging any potential risks can be 
cause for allegations of irresponsible parenting.992 Some authors argue this 
aversion to risk has gone too far, creating an overreliance on parenting experts 
and not allowing children to develop the ability to cope with small elements of 
risk, which affect their ability to function well as adults.993 Risk and child welfare 
was the primary concern of the courts in Dickson and Mellor, and remains one of 
the main factors by which prisoners in England and Wales applying for AI are 
assessed.994 If perceived standards of parenting are set high for parents in free 
                                                
988 Ellie Lee, Jan Macvarish, Jennie Bristow, ‘Risk, health and parenting culture.’ (2010) 12 
Health, Risk & Society 293, 295. 
989 Diane M. Hoffman, ‘Risky investments: Parenting and the production of the “resilient child” ’ 
(2010) 12 Health, Risk & Society 385. 
990 ibid 387. 
991Ellie Lee, Jan Macvarish, Jennie Bristow, ‘Risk, health and parenting culture.’ (2010) 12 
Health, Risk & Society 293, 295 
992 One example of this from the UK is the case of the Schonrocks who let their children aged five 
and eight cycle to school unsupervised. The headteacher threatened to contact the authorities if 
they continued to let their children cycle to school unsupervised. Richard Savill ‘Couple warned 
over allowing children to cycle to school alone’ (The Telegraph, 04 July 2010) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/7871046/Couple-warned-over-allowing-children-to-
cycle-to-school-alone.html> accessed 25 April 2015. 
993 Jennie Bristow, ‘The Double Bind of Parenting Culture: Helicopter Parents and Cotton Wool 
Kids’ in Ellie Lee, Jennie Bristow, Charlotte Faircloth, Jan Macvarish (eds) Parenting Culture 
Studies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 202. 
994 See Appendix. 
 
 
248 
society, it may be argued that prisoners and their single partners would struggle to 
reach them. This may make it difficult to gain the right to procreate, and make it 
difficult for their decision to procreate gain social acceptance from the wider 
community. This will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.  
The Mother  
In order to explore what mothering is and whether this differs to what 
fathers do, thus justifying a different approach for male and female prisoners, it is 
important to define what ‘mothering’ means. Forcey defines mothering as ‘a 
socially constructed set of activities and relationships involved in nurturing and 
caring for people.’995 Arendell describes the ‘ideology’ of ‘intensive 
mothering.’996 This ideology requires mothers to be completely devoted to the 
needs of others, and is tied up with traditional ideas of a nuclear family formed 
from a traditional heterosexual, Caucasian, and middle class marriage.997  
Rich divides motherhood up into two distinct meanings: ‘… the potential 
relationship of any woman to her powers of reproduction and to children; and the 
institution, which aims at ensuring that the potential- and all women- shall remain 
under male control.’998 When discussing mothering, Rich recognises that 
mothering as an individual status can be disempowering for women.999 Some 
authors argue that a gendered approach to parenting in which the mother takes 
primary care and responsibility for childcare is based upon biological principles. 
In studies of mammalian animals, higher levels of the hormone oxytocin have 
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been associated with bonding behaviours and maternal care.1000 Similarly, 
mothers who have higher level of oxytocin demonstrate more bonding behaviours 
than other mothers who had lower levels. Some authors argue that physiology 
alone is not enough to explain the wide variations in how childcare arrangements 
are made and expressed in different cultures.1001 Hays argues that the care of 
children is only reliant in a small part on biology; the majority of approaches to 
parenting are due mainly to social norms and constructions of parenthood.1002 
As society evolved into the modern age, mothers were viewed as the 
moral keeper of the domestic sphere, with primary responsibility for child 
rearing.1003 In terms of the dominant norms of parenting, it is assumed that most 
women will have children and will want to be their primary carers, and will do so 
with devotion.1004 The ‘ideology’ of mothering and stories about mothers 
perpetuates the ideal of self-sacrifice, which avoids discussing whether one can 
choose to be a mother after birth has occurred.1005 Hays explored the concept of 
gendered ideology of parenting which emphasised the primary importance of the 
mother.1006 She found through qualitative interviews with mothers, regardless of 
social status, that they thought of the work of mothering as intensive and child 
centred. Their approaches were expressed in different ways due to the lack or 
availability of resources, but all approaches had a child-centred ideology at their 
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core.1007 This creates a cultural contradiction between the intensive methods of 
childcare espoused by guidance and parenting discourses and the reality of 
mothers who spend more time in paid work. Whilst in recent years, it can be 
argued that the focus has moved away from just ‘mothers’ towards intensive 
parenting, Shirani et al argue that debates about intensive parenting have tended 
to focus on mothers, with the assumption that they provide the majority of 
childcare.1008  
Douglas and Michael’s work follows on from Hay’s, by explaining that 
the development of intensive mothering is a method of patriarchal oppression that 
controls women, by creating impossible demands and high standards that most 
women can never reach.1009  These demands are created by the media, who 
highlight celebrity women, who appear to be juggling all of the requirements to 
be a successful intensive mother: a good job, wage, and child-centred approach. 
This then induces guilt in mothers by referring to the dangers of not parenting 
correctly.1010 
The work of ‘parenting’ and the role of ‘parent’ have widened as the 
importance of different aspects of childhood have been explored and 
researched.1011 Enos identifies the ‘dominant’ family ideology, which she 
specifically relates to mothering. She states that the ‘ideal family’ will live at one 
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address, have a male who provides economic support for the family unit.1012 Each 
individual family member is socialised according to their gender role. The 
interests of all family members are ‘harmonious’ and families are self-sufficient 
economically.1013  
Mothers who do not have custody of their children, either through choice 
or because of circumstances such as imprisonment are thought of as deviant 
mothers. These women ‘go against the natural tendency’ for women to be the 
primary caregivers of children. Fischer stated that it is considered ‘noteworthy’ 
for a father rather than a mother to not have primary custody of children. 1014 In 
her doctoral research, Bemiller noted that some of the 16 women that she 
interviewed suffered social stigmatisation because of their ‘deviant’ status as non-
custodial mothers.1015 She noted that women related feelings of embarrassment 
about losing custody, and found themselves accused of being unfit mothers. Many 
people assumed that that their child was removed for their own safety. This was 
often not the case, but was mostly because the mother was unable to provide for 
her child financially.1016  Separation from their children is often not voluntary. 
Herrerías’ research with 285 mothers found that 84% of mothers had been 
separated from their children against their will, even in some cases despite 
evidence of spousal abuse.1017  
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The Father 
‘What of Father?’ The title of the chapter concerning fathers in The Child, 
The Family and the Outside World’ by Winnicott consider fathers almost as an 
afterthought. Winnicott sees the role of the father as peripheral to the mother.1018 
Traditional definitions of fathering view the male parent as someone who 
provides. The ‘good father’ was seen as a provider, an individual who earns 
money for the family outside of the home.1019 In comparison with definitions of 
‘mothering’ definitions of the responsible father concern providing financially 
and emotionally for their child, and sharing responsibility with the mother.1020 
Modern interpretations of parenting have moved away from the distant 
father figure.  It could still be argued however that fathers are still viewed as 
taking a more peripheral role in the care of infants and young children. 
Sunderland terms this as the ‘Part-time father/Mother as main parent.’1021 Within 
some heterosexual relationships, mothers are seen as the main gatekeeper of the 
relationship between fathers and children. The father’s role is seen as secondary 
to that of the mother, he is a ‘helper’ rather than as an active, fulltime parent.1022 
In the same way, Winnicott views the father as mother’s ‘helper’: the ‘…father is 
needed to give mother moral support, to be backing for her authority…’1023 This 
idea is further reinforced by Biblarz and Stacey who state:  
‘The argument that the children need both a mother and father presumes 
that mothering and fathering involve gender-exclusive capacities. The 
“essential father” is a disciplinarian, problem solver and playmate who 
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provides crucially masculine parenting…Mothers provide nurturance, 
security, and caretaking.’1024  
 Evidence exists of these stereotypes being reinforced in mainstream 
parenting guidance for parents.1025 The majority of children in the UK and the 
USA still live in two-parent families, and the majority of these are 
heterosexual.1026 A father’s role as the main wage earner for the family is still a 
relevant concern, as many women work part time.1027  Despite these traditional 
divisions, fathers have been asserting their legal rights to fatherhood and have 
been moving towards more equal division of the work of parenting.1028 In their 
review of twentieth century literature on fatherhood, Atkinson and Blackwelder 
argue that the increase in the term ‘parenting’ as opposed to either ‘mothering’ or 
‘fathering’ indicates that ‘most people think that fathers and mothers should be 
engaging in the same behavior regardless of what they actually do.’1029 Other 
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research, such as that by Henwood and Proctor highlight how the majority of the 
new fathers that they interviewed valued the ‘new father’ role, citing the ideal 
father as one who is child-centred, selfless and sensitive.1030 Many of the fathers 
also noted the conflict they felt between the desire to care for their children, and 
be ‘hands on’ whilst the social expectation that required them to work outside of 
the home full time remained. As well as involved and concerned fathers, a man 
can also be considered to be a ‘father’ without being involved with his children, 
or even in contact with them.1031 However, ‘fathering’ can only occur when the 
father and child are in a relationship with regular contact.1032  
Biblarz and Stacey argue that one of the reasons that many studies point to 
differences in parenting styles and roles between men and women is because the 
majority of studies examine traditional heterosexual couples who ‘fall into’ 
socially accepted gender roles for parenting.1033 In these studies, mothers 
concentrate upon childcare and domestic work whilst fathers spend more time on 
traditional roles such as earning money, and more ‘masculine’ tasks.1034 However, 
there has been little attempt to examine how families operate when there are two 
parents of the same sex, and how gender roles affect these parents.1035 Some 
research shows that lesbian parents are raising children with similar outcomes to 
those in heterosexual two-parent families, demonstrating that gender is not the 
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primary factor in deciding whether children flourish or founder within a family 
unit.  
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Summary 
The majority of people procreate without public interference, as their 
autonomy is strongly protected. A pregnant woman may be subject to significant 
moral and social pressures, but she is not subject to many specific legal 
restrictions. She is prohibited from aborting her foetus after a certain gestation in 
most circumstances, but she is free to smoke, drink and engage in risky behaviour 
even if it may damage her foetus. The autonomy of the competent woman is 
respected to such a degree that she may not be operated on against her will, even 
if this will lead to the death of her foetus. This is justified; as to subject a pregnant 
woman to legal restrictions would place her interests below those of a foetus that 
has no legal or actual existence separate from the mother. Restrictions on the 
fertility of those in free society are very rare, apart from some US cases, which 
restrict fertility as a condition of probation. 
It can be seen that there is a strong presumption in favour of autonomy in 
the choices individuals make when selecting a partner with whom to procreate. 
When the foetus is born and gains a separate existence from the mother, state 
interest in the process of parenting then increases, and parenting itself becomes 
subject to a number of legal and social requirements, such as minimum 
educational requirements. These act as a minimum legal threshold, which is 
designed to protect the child. A parent’s relationship with their child reflects this 
change, with reference made to parental ‘duties’ and ‘responsibilities’ rather than 
parental rights.  
 Gender and parenting still have a large influence over how children are 
reared within heterosexual partnerships. Whilst fathers take on more childcare in 
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addition to the view of the traditional role of provider, mothers are still seen as the 
primary carers of small children. The perceptions of expected standards of 
parenting have become more intensive since Winnicott’s described the ‘good 
enough mother.’ These standards are often unrealistic, leading to parents 
becoming increasingly risk averse. Also, these standards of parenting are hard 
enough for those in free society to cope with, many would argue that prisoners 
would not have the resources to meet these standards. Whether prisoners can 
parent effectively from prison and what the adverse effects of parental 
imprisonment on children are will be considered in the final chapter. 
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Chapter Nine: Prisoners and Parenthood 
from Prison 
Introduction 
 In both England and Wales and the USA, many children are affected by 
the imprisonment of either one or both prisoners. In the USA it is estimated that 
1.7 million children experienced the imprisonment of a parent in 2007.1036 In 
England and Wales in 2009, there were estimated to be around 200,000 children 
affected each year affected by the imprisonment of a parent.1037 The figure across 
Europe is estimated to be around 800,000.1038 In both England and Wales and the 
USA, there appear to be few official and systematic schemes to collect this 
data.1039   
This chapter will examine the challenges of parenting from prison. 
Parenting from within prison, especially behind closed and restricted conditions 
can be extremely difficult. Many prison regimes view family contact as a 
privilege and this approach can cause prisoners to become alienated from their 
relatives, leading to increased risks of recidivism on release.1040 Children can 
display negative behaviours and suffer negative consequences as a result of a 
                                                
1036 Lauren E Glaze, Laura M Maruschak, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Parents in 
Prison and Their Minor Children (US Department of Justice, 2008, revised 2010) 1. 
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parent being imprisoned. These negative consequences can include mental health 
issues; lower educational achievement and an increased likelihood for entering 
prison themselves.1041 The theoretical causes of the adverse effects the children of 
prisoners suffer will be discussed. In order to tackle and ameliorate the negative 
effects of a parent’s imprisonment, it is important understand the root cause of the 
negative effects, so that they can be addressed effectively.  
Next the realities of parenting from behind bars will be considered. There 
are considerable barriers towards both men and women being effective parents, 
which are caused by their offence, by the physical situation of imprisonment and 
by restrictions, which affect their ability to remain in contact with their children. 
These restrictions can affect both genders differently. Fathers are traditionally 
expected to be financial providers for their families, which is impossible for 
prisoners prevented from earning a wage. Mothers are traditionally expected to 
provide care and support to their children, but this is hindered when women 
remain physically separated from their children, who often cannot visit because of 
the cost and expense involved. 
The chapter will finally consider methods that can be used to ameliorate 
the negative effects of having a parent in prison. Various initiatives exist within 
prisons, community based facilities and ‘halfway’ houses. These schemes are 
designed to help prisoners and their families to maintain a relationship with their 
existing children and partners, including babies enabling them to actively parent 
their children. Mother and baby units, enhanced visits, family and parenting 
courses and groups run by voluntary organisations promote normal family 
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relationships as far as possible within the prison system, increasing attachment 
between children and their parents in prison. If these interventions were more 
widely adopted, then prisoners’ links with their families could be improved and 
procreation should then be seen as a step towards prisoners realising a normal 
family life.  
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Child Welfare 
Child welfare is a vital concern of prison authorities, governments and of 
course, parents. It is one of the primary concerns of Ministers in England and 
Wales when a prisoner applies for access to AI.1042 The Children Act 1989 in 
England and Wales makes the welfare of the child a primary consideration in all 
legal cases concerning children.1043  
‘Child welfare’ is vague term however and can mean different standards 
of parenting and care in different situations. Storrow highlights that within law,  
‘…child welfare is a multi-faceted concept ranging from narrow inquiries 
about protecting children from physical harm and abusive parents on the 
one end of the spectrum to expansive questions about what promotes a 
child’s best interests on the other.’ 1044 
Within child protection situations, child welfare is what Budd terms a 
‘minimal parenting standard.’1045 It is a safety net, the minimal level at which the 
child’s safety, mental and physical needs can be cared for.1046 In the case of the 
ministerial assessment of prisoners’ parental suitability, it could be argued that 
their expected standard of welfare is higher. On the face of it, this test appears 
similar to the welfare test that putative parents have to pass when applying for 
licensed fertility treatment in England and Wales. Jackson argued that in the 
context of fertility treatment, the requirement to turn down potential parents 
because being conceived would not be in the putative child’s best interests is 
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‘puzzling.’1047 Non-existence for the child would never be conceivably in their 
best interests, apart from in the direst of circumstances.1048  She suggests instead, 
that the test is intended as a test of ‘aptitude’ of the ability of the potential parents 
to raise a child successfully.1049 In Dickson, reference was made to the 
‘insufficiency of resources to provide for the material welfare of any child.’1050 
Both Court of Appeal judgments in Dickson and Mellor suggested that the 
applicants’ relationships had not been properly tested outside of the prison 
environment, also causing concern for the stability of the family home.1051 This 
suggests that what is also being tested by is parental competence, which judging 
from the case law and FOI request, requires two parents in a strong relationship 
who are financially independent. This is a higher standard than one which is 
normally required by social workers and child protection agencies do not take 
children into care just because their parents rely on state benefits or because they 
are raised in a single parent family. Child welfare concerns are also considered 
very closely by corrections departments in US states when deciding whether or 
not women are allowed access to mother and baby unit facilities, or whether 
parents resume legal custody of their children on release from prison.1052  
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Corrections officials share the concern of prisoners procreating during private 
visits, who then produce children that they cannot financially support. New 
Mexico removed private visits for its prisoners after reports about a prisoner 
Michael Guxman fathering four children by four different women, whilst not 
paying any child support.1053  
One justification for prisoners being required to satisfy higher welfare 
standards is that the state is asked to be a party to the creation of new life and they 
want to reduce the risk that any prisoner may fail to be an adequate parent. 
Parenting itself has become closely associated with risk and risk avoidance. The 
development of a culture of risk management and the ‘concept of children at risk’ 
is argued to be recent.1054 The concept of risk, both Furedi and Lee argue, has 
developed from a neutral concept of ‘probability’ is now associated with negative 
outcomes.1055 Thus, the foetus in utero or even putative child can be perceived to 
be at risk, even though these risks can often be unknown or unquantifiable.1056 In 
the same way as parents are seen as a ‘manager of risk’, it could be argued that 
the Government Minister responsible for giving prisoners permission to access AI 
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times-fathers-children-New-Mexico-prison--prompting-lawmakers-rethink-conjugal-visits.html 
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is also managing risk.1057 The risks of potential adverse outcomes for the children 
of prisoners has been researched in some detail, but that is not to say that every 
child of a prisoner conceived through AI would be guaranteed to suffer these 
outcomes. The single successful known prisoner who was granted access to AI in 
England and Wales shows the normal presumption that people are 
competent parents is reversed in the situation of prisoners and their partners.1058 
Parents who conceive their children naturally are presumed by the state to act in 
their child’s best interests unless shown otherwise by their circumstances or 
actions.1059 A prisoner’s fitness to parent is called into question because they have 
a criminal record, but this does not automatically mean that all prisoners are unfit 
parents. If all prisoners were thought to be unfit parents because of their 
criminality then this would mean that all prisoners would have parental 
responsibility terminated on admission to prison. This usually happens only if the 
parent poses a danger to their child, or if their incarceration is of such a long 
duration that they will not be released until after their child has grown up. The 
negative consequences of parental incarceration could be used as a justification to 
prevent prisoners from having children. The origins of these negative 
consequences and the likelihood of children being affected by a parent in prison 
will be considered next. 
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Causes of Adverse Consequences in Children Following 
Parental Incarceration 
It is undeniable that the children of prisoners are at risk of a range of 
negative outcomes, but the extent to which individual children are affected 
depends upon the crime their parent has committed, whether the child and parent 
continue to have contact and the support systems available to the child and their 
family. Murray and Farrington highlight four key theories, which explain how the 
negative consequences suffered by the children of prisoners arise. These are: 
trauma theories, modelling and social learning theories, strain theories and stigma 
and labelling theories and will be discussed in term.1060 Knowing the root cause of 
the negative consequences suffered by children could help agencies involved with 
prisoners and their families to develop schemes to minimise and mitigate the 
negative effects that children suffer. 
Trauma Theories 
 Trauma theories state that the separation of parent and child creates 
trauma, which leads to adverse outcomes for the child both at the time of the 
separation and in the future. Attachment theory argues that attachment to a 
primary carer as a baby and child is essential for the child to feel secure. This 
secure attachment is argued by some to be essential for the child to develop 
healthy relationships, as they grow older.1061 It has been argued that anything that 
disrupts this process is traumatising to the children in the shorter-term leading to 
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sadness and disruptive behaviour.1062 Children of offenders, due to their disrupted 
attachment may be at increased risk for delinquent behaviour.1063 Poehlmann 
found in her research of incarcerated mothers and their 54 children aged between 
2.5 years and 7.5 years of age that the majority of the children displayed 
responses to their mother’s imprisonment such as sadness, crying and repeatedly 
looking for their mothers. Half of the children were confused about what had 
happened to their mother, 40% of children demonstrated anger, or ‘acting out’ 
behaviours and 33% of children showed detachment 
Strain Theories 
Strain theory states that due to parental imprisonment, there is a loss of 
both social and economic capital. Social capital can be defined as ‘an instantiated 
informal norm that promotes co-operation between two or more individuals.’1064 
According to Fukuyama this can be a simple reciprocal relationship between two 
people or complex doctrines such as religions, which encourage cooperation 
between people.1065 Social capital is essential for the smooth running of modern 
society and social cohesion. The imprisonment of a parent places their child and 
the carer of the child under strain. Children may be required to leave the family 
home and enter social care, or may be cared for by their other parent or a 
grandparent, leaving their relationship under strain. The imprisonment of a parent 
can also reduce the income of a family unit.1066 The prisoner’s family is expected 
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to meet a number of out of pocket expenses attached to supporting the offender, 
as well as the more obvious drop in income that can result from the incarceration 
of a family wage earner. Imprisonment may also reduce the ability of the prisoner 
to get a job once they are released, thus having a long-term negative effect on 
finances.1067 Social capital is brought under pressure by the loss of the parent, 
increasing the strain of care giving as a single parent, which in turn can adversely 
affect the prospective life chances of the child.1068 Children may often have 
unstable care arrangements that result from the imprisonment of their parents, 
such as being placed in care.1069 They may have to move out of their family home, 
which often occurs if their mother is imprisoned and is a single parent.1070 
Labelling/ Stigma Theories 
 Children can be bullied and stigmatised as a result of their parent’s 
imprisonment, which affects their self-esteem and behaviour.1071 Children of 
prisoners may experience bullying and stigmatisation at school, which affects 
their academic performance. Boswell and Wedge found that children experienced 
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verbal abuse from their peers, which made them reluctant to attend school.1072 
Condry highlighted in her research with the families of offenders that many of 
them were treated as tainted, or guilty by association. She terms this ‘secondary 
stigma’, the offender’s family are stigmatised by the conviction of their relatives. 
1073 An example of this, identified by a study into the media reporting of sex 
crimes by Soothill and Walby shows how devastating the effects of stigmatisation 
can be on the offender's families. The wife and young children of a man convicted 
of rape experienced ‘men urinating through the letter-box, and the children being 
roughed up at school.’ 1074 
 In the USA the problem is exacerbated further with the active publication 
of details of offenders online in various ‘mugshot’ galleries, which are publically 
accessible without restriction.1075  
Modelling and Social Learning Theories 
Social learning theory states that children imitate their elder’s 
behaviour.1076 This may be because the child is made aware of their parent’s 
criminal tendencies when they are incarcerated.1077 Sutherland states that through 
differential association theory, children learn criminal behaviour in the same way 
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that socially accepted behaviour is learned. Criminality is learned through small 
personal groups such as within a family group.1078 Van de Rakt et al hypothesise 
that this ‘modelling’ behaviour may become stronger after early childhood and 
during adolescence when children have a greater understanding of their parent’s 
offending.1079 They hypothesise that children model offending behaviour, 
thinking it is normal.1080 There is, however, no rigorous way to test whether the 
children of prisoners offend because they model their parent’s behaviour or 
because of other factors such as poverty.1081 
Effects of Parental Incarceration on Children 
‘We conclude that parental imprisonment is a strong risk factor (and 
possible cause) for a range of adverse outcomes for children, including 
antisocial behavior, offending, mental health problems, drug abuse, school 
failure, and unemployment.’1082 
Risk of Imprisonment 
One of the most studied areas of concern to both penologists and 
researchers is the risk that having a parent who has been in prison leads to the 
children themselves offending when they get older, thus continuing a cycle of 
imprisonment.1083 Many authors claim that the children of prisoners are 5-6 times 
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more likely to be incarcerated or convicted of a crime than their peers who do not 
have a parent in prison.1084 In their review, Murray and Farrington were unable to 
find evidence for this statistic, claiming that the risk for antisocial behaviour for 
the children of offenders is more likely to be about three times that than the 
children of non-offenders.1085  
 One of the most comprehensive longitudinal studies on the effects of 
parental incarceration on children and their risk of adult offending behaviour is 
the Cambridge Study in Delinquent Development. It has followed 411 boys born 
in inner London in 1952-1953. The initial sample was created by selecting all of 
the boys in primary school in a one-mile radius of a research office. The subjects 
were divided into five different groups. The experimental group contained 23 
boys who experienced parental imprisonment during the first 10 years of life. 
These boys were compared with the first control group of 227 boys who were not 
separated from a parent during the first 10 years of life. The second control group 
contained 77 boys whose parents were not imprisoned but were separated from 
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parents during the first 10 years because of hospitalisation or parental death.  The 
third control group contained 61 boys whose parents were not imprisoned but 
were separated for reasons other than hospitalisation or death. The fourth control 
group contained 17 boys whose parents were imprisoned before their birth, but 
not after their birth or before their 18th birthday.1086 Murray and Farrington found 
that parental imprisonment strongly indicated risk for ‘antisocial personalities’ at 
aged 32; thus 71% of boys compared with 19% of boys who were not separated 
from their parents and whose parents were not imprisoned.1087 The authors did 
concede that the small sample size may have made the sample statistically 
unreliable, and that other risk factors for delinquency may have existed in 
conjunction with parental imprisonment.1088 The same data set was reanalysed 
with data from the Swedish Project Metropolitan, which studied 7,719 males and 
7,398 females born in 1953.1089 Incarceration rates in Sweden were low; within 
Project Metropolitan 2% of children suffered the incarceration of a parent by the 
time they were 19 and 2% of children had a parent incarcerated prior to their 
birth.1090 In comparison, 7% of children from the Cambridge study had a parent 
incarcerated during any time from age 0-19 and 4% had a parent incarcerated 
before birth (but not during childhood).1091 In order to compare like with like 
between the cohorts, Murray et al compared the Cambridge study cohort with 
those families identified as working class in the Metropolitan study. Whilst 
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Murray and Farrington identified that imprisonment carried an additional risk of 
children developing delinquent tendencies that were independent of separation, 
the Swedish data found that having a parent in prison did not predict whether the 
child would do on to offend, after controlling for parental convictions.1092 Murray 
et al hypothesise that this was because Swedish prison sentences were shorter and 
that Swedish prison policies that promoted better contact between prisoners and 
their families ameliorated the effects of incarceration to some extent.1093 There 
was also some evidence that children were diverted away from the criminal 
justice system into welfare more effectively in Sweden, thus reducing the 
likelihood of those children at risk ending up in prison.1094   
Huebner and Gustafson’s study of American children used data from the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth that initially studied men and women 
aged between 14 and 22 in 1979. In 1986 the study was expanded to include 
children born to mothers who were part of the 1979 survey.  Huebner and 
Gustafson used data on 1697 adult offspring who were between 18 and 24 in 2000 
and their mothers (1,258).1095 A total of 26 or 2.1% of these mothers had been 
incarcerated between 1979 and 2000, and 31 or 1.8% of children had mothers 
who had ever been incarcerated (including before the children’s birth).1096 When 
maternal and offspring behaviours were considered together, maternal 
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incarceration had a powerful effect on offspring. Adult offspring of incarcerated 
mothers were nearly three times as likely to be convicted of a crime and four 
times more likely to have been on probation.1097  Maternal absence (without 
incarceration) also significantly increases the likelihood of the offspring of 
mothers in the study being convicted.1098 Surprisingly though, there was no 
significant relationship between maternal incarceration and child offspring 
experiences of delinquency, peer pressure or ‘emotional home environment.’1099 
Mental Health Problems 
Murray et al undertook a systematic review in order to investigate whether 
research does demonstrate a definitive link between parental incarceration and 
mental health problems in offspring.1100 They found that there was ‘a moderate 
overall association between parental imprisonment and child mental health 
outcomes, once covariates were controlled for.’1101 The meta-analysis also found 
that there was a slightly elevated odds ratio for boys developing mental health 
problems over girls and a mother’s incarceration was linked to a higher odds of 
mental health problems than a father being incarcerated, but the small sample 
sizes meant that these relationships require further detailed research.1102 One 
large-scale study, the COPING study took four European jurisdictions: England 
and Wales, Romania, Germany and Sweden, and interviewed over 1500 children 
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of prisoners and their parents and carers.1103 The majority of the children had a 
father in prison, whilst 25% of the children interviewed in England and Wales had 
a mother in prison.1104 Most children had visited their imprisoned parent; these 
figures were highest for England and Wales at 92.9%, with the lowest visits being 
received in Sweden at 75.9%.1105 Children over 11 years old were asked to 
complete a Strength Difficulties questionnaire in order to measure risks of mental 
health problems and 25% of prisoners children demonstrated that they were at 
risk of mental health problems.1106 The study concluded that in general children 
suffer poorer mental health outcomes when a parent is imprisoned and this effect 
is largest in children over 11 years old.1107 Factors which promoted resilience 
were strong family relationships and looking to the future when the incarcerated 
parent was released.1108 Contact with the incarcerated adult also helped to 
maintain family bonds and increase a child’s wellbeing.1109 The authors 
recommended that once a prisoner had been arrested, that his status as a parent 
should be taken into account when being sentenced.1110 If a prisoner is to be sent 
to prison then he should be kept as local to his family as possible, with children 
being allowed regular contact visits (if appropriate).1111 Relevant NGOs should be 
available to support parents and children in maintaining family relationships.1112 
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Poorer Academic Outcomes 
 The COPING study found that 12.9% of children in the England and 
Wales sample had been excluded from school, as opposed to 2.8% in Sweden.1113 
This could be due in part to a greater use of welfare provisions in Sweden, which 
divert children with behavioural problems down a child welfare route rather than 
a more punitive route. Children in Sweden may arguably get better quality contact 
with their imprisoned parent through residential furloughs or home leave. Trice 
and Brewster found that 36% of the children of prisoners dropped out of school 
compared to 7% of their counterparts whose parents were not imprisoned.1114 It is 
difficult to say whether imprisonment itself is the major factor causing children to 
be excluded or drop out, or whether it is a combination of different social factors 
causing the children of prisoners to experience poor educational attainment. 
Prisoners Parenting from Prison 
If it is accepted that prisoners do retain a right to procreate then it becomes 
necessary to examine what this means in practice for prisoners. Prisoners within 
England and Wales and the USA are not afforded the same level of protection. 
Legally, whether the right to procreate is removed or just suspended was not 
resolved consistently within the cases. If a prisoner is permanently sterilised then 
it is clear that their right to procreate is removed. In the case of prohibiting 
procreation by preventing either sexual intercourse or the use of medical 
alternatives, then some may argue that the right is merely suspended, to be 
regained once the prisoner leaves. For a prisoner who will never be released from 
prison, this distinction is meaningless, as they will be prohibited from procreating 
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for their natural life. Stating a right is suspended implies that the prisoner will one 
day have a chance of regaining it once they leave prison. It is inaccurate to claim 
that rights are suspended if the prisoner is never to be released, or will be 
executed. With the current restrictions against procreation for the vast majority of 
prisoners in both countries, it may be more accurate to say the right to procreate is 
removed on incarceration and regained on release from prison.  
Restrictions on the right of prisoners to procreate could arguably be 
justified by three broad reasons. The first reason would be the right of the putative 
child to be born into a more favourable situation where their one parent (or 
perhaps even both parents) are not serving prison sentences. There are certainly 
proven risks associated with having a parent in prison, which have been covered 
earlier in this chapter. To argue that the child is better off not being born at all 
however would render the child out of existence, so the benefit in this particular 
situation could not be to the child itself, but perhaps to society in preventing an 
increase in single parent families.1115 Sutherland argues that appeals to ‘child 
welfare’ are often used to justify limiting the rights of adults without considering 
the positive upbringing a child could receive in a single parent family, or without 
considering how non-resident and prisoner parents can use a number of methods 
to maintain contact with their families.1116  She cautions: ‘Let us not pretend that 
the protection of the welfare of the child is either simple or scientific in turning it 
into the new eugenics.’1117 Williams states that the refusal of the authorities to 
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allow prisoners to procreate is ‘tantamount to the constructive sterilisation of 
prisoners while incarcerated.’1118  
The second justification for limiting a prisoner’s right to procreate may be 
the need to consider how respecting their right to procreate affects other prisoners 
and prison staff. Allowing prisoners to procreate could divert valuable resources 
away from other areas of prison life. Prisons on both sides of the Atlantic are 
subject to financial restraints, which might be stretched further if prisoners were 
allowed private visits, medical procedures to achieve pregnancy. Caring for 
pregnant prisoners in particular would cost a large sum of money, especially if 
they were to be allowed to keep their children in special facilities. Allowing male 
prisoners to procreate via AI with a female partner outside of prison would not 
create additional financial burdens as the prisoner’s partner would raise the child. 
If one justified preventing women prisoners from procreating whilst allowing 
male prisoners however, this would be unjust discrimination based upon gender. 
Equally, however, removing all prisoners’ rights because of the cost of allowing 
one group of prisoners to exercise their rights is also unjust. Facilities to promote 
family relationships should be given budgetary priority, considering how 
important the family is in helping prisoners to desist from offending once they are 
released. Families can have a positive effect on prisoners even whilst still in 
prison, giving prisoners a reason to concentrate on rehabilitation. 
The third justification often given to remove the right of prisoners to 
procreate, is the collective right of society to punish offenders. This assumes that 
prohibiting procreation is central to the punishment of imprisonment. The reasons 
                                                
1118 John Williams, ‘The Queen on the Application of Mellor v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department. Prisoners and artificial insemination- have the courts got it right?’ (2002) 14 Child & 
Fam L Q 217, 228. 
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for punishing are argued to be that society demands payment for the debt of the 
crime by the punishment, as well as the additional effects of deterrence and 
rehabilitation. It can be argued that the removal of freedom is the primary purpose 
of imprisonment, not the removal of the right to procreate. Removing the right to 
procreate for all prisoners does not further deterrence, as such little thought would 
be given at the time of the offence to the prospect of being childless whilst 
incarcerated. Removing the right to procreate also does nothing to further 
rehabilitation, in fact it could damage family relationships, leading to an increased 
risk of reoffending.  
Women Prisoners and Obstacles to Pregnancy      
A female prisoner who wants to become a mother would in most 
circumstances have to gestate a pregnancy in prison.1119  It is because of this 
biological fact that most health services for new parents are directed at mothers, 
rather than fathers, and only prisons for women have mother and baby units in 
England and Wales and the USA. The primacy of the role of the mother is 
acknowledged by prison authorities in England and Wales and the USA, arguably 
given more importance than the role of the father. This can in turn be linked to 
normative constructions of motherhood and the importance of mothering.1120  
                                                
1119 The female prisoner may also donate eggs for a surrogate or for her female partner to gestate, 
but it is most likely that the prisoner will gestate the pregnancy herself, especially if she is in a 
heterosexual relationship. 
1120 In England and Wales prison staff must ensure all prisoners deal with urgent childcare needs 
on arrival: National Offender Management Service, Prison Service Instruction 74/2011 Early 
Days In Custody: Reception In, First Night in Custody and Induction to Custody (National 
Offender Management Service, 2011) paras 3.25- 3.27. General guidance is supplemented with 
specific guidance for women: National Offender Management, Service Prison Service Order 4800 
Women Prisoners (National Offender Management Service, 2008) 10-11. Issue B. It is also 
stressed that enhanced prison visits should not be linked to the IEP Scheme for women prisoners. 
See National Offender Management Service, Prison Service Order 4800 Women Prisoners 
(National Offender Management Service, 2008) Issue G 17 and National Offender Management 
Service, Prison Service Instruction 30/2013 Incentives and Earned Privileges (National Offender 
Management Service, 2015) paras 9.6- 9.7.  
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Female prisoners who enter prison are more likely than the general 
population to be addicted to drugs, have blood borne diseases, or smoke.1121 
These factors are often combined with prior maternal histories of surviving abuse, 
poorer mental health and low levels of social support outside of the prison.1122 
Ironically, prisons can have an ameliorating effect on some prisoners, who may 
find that their removal from chaotic lives, where they receive regular meals and 
can reduce their drug intake increases the chances of them having a healthy 
baby.1123 Prisoners may however be subject to poor or substandard maternity care, 
which can adversely affect the health of themselves and their babies.1124 Prisoners 
may be shackled during pregnancy and labour.1125 There are also reports of 
                                                
1121 Women prisoners have higher levels of blood borne infections and sexually transmitted 
infections as well as chronic drug addiction. Noelle E Fearn, Kelly Parker, ‘Washington State’s 
Residential Program: An Integrated Public Health, Education, and Social Service Resource for 
Pregnant Inmates and Prison Mothers’ (2004) 2 Cal J Health Prom 34, 36-37; Nicolas 
Freudenburg, ‘Adverse Effects of US Jail and Prison Policies on the Health and Well-Being of 
Women of Color’ (2002) 92 Am J Pub Health 1895, 1896; Marion Knight, Emma Plugge, ‘The 
outcomes of pregnancy among imprisoned women: as systemic review’ (2005) 112 BJOG 1467. 
In research, of 505 female prisoners in England, Plugge et al found that that prior to entering 
prison 85% of prisoners smoked cigarettes, 75% had used illegal drugs in the previous six months 
before admission, 42% drank more alcohol than the recommended amount and 16% of them self-
harmed in the month before they were imprisoned. Emma Plugge, Nicola Douglas, Ray 
Fitzpatrick, The Health of Women in Prison Study Findings (University of Oxford, 2006) 7. 
1122 Barbara A Hotelling ‘Perinatal Needs of Pregnant, Incarcerated Women’ (2008) 17 J Perinatal 
Ed 37, 39. 
1123 A systemic review by Knight and Plugge suggests that women who lead chaotic lives benefit 
from having medical care and meals in prison, which improves the outcomes they may have 
otherwise experienced in the community, including reducing the risk of low birth weight babies. 
Marion Knight, Emma Plugge, ‘The outcomes of pregnancy among imprisoned women: as 
systemic review’ (2005) 112 BJOG 1467, 1471. See also accounts from women describing prison 
as a place of stability whilst pregnant, in comparison with their life outside with regular meals and 
medical care. Katherine J Ferraro, Angela M Moe, ‘Mothering, Crime and Incarceration’ (2003) 
35 J Contemp Ethnography 9, 25. 
1124 Jenni Vainak, ‘The Reproductive and Parental Rights of Incarcerated Mothers’ (2008) 46 Fam 
Court R 670; Barbara A Hotelling ‘Perinatal Needs of Pregnant, Incarcerated Women’ (2008) 17 J 
Perinatal Ed 37, 38. 
1125 There are 18 states that have legal restrictions on the use of shackles in pregnancy, specifically 
during labour, 24 states only have policy limitations on the use of shackles for pregnant women. 
Brian Citro, Jamil Dakwar, Amy Fettig, Sital Kalantry, Gail Smith, ‘The Shackling of Incarcerated 
Pregnant Women: A Human Rights Violation Committed Regularly in the United States. An 
Alternative Report to the Fourth Periodic Report to the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights’ (International Human Rights Clinic, University of Chicago Law School, August 
2013) <https://ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/sites/ihrclinic.uchicago.edu/files/uploads/Report%20-
%20Shackling%20of%20Pregnant%20Prisoners%20in%20the%20US.pdf> accessed 23 April 
2015. Shackling of pregnant prisoners in England and Wales is allowed during the transport of 
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inadequate medical care, including delays in getting women to hospital, which 
sometimes result in the injury or death of either mother or their foetus/ baby.1126 
Many prisoners are required to remain in the general prison population until their 
delivery date, and following the birth of their baby, will be separated following a 
short stay in hospital.1127 
Women Prisoners and Obstacles to Parenting      
Women prisoners, especially violent offenders, are often cast as ‘doubly 
deviant.’ They act against the expected role of women in society, who see women 
in general as more cooperative, nurturing and less aggressive than men. Violent 
women are ‘doubly deviant’ as they defy the expect role of nurturer.1128 Women 
prisoners who try to maintain and claim a role as mother may well find 
themselves to be judged to be lacking, even though many try to actively parent 
from inside prison.1129  
                                                                                                                                
women to hospital or clinic, but restraints are removed on arrival. They can be carried and used if 
necessary in clinic areas. Pregnant women in labour are not shackled on transport to hospital or 
during their stay. See HM Prison Service Prison Service Order 4800: Women Prisoners (HM 
Prison Service, 2008) 50. 
1126 Barbara A Hotelling ‘Perinatal Needs of Pregnant, Incarcerated Women’ (2008) 17 J Perinatal 
Ed 37, 39; Natalia D Tapia, Michael S Vaughn, ‘Legal Issues Regarding Medical Care for 
Pregnant Inmates’ (2010) 90 Prison J 417, 421; Jenni Vainak, ‘The Reproductive and Parental 
Rights of Incarcerated Mothers’ (2008) 46 Fam Court R 670, 677-678;  
1127 Admission to a prison Mother and Baby Unit in England and Wales must be in the best 
interests of the child and is not automatic.  National Offender Management Service, Prison 
Service Instruction 49/2014 Mother & Baby Units (National Offender Management Service, 2014) 
s2.16. In the USA, only 13 states have any provision to allow women and babies to stay together. 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons has a community-based scheme, which allows mothers and babies 
to remain together, from 3 months to 1 year. See Malkia Saada Saar, Mothers Behind Bars: A 
state- by state report card and analysis of federal policies on conditions of confinement for 
pregnant and parenting women and the effect on their children (National Women’s Law Center, 
2010) 7. 
1128 Ann Lloyd, Doubly Deviant, Doubly Damned: Society’s Treatment of Violent Women 
(Penguin Books, 1995) 36 
1129 Sandra Enos, Mothering from the Inside: Parenting in a Women’s Prison (State University of 
New York Press, 2001) 84-88; Jeanne Flavin, Our Bodies, Our Crimes: The Policing of Women’s 
Reproduction in America (New York University Press, 2009) 144.  
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Enos states that women prisoners may have different ideas of what 
constitutes a ‘good mother’ due to different cultural and social influences.1130 In 
her qualitative interviews with 25 subjects, she highlighted how woman prisoners 
have to manage multiple identities such as prisoner and mother.1131 Women 
prisoners can place great importance upon claiming the role of mother, especially 
one that is considered fit to care for her children.1132 Enos demonstrated how 
some women prisoners resisted the label of ‘bad mother’ and the identity of 
prisoner by distancing themselves from their inmate status. They used this to 
differentiate themselves from other prisoners.1133 Others performed ‘bracketing’, 
where they placed a space between their behaviour at the time of the offence and 
their current rehabilitated self.1134 Similarly, Ferraro and Moe’s qualitative 
research with 30 mothers in prison found that many of them had low self-esteem, 
and that ‘mothering was critical in sustaining perceptions of value and 
goodness.’1135 Mothers undertook the parenting role from inside the prison by 
arranging for visits, proving fitness with frequent contact, improving their 
parenting skills by enrolling in parenting classes and by demonstrating knowledge 
of their children’s daily lives.1136  
Women prisoners have unique barriers to maintaining relationships with 
their children. Because women prisoners are fewer in number than their male 
counterparts, there are fewer women’s prisons, which means that prisoners 
                                                
1130 Sandra Enos, Mothering from the Inside: Parenting in a Women’s Prison (State University of 
New York Press, 2001) 27. 
1131 ibid 34. 
1132 ibid 75. 
1133 Ibid 77. 
1134 Ibid 81.  
1135Katherine J Ferraro, Angela M Moe, ‘Mothering, Crime and Incarceration’ (2003) 35 J 
Contemp Ethnography 9, 33. 
1136 Sandra Enos, Mothering from the Inside: Parenting in a Women’s Prison (State University of 
New York Press, 2001) 84-88. 
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families are often required to travel longer distances to visit their mothers.1137 
Many women prisoners were the sole carers of their children before their 
incarceration and so most of these children are cared for away from their family 
home for the duration of their mothers’ sentence.1138 This is in direct contrast to 
the children of male prisoners who rely upon the children’s mother to care for 
their child.1139 As women prisoners rely upon others to care for their children, 
they are potentially more likely to lose custody of their child, especially if they do 
not receive regular visits from that child.1140 Finally, women may have contact 
with their and other children prohibited because of the nature of the crimes that 
they committed. 
Male Prisoners and Obstacles to Parenting 
 Male prisoners may be seen to have deviated from the traditional role of 
provider for his children. In many situations, the female partner is expected to 
                                                
1137 In England and Wales 2013, 63% of women prisoners were held a distance of less than 50 
miles away from their home address, 23% were held a distance of under 100 miles away and 
almost 14% were held more than 100 miles away. There is currently no women’s prison in Wales, 
exacerbating the problem. See Cathy Robinson, Women’s Custodial Estate Review (National 
Offender Management Service, 2013) 10. In the USA, most prisoners are kept over 100 miles 
from their previous home address (men included) See Christopher J Mumola, Bureau of Justice 
Statistics Special Report: Incarcerated Parents and Their Children (US Department of Justice, 
2000) 5. As there are fewer women’s then men’s prisons in the USA, this distance is probably 
larger for women. 
1138 In the USA, in state prisons, 41.7% of women were the sole parent living with their minor 
child in the month before arrest compared to 17.2% of men. Whilst serving their sentence, 88.4% 
of men reported that person caring for their child was the other parent, whereas 37% of women 
said this. For women prisoners, 44.9% stated that a grandparent cared for their child, with 10.9% 
of prisoners stating that their child was being cared for by social services. See Lauren E Glaze, 
Laura M Marushak, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Parents in Prison and Their 
Minor Children (US Department of Justice, 2008 revised 2010) 4-5. In England and Wales, only 
9% of children are cared for by their fathers when their mothers are in prison and only 5% of them 
remain in their home. Jean Corston, A Review of Women with Particular Vulnerabilities in the 
Criminal Justice System (Home Office, 2007) 20. 
1139 In the USA, whilst serving their sentence, 88.4% of men reported that person caring for their 
child was the other parent, whereas 37% of women stated that the other parent cared for their 
child. Lauren E Glaze, Laura M Marushak, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: Parents in 
Prison and Their Minor Children (US Department of Justice, 2008 revised 2010) 4-5.  
1140 Timothy Ross, Ajay Khashu, Mark Wamsley, Hard Data on Hard Times: An Empirical 
Analysis of Maternal Incarceration, Foster Care and Visitation (Vera Institute for Justice, 2004) 
1; Jeanne Flavin, Our Bodies, Our Crimes: The Policing of Women’s Reproduction in America 
(New York University Press, 2009) 45. 
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assume sole responsibility for the support of the family unit whilst the father is 
imprisoned.1141 This support can extend to the prisoner himself, with the free 
partner being expected to provide the prisoner with items such care packages, and 
payments into their prisoner accounts to enable prisoners to buy toiletries and 
food from the prison shop.1142 The imprisonment of a non-resident father may still 
impact the child’s family financially as the father cannot afford usually to provide 
financial maintenance whilst in prison.1143 Contact between prisoner fathers and 
their children can also be problematic. Non-resident fathers may lose contact with 
their children as families refuse to visit them.1144 The expense and distance in 
visiting a prisoner may be prohibitively high which also prevents contact.1145 
Provision for male prisoners to keep in touch with their children is often not seen 
as a priority. There are no provisions made for male prisoners to care for their 
children in residential facilities in either England and Wales or the USA. 
Moreover, the visiting environment can be unpleasant and intimidating to 
                                                
1141 Pauline Morris, Prisoners and their Families (George Allen & Unwin, 1965) 153; Jeremy 
Travis, Michelle Waul, Prisoners Once Removed: The Impact of Incarceration and Reentry on 
Children, Families, and Communities (The Urban Institute Press, 2003) 18-20; Joyce A Arditti, 
Jennifer Lambert-Shute, Karen Joest, ‘Saturday Morning at the Jail: Implications of Incarceration 
for Families and Children’ (2003) 52 Fam Relations 195, 199. 
1142 Megan Comfort, Doing Time Together: Love and Family in the Shadow of the Prison 
(University of Chicago Press, 2007) 80-90. 
1143 This was the justification for releasing Oakley on parole in State v Oakley, in order so that he 
could earn money to back pay his child support arrears State v Oakley 2001 WI 103 (2001) para 
14-15. 
1144 In research with male prisoners in England, Boswell and Wedge found that 1 in 12 prisoners 
received no visits from their children, and for some prisoners it was because their ex-partners did 
not want to bring them to the prison. See Gwyneth Boswell, Peter Wedge, Imprisoned Fathers and 
Their Children (Jessica Kingsley Publishers, 2002) 37; Amanda Gekker ‘Paternal Incarceration 
and Father- Child Contact in Fragile Families’ (2013) 75 J Marriage & Fam 1288, 1290. In the 
USA, 42% of state prisoners reported receiving a visit since incarceration, 55% of parents in 
federal prison had received a visit from their child. Visits were equally likely to have occurred for 
both mothers and fathers. See Laura M Marushak Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report: 
Parents in Prison and Their Minor Children (US Department of Justice, 2010) 6. 
1145 Megan Comfort, Doing Time Together: Love and Family in the Shadow of the Prison 
(University of Chicago Press) 81; Amanda Gekker, ‘Paternal Incarceration and Father- Child 
Contact in Fragile Families’ (2013) 75 J Marriage & Fam 1288, 1290. 
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children.1146 Male prisoners may also have contact with children prohibited 
because of the nature of their crimes.  
Ameliorating the Effects of Imprisonment 
 The obvious option to Murray and Farrington to reduce the impact of 
imprisonment upon children is to ‘imprison fewer parents.’1147 Whilst this may be 
a better longer-term solution, considering the rising levels of incarceration, a large 
reduction in the overall prison population in England and Wales and USA is 
unlikely. Effective interventions can be targeted towards the root causes of the 
problems that the children of prisoners experience: trauma, strained care giving, 
economic strain and stigma.1148 Interventions in the jurisdictions of England and 
Wales, the state jurisdictions of New Jersey, California, and the Federal 
jurisdiction of the USA will be considered in turn. 
Attachment Based Interventions 
Basing interventions on trauma theory aims to prevent or reduce the harm 
suffered by children by increasing the attachment of children to their parents, 
mainly by improving contact and improving relationships between parents and 
child.1149 For the mothers of infants and young children, some jurisdictions have 
used prison-based MBU, or community-based alternatives to enable suitable 
pregnant prisoners to care for their child. It is hoped that allowing mothers to care 
for their babies would promote bonding between mother and child and allow them 
to benefit from help within the prison to overcome any parenting difficulties. 
                                                
1146 Gwyneth Boswell, Peter Wedge, Imprisoned Fathers and Their Children (Jessica Kingsley 
Publishers, 2002) 38.  
1147 Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘The Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children’ 
(2008) 37 Crime & Just 133, 187. 
1148 ibid 188-189. 
1149 Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘The Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children’ 
(2008) 37 Crime & Just 133, 188; Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘Evidenced-based 
Programs for Children of Prisoners’ (2006) 5 Criminology & Pub Pol 721, 724.  
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Within England, there are six prisons with a mother and baby unit (MBU) 
available to female prisoners since the closure of HMP Holloway’s MBU in 
October 2013.1150 Access to the MBU is only allowed if it is in the best possible 
interests of the child.1151 Children are allowed to stay on the MBU up to 18 
months.1152 Provision for prisoners in the USA is more scant, only 13 states in the 
USA have any access to prison nurseries, and out of that 13, three states only 
allow prisoners to stay with their babies for up to 30 days.1153 The Federal Bureau 
of Prisons do not run prison nurseries, but instead allow a few low risk prisoners 
to enter a residential programme called Mothers and Infants Nurturing 
Together.1154 Prisoners enter the residential facility for the final trimester of their 
pregnancy and spend three to twelve months following the birth of their baby 
caring for them whilst living in the facility. If their sentence ends before their 
infant is three months old, they have to return to the prison to finish their sentence 
whilst the baby is cared for by relatives or social services.1155 New Jersey 
Department of Corrections does not allow any prisoners to keep their infants with 
them in any facilities.1156 Six prison units in California allow women to keep their 
babies until they turn two, but most women have to give up their children at 
                                                
1150 There are no female prisons in Wales; all female Welsh prisoners have to serve their time in an 
English prison. HC Deb, 5 March 2014, vol 576 Column 868 W (Simon Hughes MP). The MBU 
at HMP Holloway was closed following a MoJ review of the female prison estate in January 2013. 
1151 National Offender Management Service, Prison Service Instruction 49/2014 Mother & Baby 
Units (NOMS, 2014) para 2.16.  
1152 ibid.  
1153 Malkia Saada Saar, Mothers Behind Bars: A state- by state report card and analysis of federal 
policies on conditions of confinement for pregnant and parenting women and the effect on their 
children (National Women’s Law Center, 2010) 20. 
1154Federal Bureau of Prisons ‘Female Offenders’ (Federal Bureau of Prisons)    
<http://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/female_offenders.jsp> accessed 1 May 2015; 
Chandra Kring Villanueva, Mothers, Infants and Imprisonment: A National Look at Prison 
Nurseries and Community-Based Alternatives (Women’s Prison Association, 2009) 34.  
1155 ibid. 
1156 Malkia Saada Saar, Mothers Behind Bars: A state- by state report card and analysis of federal 
policies on conditions of confinement for pregnant and parenting women and the effect on their 
children (National Women’s Law Center, 2010) 20. 
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birth.1157 The Community Prisoner Mother Program (CPMP) allows female 
offenders to live with their children under 6 with them in a supervised facility for 
three years followed by three years supervision on parole.1158 
Supporters of prison nurseries argue that children of prisoners can suffer 
attachment disorders.1159 Allowing prisoners to reside with their babies can 
promote attachment and it is hoped can prevent future offending in the women 
and reduce the likelihood of their children entering prison themselves when they 
get older.1160 Some opponents of prison nurseries argue than rather than being a 
positive move which breaks the recidivism cycle and reduces the likelihood of the 
child entering prison themselves as an adult, they state it is an ‘instrumental’ use 
of mainly babies of ethnic minorities, who are incarcerated with their mothers, on 
the basis of increasing attachment and reducing reoffending.1161 Dwyer argues 
that babies are being imprisoned in a way that would be thought of as intolerable 
                                                
1157  Karen Shain, Carol Strickman, Robin Rederford, California’s Mother- Infant Prison 
Programs: An Investigation (Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, 2010) 1 
,http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ved
=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.prisonerswithchildren.org%2Fwp-
content%2Fuploads%2F2013%2F01%2FCA-Mother-Infant-Prison-
Programs_report.pdf&ei=CeGqU6mCHs_H7AbFo4HIDQ&usg=AFQjCNHHhNPIAHAvTBJvFV
iRyEcSxemyXw&bvm=bv.69620078,d.ZGU accessed 20 June 2014. 
1158 California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation ‘Community Mother Infant Program’ 
<http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_operations/FOPS/Community_Prisoner_Mother_Program.html> 
(California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 2014) accessed 25 May 2015.  
1159 Christina Jose Kampfner, ‘Post-traumatic stress reactions in children of imprisoned mothers’ 
in Kathering Gabel, Denise Johnston, (eds) Children of Incarcerated Parents (Lexington, 1995) 
89-100. 
1160 Goshin and Byrne argue that recidivism rates in mothers who have been able to keep their 
babies with them in a MBU is lower than those who were separated from their babies at birth. 
Lorie Smith Goshin, Mary Woods Byrne, ‘Converging Streams of Opportunity for Prison Nursery 
Programs in the United States’ (2009) 48 J Offender Rehabilitation 271. A report by the 
University of Indianapolis found that participants in a MBU programme at Indiana Women’s State 
Prison had significantly lower readmission to prison one year after release (10% vs 18%). Kevin 
Whiteacre, Stephanie Fritx, James Owen, Assessing Outcomes for Wee Ones Nursery at the 
Indiana Women’s Prison (University of Indianapolis, 2013) 
<http://www.uindy.edu/documents/Assessing_Outcomes_for_Wee_Ones_Nursery_at_Indiana_W
omens_Prison.pdf >accessed 10 July 2015. See also Julie Campbell, Joseph R Carlson, 
‘Correctional Administrators' Perceptions of Prison Nurseries’ (2012) 39 Crim Just & Behaviour 
1063, 1066-1067. 
1161 James G Dwyer, ‘Jailing Black Babies’ (2014) 3 Utah L R 465, 466. 
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with other dependants, such as ‘senile adults’ or disabled dependents.1162 To make 
such comparisons is to miss the point however; the relationship between very 
young children and their parents is different, based upon developing an 
attachment to a parent who is expected to act as their primary carer on release. 
Dwyer also argues that the research evidence justifying prison nurseries in this 
way is scant.1163  One longitudinal study of a 100 babies within a New York 
prison nursery that the children raised within the prison nursery with their 
mothers developed better than expected levels of attachment to their mothers.1164   
For all fathers and for the majority of mothers who cannot have their 
children with them in prison, the next best way to deal with separation is to ensure 
that children are placed with appropriate caregivers that remain stable and allow 
for open and honest communication between caregiver and child.1165 As 
previously stated stable childcare is more problematic for women prisoners who 
are more likely to be single parents. In conjunction with this, prisoners and 
children should be able to see each other regularly to maintain contact, in an 
environment that is conducive to developing and maintaining a family 
relationship.1166 In the case of prisoners sentenced to life, improving contact with 
children can help maintain a relationship with their children. For children of 
prisoners sentenced to death, there are very few, if any arrangements to foster a 
                                                
1162 ibid 2. 
1163 ibid, see also Chandra Kring Villanueva, Mothers, Infants and Imprisonment: A National Look 
at Prison Nurseries and Community-Based Alternatives (Women’s Prison Association, 2009) 15.  
1164 A follow up in 2012 (third year re-entry into the research) found that out of 59 babies released 
from prison with their mothers as primary care givers, 44 were still being cared for by their 
mothers. Mary W. Byrne, Lorie Goshin, Barbara Blanchard-Lewis, ‘Maternal Separations During 
the Reentry Years For 100 Infants Raised in a Prison Nursery’ (2012) 50 Fam Court R 77, 83. 
1165 Julie Poehlmann, ‘Representations of attachment relationships in children of incarcerated 
mothers’ (2005) 76 Child Development 679; 682, 691; Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, 
‘Evidenced-based Programs for Children of Prisoners’ (2006) 5 Criminology & Pub Pol 721, 725. 
1166 Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘The Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children’ 
(2008) 37 Crime & Just 133, 188. 
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relationship between prisoners and their children, or support them as vulnerable 
minors.1167 As the rehabilitation of the prisoner is deemed inconceivable, it 
follows that no effort would be made to promote a prisoner’s relationship with 
their family. 
Whilst adult convicted prisoners in England and Wales have the right to 
receive two one hour social visits per month, the Prison Rules allow for these 
visits to be cancelled or modified in order to promote the good order and running 
of the prison.1168 Not all prisons have a visitor centre, but many prisons do, which 
are normally run by charities.1169 Some prisons also run family visit days in 
conjunction with prisoners’ families’ charities although access to these varies 
from prison to prison and depend upon the security risk of the offender.1170 The 
first unit for overnight visits between mothers and families has also been opened 
at HMP Drake Hall, which allows for 25 prisoners to live in open conditions with 
overnight visiting allowed for children.1171 Schemes provided by some voluntary 
organisations in England and Wales also help to ameliorate some of the 
attachment problems faced by the prisoners of children.1172 Other schemes such as 
                                                
1167 As well as restrictions on visiting death row prisoners, including refusing to allow physical 
contact between relatives, children of death row prisoners in the USA are often not entitled to any 
state aid or support services following the sentence of death. See Rachel King, ‘No Due Process: 
How the Death Penalty Violates the Constitutional Rights of the Family Members of Death Row 
Prisoners’ (2006) 16 Boston U Pub Interest LJ 195, 215-217. Some prisons may also bar minors 
from visiting. Child Rights Connect, Children of parents sentenced to death or executed: How are 
they affected? How can they be supported? (Child Rights Connect, 2013) 5.  
1168 Prison Rules SI 1999/728 35(1); National Offender Management Service, Prison Service 
Instruction: 16/2011 Management Service Providing Visits and Services to Visitors (National 
Offender Management Service, 2011) 2, 6. 
1169 Spurgeons, ‘Visitors’ Centres’ (Spurgeons 2015) http://www.spurgeons.org/visitorscentres/ 
accessed 23 April 2015.  
1170 For example see the Supervised Play Services run by PACT, ‘Supervised Play Services’ 
(PACT) <http://www.prisonadvice.org.uk/our-services/supporting-prisoners-children-and-
families/supervised-play-services> accessed 05 May 2015.  
1171 Anonymous, ‘New unit for children to stay over with prison mums opens at Drake Hall Prison 
in Eccleshall’ (Staffordshire Newsletter, 5 February 2015) 
http://www.staffordshirenewsletter.co.uk/New-unit-children-stay-prison-mums-opens-
Drake/story-25979828-detail/story.html accessed 2 March 2015. 
1172 One example of the Banardo’s run scheme to enhance and improve the visiting within HMP 
 
 
289 
Storybook Mum/ Dads also aims to promote more normal family relationships by 
providing children with a CD recording of their prisoner parent reading a story 
and interactive DVDs featuring the prisoner parent.1173 
In the USA, provision made for visits varies depending on the jurisdiction. 
The Federal Bureau of Prisons does not allow for private family visits, but contact 
visits where physical contact at the start and end of the visit is allowed. Visitors in 
death row or on Secure Housing Units (SHU) are only permitted closed visits 
where prisoners remain behind a Perspex screen.1174 Family private visits are 
allowed for some categories of offender (not life sentenced or death row 
prisoners) in California, with contact visits allowed depending on circumstances 
to most prisoners.1175 In New Jersey, there are contact and closed visits only, 
depending on the offender, and no private or conjugal visits are allowed.1176  
Strain Theory Based Interventions 
 The economic strain of attempting to maintain a relationship with a 
prisoner has been mentioned previously in this thesis. Attempts to ameliorate 
                                                                                                                                
Dorchester with family visiting days thus improving the attachment between prisoners and their 
children. Naomi Clewett, Jane Glover, ‘Supporting prisoners’ families How Barnardo’s works to 
improve outcomes for children with a parent in prison’ (Banardo’s, 2009) 11-12 
http://www.barnardos.org.uk/supporting_prisoners_families.pdf accessed 10 July 2015. 
1173 Storybook Dads, ‘Home’ (Storybook Dads) http://www.storybookdads.org.uk/page120.html 
accessed 5 May 2015.  
1174 Federal Bureau of Prisons, ‘General Visiting Information’ (Federal Bureau of Prisons) 
<http://www.bop.gov/inmates/visiting.jsp> accessed 5 May 2015. 
1175 California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, Visiting A Friend or Loved One in 
Prison (California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation) 
<http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ve
d=0CCUQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fcdcr.ca.gov%2FVisitors%2Fdocs%2FInmateVisitingGui
delines.pdf&ei=ZOWqU5bVNOWy7AaP2YGIBA&usg=AFQjCNGajdCixGmX7gAoUnYrFHf8
wpp6Gw&bvm=bv.69620078,d.ZGU> accessed 05 May 2015.  
1176 An example of the standard visiting policies is evident from the New Jersey State Prison 
visiting guidelines. New Jersey Department of Corrections, ‘New Jersey State Prison: Visit 
Program http://www.state.nj.us/corrections/pdf/cia_visitation/NJSP.pdf. Visits are also considered 
a privilege and not the right of a prisoner. New Jersey Department of Corrections, ‘Understanding 
the New Jersey Department of Corrections Prison System’ (New Jersey Department of 
Corrections, 2007) 38 
http://www.state.nj.us/corrections/pdf/OTS/090311_Understanding%20the%20NJDOC%20Prison
%20System.pdf accessed 25 June 2014. 
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these problems are practical in nature, making it easier for prisoners’ families to 
visit the prison, perhaps by providing subsidised transport or assistance with costs. 
It also may entail providing help with welfare assistances or benefits and 
providing prisoners with paid work to enable them to support their families.1177 In 
England and Wales, the Assisted Prison Visits Scheme provides assistance with 
the costs of visits for low-income families, and families are entitled to claim 
benefits if they meet the criteria.1178 In the USA, there is no federal assistance to 
help pay for prison visits.1179 In California, charities run assistance to help 
prisoners maintain contact with their families with the annual ‘Get on the Bus’ 
scheme which provides free transportation and extended visitation to prisoner’s 
children.1180 A few organisations in New Jersey provide limited assistance with 
enhanced family visitation, providing transport and organising parenting 
programmes.1181 
Inadequate Parenting/ Strained Care giving Interventions 
 Parenting programmes could have a beneficial effect in helping parents 
both outside and inside of prison develop strategies to cope with the stress of 
                                                
1177 Council of Europe, ‘Recommendation 1340 on the Social and Family Effects of Detention’ 
(Parliamentary Assembly, Council of Europe, 1997) s6 (iii); Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, 
‘Evidenced-based Programs for Children of Prisoners’ (2006) 5 Criminology & Pub Pol 721, 728. 
1178In England and Wales, the Assisted Prison Visits Scheme can provide some assistance to 
prisoners’ relatives on a low income to enable them to visit offenders. See National Offender 
Management Service, Assisted Prison Visits Scheme: Customer Guide Help with the cost of prison 
visits if you are on a low income. (National Offender Management Service, 2013). There are no 
federal schemes to assist with the cost of visiting prisoners in USA, some charitable organizations 
aim to fill some of the need. See Assisting Families of Inmates, ‘About AFOI’ (Assisting Families 
of Inmates) http://www.afoi.org/ accessed 03 May 2015. 
1179 As there are no federal schemes to assist with the cost of visiting prisoners in USA, some 
charitable organizations try to fill some of the need. See Assisting Families of Inmates, ‘About 
AFOI’ (Assisting Families of Inmates) http://www.afoi.org/ accessed 3 May 2015. 
1180 California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, ‘Visitation: Get on the Bus’ 
(California Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation, 2014) 
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Visitors/Get_On_The_Bus.html accessed 05 May 2015. 
1181 There are limited services provided by the Girl Scouts of America and the New Jersey 
Association on Correction. See Human Rights Watch, ‘New Jersey: Prison Resources’ (Human 
Rights Watch, 20 July 2010) http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/07/20/new-jersey-prison-resources 
accessed 03 May 2015. 
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parenting whilst one parent is in prison.1182 In the Cambridge Study in Delinquent 
Development, boys whose parents were imprisoned in the first ten years of life 
were more likely to have fathers who had cruel and neglectful attitudes and used 
harsh or inconsistent punishment.1183 Prisons in England and Wales offer 
parenting courses, as does the Federal Bureau of Prisons, New Jersey Department 
of Corrections and California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. The 
prison authorities provide some of these programmes; others are run by voluntary 
and children’s organisations.1184 Murray and Farrington argue that prison based 
parenting courses should be evaluated in the same way as community based 
interventions to determine their efficacy.1185   
                                                
1182 Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘Evidenced-based Programs for Children of Prisoners’ 
(2006) 5 Criminology & Pub Pol 721, 726; Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘The Effects of 
Parental Imprisonment on Children’ (2008) 37 Crime & Just 133, 189. 
1183 Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘Parental Imprisonment: Effects on Boys’ antisocial 
behaviour and delinquency through the life-course.’ (2005) 46 J Child Psychology & Psychiatry 
1269, 1272. 
1184 One example of the voluntary organizations that provides support to prisoners is PACT, who 
has an integrated family support officer who provides parenting courses, and liaises on behalf of 
individual prisoners. PACT, ‘Integrated Family Support Service: Evaluation report’ (PACT, June 
2012)  <http://www.prisonadvice.org.uk/sites/default/files/resources/EvaluationReport.pdf> 
accessed 03 May 2015. In the Federal system, the Bureau of Prisons provides parenting courses. 
Federal Bureau of Prisons, ‘Custody & Care: Education’ (Bureau of Prisons) 
<http://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_and_care/education.jsp> accessed 03 May 2015. California 
provides parenting courses to women prisoners participating in its Mother Infant Prison Program. 
Karen Shain, Carol Strickman, Robin Rederford, California’s Mother- Infant Prison Programs: 
An Investigation (Legal Services for Prisoners with Children, 2010) 
<http://www.google.co.uk/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&ve
d=0CCoQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.prisonerswithchildren.org%2Fwp-
content%2Fuploads%2F2013%2F01%2FCA-Mother-Infant-Prison-
Programs_report.pdf&ei=CeGqU6mCHs_H7AbFo4HIDQ&usg=AFQjCNHHhNPIAHAvTBJvFV
iRyEcSxemyXw&bvm=bv.69620078,d.ZGU> accessed 20 June 2014. 
  In New Jersey, female prisoners can attend a specific ‘Every Person Influences a Child’ 
parenting course, whilst male prisoners are offered the ‘Help Offenders Parent Effectively’ 
Course. See New Jersey Department of Corrections, ‘Understanding the New Jersey Department 
of Corrections Prison System (New Jersey Department of Corrections, 2007) 16. 
1185 Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘Evidenced-based Programs for Children of Prisoners’ 
(2006) 5 Criminology & Pub Pol 721, 728. Some evidence for the efficacy of parenting courses 
exists, such as research by Sandifer, which compared 161 prisoners who underwent a parenting 
course with 42 prisoners who had never enrolled on a parenting course. Sandifer found that 
prisoners who had undergone positive attitude changes in areas of child discipline, child 
development, dealing with crises, and a decrease in negative parenting attitudes. Jacquelyn L. 
Sandifer, ‘Evaluating the Efficacy of a Parenting Program for Incarcerated Mothers’ (2008) 88 
Prison J 423, 442. 
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Interventions Based Upon Stigma Theories 
 These interventions would include protecting the identity of offenders, not 
publicising their crime and details of their offence.1186 The use of restorative 
justice and the use of community-based punishments to ‘emphasize the positive 
contributions that ex-offenders can make to the community’ would also reduce 
the stigma suffered by the families of offenders.1187 None of the jurisdictions 
studied protect the identity of offenders, and whilst community sentences are used 
in some instances, prison is still often used as a punishment in a large range of 
offences. 
                                                
1186 Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘Evidenced-based Programs for Children of Prisoners’ 
(2006) 5 Criminology & Pub Pol 721, 729. 
1187 ibid. 
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Summary	  
In comparison with the strong protection for autonomy afforded to those 
in free society, prisoners are not permitted to procreate in England and Wales 
without justifying their family relationships, their reasons for becoming parents 
and their suitability for parenthood. This position is defended by claims that 
making it more difficult for prisoners to procreate protects child welfare. Whilst it 
is understandable in some respects, considering the negative outcomes that some 
children of prisoners suffer, it is in effect stating that being the child of a prisoner 
is worse than not existing at all. In the USA, prisoners are completely prohibited 
from claiming a right to reproduce. 
With the estimates of children affected by imprisonment in England and 
Wales and the USA so large, one may question why anyone would advocate 
allowing prisoners to procreate, thus increasing these numbers. This is to 
misjudge the point, which is that no civil rights should be restricted or removed 
from prisoners unless it is justified by either their offence or because of the 
physical situation of imprisonment. Removing rights cannot be justified because 
of the sheer number of family members affected by incarceration. These numbers 
can only be dealt with on a societal level, by making active moves towards 
decarceration, restricting imprisonment for only the most serious offences.1188  
Longitudinal studies on the life course of the children of prisoners, such as 
the Cambridge Study on Delinquent Development, and the Great Smoky 
Mountains study both demonstrate that the prisoners of children have a greater 
                                                
1188 Bosworth highlights that decarceration in the USA is necessary for justice for the large 
numbers of people incarcerated for decades at a time, especially when one considers the large 
racial bias against African Americans. Mary Bosworth, ‘Penal moderation in the United States? 
Yes we can’ (2011) 10 Criminology & Pub Policy 335, 341. 
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risk of becoming offenders themselves.1189 These studies acknowledge however, 
that as well as the offending of the parents of the children studied, other risk 
factors for offending such as poverty were present.1190 The more punitive nature 
of incarceration in England and Wales and in the different jurisdictions of the 
USA could account for the effect of parental incarceration on the children. In a 
cross national study, comparing children of prisoners in England with Sweden, it 
was found that whilst the children of prisoners in Sweden were more likely to 
engage in criminal behaviour than the children of non-prisoners, this result 
disappeared when the criminality of the parent had been statistically controlled 
for.1191 The authors hypothesise that shorter prison sentences, prison regimes that 
fostered family contact and more considerate public attitudes to offenders may 
have protected prisoners’ children against the worst effects of their parents’ 
incarceration.1192 
Rather than insisting that all prisoners should refrain from procreating, the 
different approaches used to ameliorate the worst effects of incarceration on 
children could be employed with greater use in prisoners and their partners who 
wish to start a family. Strengthened family relationships could be fostered with 
better visitation facilities for families, including private family visits. The purpose 
of private visits would not just be for prisoners to procreate and engage in sexual 
relationships, but to allow them to develop their relationships with partners to 
                                                
1189 Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘Parental Imprisonment: Effects on Boys’ antisocial 
behaviour and delinquency through the life-course.’ (2005) 46 J Child Psychology & Psychiatry 
1269, 1272; Susan D Phillips, Alaattin Erkanli, Gordon P Keeler, E Jane Costello, Adrian Angold, 
‘Disentangling the Risks: Parent Criminal Justice Involvement and Children’s Exposure to Family 
Risks’ 5 (2006) Criminology & Pub Pol 677. 
1190 ibid. 
1191 Joseph Murray, Carl-Gunnar Janson, David P Farrington, ‘Crime in Adult Offspring of 
Prisoners: A Cross-National Comparison of Two Longitudinal Samples’ (2007) 34 Crim J & 
Behavior 133. 
1192 ibid 146-147. 
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develop in a manner that reflects those in the outside world. One of the arguments 
used against both Gavin Mellor’s and Kirk Dickson’s AI applications, was that 
their relationships had not been ‘tested’ in the real world. Unless prisoners are 
allowed to develop relationships with family members and partners in this way, 
then their relationships will always remain untested until their release, by which 
time the opportunity to strengthen their family ties prior to release has been lost. 
In conjunction with improved access to visiting facilities, access to the prison 
itself must be improved. Costs and prison protocols remain a barrier to many 
prisoners’ relatives to visiting, especially in those US states that provide no 
assistance to often low-income families. Parenting courses and positive 
interventions such as family support workers can help prisoners and their relatives 
to make positive changes to their attitudes to parenting, drugs intake and 
criminality. Again, if prisoners can make changes which strengthen their social 
capital and support on the outside of prison they are more likely to desist from 
crime.  
It could be argued that these interventions would be expensive in an age of 
austerity where prisons in both England and Wales and the USA have reduced 
levels of staff may seem like a luxury that cannot be afforded. Imprisonment itself 
is an expensive process, but by increasing the social capital of prisoners and their 
families, by providing support for pregnant prisoners and new mothers in the form 
of prison nurseries, by allowing the few prisoners that wish to have children to do 
so, recidivism and the associated costs could be reduced. It could be argued that 
promoting prisoner procreation as a means to rehabilitation that one is using a 
child as a means to an end, which is the rehabilitation of the offender. In this case 
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though, the child is not produced merely to rehabilitate the offender, but instead 
because a couple wish to exercise their right to have a child.  
If one returns to the primary punishment of imprisonment, which is the 
removal of freedom, this does not necessarily need to include the removal of the 
right to procreate. Individual’s rights, including those of prisoners should only be 
limited as necessary. This would justify curtailing the rights of child abusers to 
procreate, but this should be done on a case-by-case basis, with the presumption 
that all prisoners retain all of their rights, bar that of liberty unless there are 
compelling reasons otherwise. This would be a massive shift in the attitudes of 
the criminal justice systems, corrections systems and political views in all the 
jurisdictions within the USA and within England and Wales. A longer-term 
strategy of decarceration and abolition of the death penalty would remove all but 
the most serious offenders from prison and prisoners off death row, but it is 
acknowledged that this occurring would be extremely unlikely in both England 
and Wales and within the US as it would be politically unpopular. 
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Chapter Ten: Conclusions 
Introduction 
The first part of the title of this thesis ‘Prison and Planned Parenthood’ 
brings into focus two of the main issues raised by the prisoner procreation cases 
of Mellor, Dickson, Goodwin, Percy and Gerber. Prisoners who are prevented 
from having sexual intercourse have to plan for parenthood, making special 
arrangements such as applying for permission to access AI or IVF treatment. The 
focus of the decision-making does not end at conception, or even at delivery of 
the child. The prisoner and their partner are planning for parenthood. A 
‘conception of a right to procreate’ sees imprisonment as the removal of freedom 
and not necessarily the automatic removal of other rights, such as the right to 
procreate. If state and prison authorities can ‘conceive’ or think of prisoners as 
having rights, then the concept of a prisoner planning parenthood and conceiving 
a child would not be viewed as something that should only be allowed in 
exceptional circumstances. Instead, the converse would apply, rights would only 
be restricted if justified and necessary. The ‘conception of a right’ to procreate 
applies more generally: conceiving of the actual right to procreate itself and what 
it should consist of.  
 The main question that this thesis has examined is whether prisoners retain 
the right to procreate whilst incarcerated and whether any justifications exist for 
removing a prisoner’s right to have children whilst in prison.  A comparative 
analysis of the case law from England and Wales and the USA demonstrates that 
such blanket prohibitions on procreation are unsupported. The cases of Raymond 
v Honey and Wolff v McDonnell both state that prisoners retain all civil rights that 
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are not removed by incarceration.1193 Arguably, it therefore follows that prisoners 
do not automatically lose the right to procreate, or even to a sexual relationship 
with their partners outside of prison. 
This chapter will firstly consider the issue of prisoners’ procreative rights 
and human rights, moving on to the case law analysis, in order to draw out the 
actual legal status of the prisoner’s right to procreate in England and Wales and 
the USA. After this, the chapter will turn to the main factors that have contributed 
to the highly restrictive policies of both England and Wales and the USA. These 
include the historical context of the development of the prison, along with 
concepts of less-eligibility and how this has contributed to the pains of 
imprisonment that continues to have detrimental effects on prisoners today. 
Punishment will also be discussed, as denial of the right to procreate is often 
justified as an appropriate punishment for prisoners.  
The reality of parenting from prison and creating a family can be very 
difficult. The next part of the concluding chapter will discuss the effects of 
imprisonment on prisoners and their children, and how interventions can reduce 
some of these negative effects. Finally, the chapter will conclude with a 
discussion of the future implications of this research, and recommendations for 
how prisoners’ procreative rights should be dealt with in future.  
                                                
1193 See footnote 35. 
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Main Conclusions 
 This thesis began with a question: do prisoners retain the right to procreate 
when incarcerated? At first, the answer to this question may seem obvious. The 
courts and government officials from both the USA and England and Wales 
answer negatively. It is assumed that both sexual intercourse and the creation of a 
family are incompatible with imprisonment. Even if medical methods of 
reproduction are introduced as alternatives, restrictions are justified by the courts 
for a variety of reasons, including child welfare, punishment and the status of 
prisoners as non-citizens. Further study however, demonstrates that these reasons 
in themselves are not strong justifications for large, blanket bans on procreation or 
sexual intercourse. The main finding of this thesis is that the restrictions on 
procreation exist because of how imprisonment itself has developed as a 
punishment since Victorian reforms. Prisoners are isolated away from their 
families, their criminality treated as a contagion that must be isolated from 
society.1194 These rules are reinforced by conceptions of the prisoner as ‘other’ or 
undesirable, a person that should be preventing from procreating by the state. The 
historical legacy of eugenics has continued to influence ideas of inherited 
criminality, leading to prisoners being thought of as ‘different’ to non-
offenders.1195  These restrictions are further cemented by an assumption that 
prisoners undergo a process of civil death. This is thought to make them ineligible 
for the benefits of citizenship, including the ability to create and maintain a family. 
The loss of citizenship and rights are linked to a perception of punishment as an 
all-encompassing experience which goes far beyond the incarceration of the 
                                                
1194 See Silverman J Gerber v Hickman footnote 502 reference to ‘quarantining the prisoner.’ 
1195 See footnote 172. 
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individual and loss of liberty. Some members of the public, judiciary and 
politicians have a view of imprisonment that involves the prisoner experiencing 
punitive, humiliating and degrading conditions. Not only is the freedom of the 
prisoner restricted to their physical location, but also the pains of imprisonment 
are used as a tool to enhance the unpleasant and degrading effects of punishment. 
Contact with family members and procreation is viewed as a privilege to be 
earned rather than as a human right deserving of respect. Legally, however, there 
are few, if any justifications for highly restrictive procreative policies. In no 
country or state in either the USA or in England and Wales does statute dictate 
that prisoners are unable to procreate whilst in prison. In fact, case law in both the 
USA and England and Wales makes the explicit point that prisoners retain all 
rights that are not removed by incarceration.1196   
Human Rights and the Right to Procreate 
It has been argued that procreation itself is not an absolute right, but a 
conditional one.1197 Archard argues that the right to have children is conditional, 
putative parents should consider their responsibilities in raising a child before 
procreating. A more liberal approach views procreation as an extension of the 
right to self-determination, rooted in individual autonomy.1198 The law also takes 
this approach, so long as the individuals involved wish to procreate via sexual 
intercourse and do not require fertility treatment. Procreation itself is often 
characterised as a negative right. States should not interfere with individuals 
exercising their right to procreate unless necessary.1199 It is, however, under no 
                                                
1196 See footnote 35 
1197 David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (2 edn, Routledge, 2004, 2010 reprint) 139. 
1198 John A Robertson, ‘Procreative Liberty’ in Peg Tittle (ed) Should Parents Be Licensed? 
Debating the Issues (Promethieus Books, 2004) 214. 
1199 John Finnis, Natural Law and Human Rights (2 edn, Oxford University Press, 2011) 205. 
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obligation to provide positive assistance to those wishing to procreate, by 
providing fertility treatment for example. If necessary, a state can derogate from 
protecting an individual’s right to procreate providing there is sufficient legal 
justification.1200  This is in contrast to what could be characterised as ‘absolute’ 
human rights, such as the right to be free from torture and the right to life.1201 
Certain rights, such as the right to life are characterised as positive rights, and the 
state itself is under a positive obligation to ensure that they are protected.1202 The 
lines between positive and negative rights are sometimes unclear. Prohibiting 
prisoners from having heterosexual intercourse requires the state to provide 
positive assistance to prisoners who wish to procreate.  
Comparative Analysis      
A comparative approach was used within this thesis in order to find a 
common core between the cases and applicable statute law. This was relatively 
straightforward, as all of the cases were based upon common law, with English as 
the primary language. However, it was important to be mindful of the differences 
present between the different jurisdictions, especially those within the USA.  
Within the USA, it is also important to be aware of the interplay between state 
and federal law. The framework of the ECHR and the US Constitution was 
analysed within the case law chapter. Arguably, the ECHR provides prisoners 
with greater protection for their rights than the US Constitution, as the ECtHR 
provides another mechanism of scrutiny for the government of the member states. 
                                                
1200 This is expressed in the Human Rights Act Part 1 Sch 1 Art 8(2), which lists acceptable 
reasons for derogation. 
1201 Teraya Koji, ‘Emerging Heirarchy in International Human Rights and Beyond: From the 
perspective of Non-Derogable Rights’ (2001) 12 EJIL 917, 919-920. 
1202 John Finnis, Natural Law and Human Rights (2 edn, Oxford University Press, 2011) 205. 
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The Legal Rights of Prisoners and their Families 
The cases of Dickson v UK, Raymond v Honey and Woolf v McDonnell all 
state that prisoners retain all rights that are not removed by imprisonment.  
Legally, any restriction on a prisoner’s rights must be justified, so arguably all 
prisoners retain a right to procreate and that curtailment must be justified. The 
way in which restrictions are justified varies within each jurisdiction. For 
prisoners from England and Wales, the ECHR applies, so that all rights 
restrictions must be proportionate. This means that each case should be weighed 
on its merit, as the circumstances of each prisoner would alter this balance. The 
starting point should be that a prisoner retains those rights unless removing them 
would be proportionate and justified in the circumstances. It may be proportionate 
to remove the right to procreate from a person convicted of child abuse who is 
beginning their sentence, and who may pose a danger to children. It would be 
more difficult to argue that removal of the right to procreate would be 
proportionate for a prisoner convicted of murder, but who is progressing through 
their sentence and is likely to be released on licence in the near future.  
In the USA, any request to access AI facilities would be assessed under 
the four-part ‘rational basis’ test arising from Turner v Safley.  In order to remove 
a prisoner’s right, there must be a rational connection between the legitimate 
penological objective and the restriction on the prisoner’s right.  A second 
consideration is whether there is an alternative way for a prisoner’s right to be 
met. The Court argued that deference should be given to correctional officials, as 
they are best placed to understand the options available.  Consideration must also 
be given to the effects of meeting the prisoner’s right on other prisoners and staff.  
If no alternatives exist to the prison regulation, then this is taken as evidence of a 
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reasonable objective.  If easy alternatives exist, that can accommodate a 
prisoner’s request at minimal cost to the institution, then this may be evidence 
that the regulation is unreasonable.  The current case law that exists within the 
USA found different answers to the question of whether prisoners have a right to 
procreate and how this right could be accommodated, even when using the same 
four-part test, with similar facts in each case. This answer varied, from stating that 
prisoners do not have a right to procreate that survives incarceration, to 
supporting the idea that prisoners retain a right to procreate when incarcerated.  In 
one sense, the rulings of Percy, Goodwin, Gerber 1 and Gerber III are consistent 
in that they all denied the prisoners the right to procreate via AI, but they arrived 
at these decisions via inconsistent routes. Should future cases come to court, it is 
likely that prisoners would continue to be denied the ability to procreate. Women 
prisoners in particular stand little chance of being allowed to procreate due to the 
perception that large burdens that would be placed on the correctional services. 
There is some debate within the literature and the cases of whether the right to 
procreate is suspended or removed for prisoners serving a life sentence. It is more 
accurate to state that legally in practice the right to procreate is removed on 
imprisonment and regained on release from prison. A right that is ‘suspended’ 
implies that there is a chance that a person may be released from prison and will 
in turn regain that right. Clearly, that would be impossible if a person dies in 
prison following a whole-life or a death sentence. This removal is not absolute 
within England and Wales as it is within the USA, but in practical terms the 
numbers of prisoners being allowed to procreate is very low.  
The rights of the prisoner’s partner to procreate are similarly affected in 
both the US jurisdictions and within England and Wales. Only the Grand 
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Chamber in Dickson, and the minority judgments in Gerber and in the Chamber 
ruling in Dickson considered the plight of the free partner of the prisoner. The free 
partner is not serving a prison sentence; yet will find themselves similarly 
restricted from having a child with the partner of their choosing. Considering the 
large collateral consequences that affect the partners of prisoners, it is inaccurate 
to state that the partners of prisoners retain the same rights as all other free 
citizens.1203  
All of the judgements touched upon the aims of imprisonment and 
legitimate penological objectives. Within Mellor and Dickson, the courts had 
great concern with whether public confidence would be maintained within the 
system if prisoners were allowed to procreate.1204 This ties in with deterrence: if 
the public perceives prison as a harsh place, the idea is that this will reduce future 
crime.1205 The courts in Percy, Goodwin and Gerber were concerned with the 
burden that allowing prisoners to procreate would pose to correctional officials 
and other prisoners.1206 They restricted the right of the prisoners to procreate 
based upon the argument of treating all prisoners equally. The majority judges in 
all of the US cases apart from Gerber II argued that allowing male prisoners to 
procreate would lead to women prisoners requiring access to AI treatment, which 
would be prohibitively burdensome for the correctional services. Prisons in both 
England and Wales and the USA run on limited budgets, and are subject to 
periodic cuts. It could be argued that prisoners having children when in prison 
                                                
1203 Helen Codd, In the Shadow of Prison: Families, Imprisonment and Criminal Justice (Willan 
Publishing, 2008) 110-111. 
1204 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472 para 
62; Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd, Secretary of State for the Home 
Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 20. 
1205 ibid. 
1206 Goodwin v Turner 980 F.2d. 1395, 1399-1400 (1990); Percy v State of New Jersey 278 NJ 
Super 543, 549 (1995); Gerber v Hickman 103 F Supp 2d 1214, 1218 (2000). 
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could be a drain on resources, diverting money away from other vital services 
provided to prisoners. This could certainly be true when one considers women 
prisoners getting pregnant, the costs of providing healthcare to pregnant and 
parturient women, the provision of MBU places, and the increased staffing 
necessary could prove to be expensive for prisons. In the case of male prisoners 
who require very little more than a cup to provide a sample this argument fails. 
Prison and government officials may wish to protect themselves from claims of 
discrimination by removing the ability of all prisoners to procreate. If only male 
prisoners were allowed to procreate, this would provide grounds for women 
prisoners to sue. Using ‘gender equality’ concerns as an excuse to prohibit all 
prisoners’ rights makes women responsible for male rights claims and reduces 
women’s rights. 1207 In order to protect gender equality for women prisoners, 
there is often a requirement to provide greater resources for women in order to 
create parity between men and women, to meet different needs. One example is 
that women prisoners are more likely to enter prison with greater mental health 
needs than men, so their mental health service provision may be more costly per 
head than in a male prison.1208 The right to procreate is of such importance that 
denying the right of women prisoners because of cost would have lifelong effects 
that could extend beyond their sentence and so would be unjust. In particular, 
women prisoners may lose their fertility when incarcerated for relatively short 
periods of time, depending upon their age. It is also assumed by many that 
allowing women prisoners the ability to procreate would open the floodgates to 
                                                
1207 Rachel Roth, ‘No New Babies? Gender Inequality in Prison Systems (2004) 12 Am UJ Gender 
Soc Policy & L 391, 393. 
1208 Women prisoners make up around 5% of the total prison population, but 25% of the total self-
harm incidents reported every year in England and Wales. See Ministry of Justice, Safety in 
Custody Statistics England and Wales Update to March 2014: Ministry of Justice Statistics 
bulletin (Ministry of Justice, 2014) 7. 
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many women seeking to become pregnant, creating great strain on the various 
prison authorities. Potential demand could by gauged by conducting empirical 
research by asking women prisoners themselves whether they would take the 
chance to have children were it offered. It may be that the reality of being 
pregnant and giving birth whilst in custody would dissuade many prisoners from 
making that choice, especially if they did not have the opportunity to enter a 
MBU. The small number of cases appearing in court, plus the complete absence 
of women prisoners in England and Wales pressing a claim to access AI could be 
evidence that there is little demand for prisoners to procreate. Low demand, 
however, should not be used as an argument for withholding a prisoner’s rights, 
as it is not ‘important’ to many prisoners. Conversely, it should be viewed as 
support for the claim that the prison system may not find allowing women 
prisoners to procreate as burdensome as it claims.  
Welfare of the Child Concerns 
One of the major concerns of the court in both Mellor and Dickson was 
the welfare of the child. In contrast to the US cases, which failed to consider the 
putative child, the domestic courts had great concern over the welfare of the child, 
reflecting the focus of UK Government policy. It continues to have a central place 
in the decision-making process as to whether a prisoner is granted access to AI 
facilities in England and Wales. The child welfare standard that prisoners have to 
satisfy is higher than the standard that those having licensed fertility treatment. 
Prisoners are required to be in a partnership, which must have been in existence 
and tested outside of prison, which automatically excludes any prisoner who has 
developed a relationship since their confinement. Enquiries are made to the 
financial status of prisoners and their partners, including the kind of 
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accommodation the prisoner’s partner has.1209  Within England and Wales the 
threshold used for assessing putative parents for licensed fertility treatment is 
limited to checking that they have not been convicted of abusing children, that 
there is no risk of neglect or serious harm to the child.1210 There are no 
requirements to ensure that the child will not be born into a single parent family 
and no checking of whether putative parents are financially self-sufficient. 
Considering the serious nature of preventing someone from having a child, the bar 
against prisoners having children should use a similar standard; prisoners could 
justifiably be prevented from procreating if there is a risk of serious harm or 
neglect to the child. The risk of serious harm is fairly obvious in some cases. 
Those convicted of the abuse and murder of children would pose a very grave risk 
to children. The domestic courts in both Mellor and Dickson justified prisoners 
being restricted because of concerns over creating single parent families whilst 
the prisoners served their sentences.1211 Whilst the Grand Chamber did feel that it 
was appropriate to have regard for the welfare of the child, this did not extend to 
preventing procreation because of concerns over creating a single parent family, 
so long as there was one competent parent to care for the child.1212 
Eugenics and Biological Criminology 
The case of Buck v Bell highlights the ultimate interference that the state 
can have over an individual’s right to procreate, compulsory sterilisation. 
                                                
1209 Appendix; R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA 
Civ 472 paras 17-67; Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd Secretary of State for the 
Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 paras 7, 19, 20; Dickson v UK  (2007) 44 EHRR 21 
para 23.  
1210 Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority Code of Practice (Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology, 8th ed, 2009, revised April 2015) paras 8.10, 8.11. 
1211 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department Ex parte Mellor [2001] EWCA Civ 472; 
Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd Secretary of State for the Home Department 
[2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 8. 
1212 Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 para 76. 
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Reproductive autonomy is completely removed by a single operation. Whilst the 
compulsory sterilisation of prisoners was never approved in Skinner, the historical 
legacy of eugenics still casts a shadow over current discussions over whether 
prisoners should be able to procreate.  Sterilisation of the mentally ill and the 
learning disabled continued in some countries in Europe and in the USA up until 
the 1970’s.1213 Modern criminology does not support the notion of ‘innate 
criminality’ such as that espoused by Lombroso. There are, however, some 
offenders that are thought to have committed crimes that are so heinous that they 
are beyond rehabilitation. Prisoners who thought of as beyond redemption are 
given the maximum sentences allowed, either the death sentence in some states of 
the USA, or a whole-life tariff, which is the maximum sentence, allowed in 
England and Wales. Wilson argues that current punishments such as chemical 
castration for sex offenders and three strikes laws are examples of ‘new eugenics’ 
laws, methods, designed to stop offenders from procreating.1214 Recently, women 
prisoners in California were sterilised without following the correct consent 
procedures.1215 Whilst this was not a systematic attempt to sterilise all women 
prisoners, the fact that 39 out of the 144 female prisoners sterilised between 2005 
and 2012 were sterilised without the proper safeguards demonstrates the lack of 
importance given to ensuring the reproductive autonomy of vulnerable 
prisoners.1216 Eugenics also contributed to prisoners being seen as ‘other,’ 
intrinsically different to ‘normal’ non-offenders.1217  
                                                
1213 There were similar laws in operation in Denmark and Norway. See Gunnar Borberg, Nils 
Roll- Hansen, Eugenics and the Welfare State: Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland (2 edn, 
Michigan State University Press, 2005) ix; Anna Stubblefield, ‘ “Beyond the Pale”: Tainted 
Whiteness, Cognitive Disability, and Eugenic Sterilization’ 2 (2007) 22 Hypatia 162.  
1214 Debra Wilson Genetics, Crime and Justice (Edward Elgar, 2015) 19-21. 
1215 See footnote 166.  
1216 ibid. 
1217 David Garland, ‘The limits of the sovereign state: strategies of crime control in contemporary 
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Less Eligibility and the Pains of Imprisonment. 
Prior to the Victorian period, imprisonment was mainly used as a place to 
hold offenders prior to their physical punishment or to house debtors.  It was not 
unusual for a debtor’s immediate family, including wife and children to be 
imprisoned with the debtor.  The isolation of the prisoner from their family and 
society as the main form of punishment for serious offences gradually began to 
take over from physical punishment in the eighteenth century. Punishment moved 
away from the public sphere, becoming private, shameful and hidden away.1218 It 
became possible to hide and isolate the offender behind the closed gate of the 
prison. Prison reformers led by Howard and Fry challenged conditions within the 
poorly run prisons. Following reforms, prison conditions improved to the point 
that prisoners were provided with basic clothes and Spartan food, but they were 
isolated from one another, receiving visits from religious ministers.1219  Prisoners 
today remain cut-off behind the prison wall, within the ‘total institution of the 
prison.’ By design, prisoners are physically isolated from their families. In 
conjunction with strict regimes, the concept of less-eligibility developed. Prisons 
were designed to have a standard of living below the normal situations of the 
poorest worker, in order to deter people from committing crime.1220 The effects of 
less-eligibility persist today. Prisoners are routinely housed in overcrowded and 
unpleasant surroundings, often on purpose to enhance the punitive effects of their 
                                                                                                                                
society’ (1996) 36 Brit J Criminology 445, 461.  
1218 Pieter Spierenburg, ‘The Body and the State: Early Modern Europe’ in Norval Morris, David J 
Rothman (eds) The Oxford History of the Prison: The Practice of Punishment in Western Society 
(Oxford University Press, 1998) 58. 
1219 Michael Ignatieff, A Just Measure of Pain: The Penitentiary in the Industrial Revolution 1750-
1850 (Penguin Books 1978) 6-7. 
1220 Ahmed A White, ‘The Concept of “Less Eligibility” and the Social Function of Prison 
Violence in Class Society’ (2008) 56 Buff L Rev 737, 739-740. 
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incarceration.1221 Restricting access to non-essential items for prisoners is a 
popular political aim, as many feel they do not deserve luxuries such as 
televisions and equipment for hobbies. 1222 The pains of imprisonment are 
enhanced intentionally in many prisons. For example in ‘super max’ prisons, 
individuals have extremely limited contact with other humans, including prison 
staff, increasing the prisoner’s isolation and loneliness, even to the point of 
causing mental disorder.1223 Arguably, restrictions on prisoners’ living conditions 
and restrictions on prisoner’s accessing their families should be the minimum 
necessary to ensure public protection and good order.1224    
The physical isolation of the prisoner from loved ones, the rigid regime 
and limited facilities of prison creates an environment where the pains of 
imprisonment are keenly felt. These are listed by Sykes as: the deprivation of 
liberty, possessions and services, heterosexual relationships, autonomy, and 
security.1225 All of these pains of imprisonment have practical consequences for 
prisoners who wish to become parents. The most obvious side effect to 
restrictions on heterosexual sex is that the prisoner cannot have sex in order to 
procreate. All of the other pains of imprisonment impinge upon the prisoner’s 
ability to procreate. The loss of autonomy means that in most circumstances 
prisoners are unable to act upon the decision that they would like to start a family. 
Lack of resources makes supporting a family financially impossible for most 
                                                
1221 See footnote 878. 
1222 An example from England and Wales shows the government ‘clamping down’ on prisoners 
watching TV. Robert Winnett, ‘Prisoners stripped of right to watch TV’ (Daily Telegraph, 29 
April 2013) http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/law-and-order/10026566/Prisoners-
stripped-of-right-to-watch-TV.html accessed 20 July 2015. 
1223 See footnote 813. 
1224 Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice The Choice of Punishments: Report of the Committee for 
the Study of Incarceration (Hill and Wang, 1976) 107; Andrew von Hirsch, Censure and 
Sanctions   (Oxford University Press, 1993) 80. 
1225 Gresham Sykes, Society of Captives (Princeton University Press, 1958) 64-78. 
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prisoners. The removal of the right to freedom means that prisoners will not be 
able to physically care for their child, unless they are one of a minority of women 
in a mother and baby unit. In addition to these five pains of imprisonment 
identified by Sykes, Crewe identifies a further two that are relevant: the pains of 
continual psychological assessment and the pains of uncertainty. Prisoners who 
are sentenced for serious offences will be subject to psychological assessment in 
order to establish if it is safe to release them back into the community, or to see 
what interventions may improve their chances of rehabilitation. In England and 
Wales, these assessments could possibly be used to assess a prisoner’s suitability 
for access to AI. The other pain of imprisonment, the pain of uncertainty would 
certainly apply to prisoners who are prevented from procreating. Prisoners serving 
life sentences or those with indeterminate sentences may not be given a definite 
release date, as they have to satisfy parole criteria and attend specific offending 
courses. These prisoners are most likely to be prevented from accessing AI and so 
will not be able to plan their future. 
Punishment 
The complete prohibition of prisoners in the USA and the restriction of 
prisoners in England and Wales on procreating is unjustified if one accepts that 
prisoners retain all of their rights apart from those that are explicitly removed as a 
consequence of their imprisonment. This is especially true when one considers the 
seriousness of removing a person’s ability to have children. These include 
detrimental effects on family relationships, and the collateral damage suffered by 
the free partner who is unable to procreate with a person of their choosing. The 
loss of a chance to create a family may have continuing effects for many years 
after the completion of a prisoner’s sentence- so any justifications for restricting 
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procreation should be given serious consideration. In the case of prisoners who 
have committed serious offences there may be good cause to restrict their right to 
procreate, but this should explicitly stated during sentencing. 
Some argue that society has a right to punish offenders, which can include 
prohibitions on procreation whilst incarcerated. This view makes the assumption 
that prisoners automatically lose their right to procreate, a view that was reflected 
in all of the domestic case law apart from Gerber II. Steven Goodwin argued that 
removing his right to procreate was a cruel and unusual punishment, a claim that 
was dismissed.1226 William Gerber argued that the three strikes law was a 
punishment, which treated him differently to other offenders, as his punishment of 
whole life incarceration was disproportionately more severe than first time 
offenders.1227 In Gerber III the restriction of procreation was affirmed as a 
legitimate part of the ‘punishment’ of imprisonment.1228 
The dissenting judgments in Gerber III offered a contrasting view, 
criticising the approach that prohibiting procreation formed a part of the 
prisoner’s sentence. In his dissenting judgement, Kozinski J made the vital point 
that legislature has not specifically stated that prisoners be automatically denied 
the right to procreate.1229 In deciding whether to prohibit procreation, Tashima J 
reiterates that this decision should lie with the legislature alone as only they have 
the legitimacy to decide what punishments should be meted out for what 
                                                
1226 Goodwin v Turner 702 F Supp 1452, 1455 (1988). The restriction was seen as legitimate 
punishment and not excessive.   
1227 Gerber v Hickman 103 F Supp 2d 1214, 1218 (2000). In 2012 California voted to amend the 
law on three strikes to only sentence to mandatory life when the third crime was serious, rather 
than a misdemeanour. See Lorelei Laird, ‘California begins to release prisoners after reforming its 
three strikes law.’ (American Bar Association, 1 December 2013). 
<://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/california_begins_to_release_prisoners_after_reformin
g_its_three-strikes_la> accessed 3 March 2015. 
1228  Gerber v Hickman 291 F3d 617, 620 (2002). 
1229 ibid 632. 
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crime.1230 The Grand Chamber in Dickson made it clear to the government that 
the only punishment prisoners should receive is the removal of liberty.1231  
One needs to return to the original justifications of punishment to evaluate 
how imprisonment and removing the ability to procreate fits in with these 
justifications. Punishment is imposed on an offender because they have 
committed a crime. The crime justifies the punishment for the individual 
offender.1232 If the legislature deems the crime serious enough, then the offender 
will be incarcerated, or in some jurisdictions sentenced to death. In a more general 
context, the common justification for maintaining the institution of punishment is 
to deter potential and current offenders, to punish offenders and to protect society 
by incapacitating the offender.1233 On a general level, deterrence is ineffective in 
reducing the overall levels of crime.1234 If prison itself is not enough to deter 
potential offenders away from crime, it is extremely unlikely that the prospect of 
enforced childlessness will also have a specific deterrent effect. Protecting society 
is not furthered by a general prohibition on procreation for prisoners, as the 
prisoner themselves would not be released from prison before their sentence has 
expired. It could be argued that the prohibition on prisoners having children is 
justified by the punitive effect of the restriction. This is a decision that should be 
                                                
1230 ibid 630. 
1231 Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 [67] citing Hirst v United Kingdom (no 2) 
(2006) 42 EHRR 41 para 69.  
1232 Immanuel Kant, Metaphysical Elements of Justice: The Complete Text of The Metaphysics of 
Morals, Part 1 (Tr John Ladd, Hackett Publishing Company, 1999) 138. 
1233 Herbert Lionel Adolphus Hart, ‘Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment’ in Robert M 
Baird, Stuart E Rosenbaum, (eds) Philosophy of Punishment (Prometheus Books, 1988) 16. 
1234 In a sample of 130 prisoners, Burnett and Maruna sought to test the hypothesis that prison 
deters offenders from committing crime by following the post release trajectories. They found that 
10 years post release; only 18% had no convictions for serious crime after a ten-year period 
(serious crime excluding parole violations, minor traffic offences and offences which only resulted 
in fine or conditional discharge) Ross Burnett, Shadd Maruna, ‘So ‘Prison Works’, Does It? The 
Criminal Careers of 130 Men Released from Prison under Home Secretary, Michael Howard’ 
(2004) 43 How J 390, 397; Francis T. Cullen, Cheryl Lero Jonson, Daniel S. Nagin, ‘Prisons Do 
Not Reduce Recidivism: The High Cost of Ignoring Science’ (2011) 9 Prison J Supp 49S, 50S. 
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specifically made by the legislature. Removal of a prisoner’s freedom is already 
the most powerful punishment that society can exert over an offender and the 
specific punishment inflicted by a prison sentence. Apart from the death penalty, 
the punishment given to a prisoner at sentencing is the length of time to be spent 
in prison.  
One of the more ‘positive’ aims of any punishment is encouraging the 
prisoner to desist from committing further crimes. Having children is a life 
changing decision for many, and in the case of prisoners, may help them desist 
from crime. Prisoners re-entering the community more often than not rely upon 
the support of their families to help them desist from crime. Rehabilitation and 
family ties are of primary importance to former prisoners seeking to desist from 
crime and prisoners who have stronger family ties are more likely to desist from 
crime.1235 For some prisoners, being able to procreate would help cement these 
ties and help them to create a future for themselves and their families outside of 
prison. For a few prisoners who are convicted of serious offences against children, 
it would be appropriate to prevent them from procreating. It is very difficult to 
make generalised statements about which prisoners should have their right to 
procreate restricted, especially when one considers the variations in sentence 
given for the same offences in different jurisdictions.  
Civil Death 
 Prisoners today in both the USA and in England and Wales continue to be 
affected by concepts of slavery and civil death, where the prisoner is presumed to 
no longer exist as a legal entity. Civil death in the medieval sense, of the person 
                                                
1235 William D Bales, Daniel P Mears, ‘Inmate Social Ties and the Transition to Society: Does 
Visitation Reduce Recidivism?’  (2008) 45 J Res Crime & Delinquency 287, 312; Alice Mills, 
Helen Codd, ‘Prisoners’ families and offender management: Mobilizing social capital’ (2008) 55 
Prob J 9, 10. 
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who is legally dead to the world, no longer exists outside of some states in the 
USA, which mandate civil death for offenders convicted of murder.1236 Slavery 
and imprisonment are also intrinsically linked with social death. These create 
practical barriers to parenthood, as prisoners are not able to earn a wage to 
support a family and are prevented from being involved with their family. 
Patterson highlights the historical links between slavery and imprisonment, where 
prisoners were subject to forced labour.1237  Links between slavery and 
imprisonment in the USA are profound, where high numbers of Hispanic and 
African American individuals are incarcerated.1238 Due to the large numbers of 
African American and Hispanic individuals incarcerated, restrictions to their 
ability to start a family will have profound effects on wider minority 
populations.1239 Similar to the slave who loses all rights to their family, Nagel 
argues that prisoners undergo a process of natal alienation.1240 The prisoner may 
have parental rights terminated; they are prevented from seeing their partner and 
may be prevented from having children. These collateral consequences go beyond 
the concept of penal punishment as just removing a person’s freedom. 
Prohibitions on procreation also stem in part, to the notion that following 
the commission of a crime, prisoners have a ‘shattered character.’ This ‘shattered 
character’ is used as a justification for a raft of collateral consequences, 
restrictions and intrusions into a prisoner’s life which often extend beyond the 
                                                
1236 See footnote 889  
1237 Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Harvard University Press, 
1982) 128. 
1238 See footnote 897 
1239 See footnote 898. 
1240 Mechthild E Nagel, ‘Patriarchal Ideologies and Women’s Domestication’ in Mechthild E 
Nagel, Anthony J Nocella II, (eds) The End of Prisons: Reflections from the Decarceration 
Movement (Rodopi, 2013) 164. 
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length of their prison sentence.1241  Chin applies this unwritten rule to the ex-
offender and the multitude of restrictions that face him on release. It equally 
applies to the current prisoner, who is thought of as deserving punitive treatment 
because of their past wrong which has ‘shattered’ their good character.1242 Dayan 
goes further, stating that the law enables the prisoner to be seen as civilly dead, 
living in body but dead in legal existence.1243 Such a person has no ability to 
assert a right to procreate, as he is not viewed as a full person in the eyes of the 
law.  
Parenting from Prison 
When deciding when to have children individuals are usually afforded a 
great deal of privacy and autonomy. Some individuals may be criticised for 
making a decision which appears foolish, but no legal means will be taken to 
prevent otherwise competent adults from procreating via sexual intercourse. 
Prisoners on the other hand are subject to the full glare of the public gaze, having 
to justify personal decisions. They are completely stripped of their autonomy 
because the whole of prison is a public place. When a prisoner does submit to 
scrutiny in England and Wales, the prisoner and their partner will find that they 
may be refused for any number of reasons as they are subject to higher parenting 
standards than those in free society. The Dicksons were refused because of the 
‘seeming material insufficiency’ of the provision made for the putative baby.1244 
                                                
1241 In his dissenting judgment in Gaunt v United States, Clark J refers to the Swiss philosopher 
Amiel who stated that ‘character is an historical fruit and is the result of a man's biography’ and 
that the criminal convictions of the former offender can shatter that character, justifying the 
removal of civil rights for an immigrant claiming citizenship. Gaunt v United States 364 US 350, 
358- 360 (1960).  
1242 Gabriel J Chin, ‘The New Civil Death: Rethinking Punishment in the Era of Mass 
Incarceration’ (2012) 160 U Pa L Rev1789, 1790-1791. 
1243 Colin Dayan, The Law is a White Dog: How Legal Rituals Make and Unmake Persons 
(Princeton University Press, 2011) 49. 
1244 Dickson and Dickson v Premier Prison Service Ltd Secretary of State for the Home 
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It was only mentioned in the Grand Chamber that Lorraine Dickson owned her 
own house and was completing a course, which would enable her to earn a 
living.1245 It is as if the prisoner, and by extension the prisoner’s partner are 
stripped of their autonomy, in order that the interest that they possess as 
competent adults can be taken over by the state. The state, in removing the 
prisoner’s autonomy over their own body has in a way taken ownership of the 
prisoner’s body. The state has an interest in the prisoner’s physical self, which it 
expresses by not only physically restraining them in a prison, but by physically 
preventing them from procreating.  
Parenting or rearing is subject to closer scrutiny than the decision to beget 
a child. This scrutiny is generally a societal pressure to perform a certain way as a 
parent, such as the development of ‘intensive parenting’ that treats parents 
themselves as a source of risk.1246 This high standard is not a legal threshold for 
removing children. The legal threshold of child welfare which would mandate the 
removal of a child is a low one, just enough to prevent a child from being 
neglected or seriously harmed.1247  It appears unfair that prisoners are required to 
meet higher standards than those in free society and even those prisoners who are 
already parents. Prisoners in England and Wales do not automatically lose 
custody of their children if they claim benefits or are single parents. That is not to 
say that prisoners do not lose custody of their children- they do, especially if they 
are serving a long prison sentence, or they are a danger to their children because 
                                                                                                                                
Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1477 para 7. 
1245 Dickson v United Kingdom (2008) 46 EHRR 41 para 55.  
1246 Frank Furedi, Paranoid Parenting: Why Ignoring the Experts May be Best for Your Child 
(Continuum, 2008) 41; Ellie Lee, ‘Introduction’ in Ellie Lee, Jennie Bristow, Charlotte Faircloth, 
Jan Macvarish (eds) in Parenting Culture Studies (Palgrave Macmillan, 2014) 10.  
1247 Karen S Budd, ‘Assessing Parenting Competence in Child Protection Cases: A Clinical 
Practice Model’ (2001) 4 Clinical Child & Fam Psychology R 1, 3. 
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of their offence.1248 The threshold for losing a child however is far lower than the 
threshold for prohibiting the creation of a new one. Sutherland argues that this 
higher welfare standard is used as a way of preventing prisoners from procreating, 
acting as a new form of eugenics.1249 
Prisoners face many challenges parenting from prison, as do the children 
of prisoners. This may be used as a justification for restricting the ability of 
prisoners to procreate, in order to protect the interests of the putative child. 
Instead of ensuring that the putative child will never exist, a more positive 
approach would be to take steps to reduce the negative effects of imprisonment 
upon children and families. Improving visitation facilities and access for families, 
including financial support would provide prisoners with better contact with their 
families, allowing their children to develop better attachment to their parents. 
Private visits could be introduced for this purpose, so that prisoners develop 
normal healthy relationships with their partners and children, helping them to 
desist from crime on release, as well as giving them a connection with their 
family whilst they are still in prison. 
Parenting courses and positive interventions such as family support 
workers can help prisoners and their relatives to make positive changes to their 
attitudes to parenting, drugs intake and criminality. Again, if prisoners can make 
changes which strengthen their social capital and support on the outside of prison 
they are more likely to desist from crime. Parenting courses and if necessary, 
                                                
1248 In the USA, prisoners can be subject to the Federal statute Adoption and Safe Families Act 
1997 §103(a)(3) which mandates that all states automatically begin adoption proceedings for 
children who have been in foster care for 15 months within the last 22 months. Whilst there are 
exceptions, such as children who are being cared for by relatives, this means prisoners serving 
longer sentences can automatically lose parental rights. 
1249 Elaine E Sutherland, ‘Procreative Freedom and Convicted Criminals in the United States and 
the United Kingdom: Is Child Welfare Becoming the New Eugenics?’ (2003) 82 Or L Rev 1033. 
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prison based nurseries can help prisoners improve their parenting skills, thus 
helping to reduce some of the negative effects of imprisonment. The potentially 
higher costs from allowing these measures could be offset by a reduction in the 
recidivism rate. 
Suggestions for Reform 
This research highlights that the legal status of prisoners who want to 
procreate needs reform. All of the jurisdictions studied had restrictive policies, 
none of which were justified by statute law. Given the fundamental importance of 
procreation to individual prisoners, their families and the wider community from 
which they come, the way requests from prisoners are dealt with requires reform. 
The potentially stabilising influence of closer family relationships justifies 
prisoners in all of the jurisdictions studied being allowed to exercise the right to 
procreate unless there are compelling reasons for restricting their right. It is 
important to separate the removal of the right to procreate from the punishment 
that the prisoner undergoes. The punishment of the prisoner sentenced to prison is 
that they lose their freedom, not their right to procreate.  
 The first stage in this process would be recognising that prisoners have a 
right to procreate that survives incarceration. Interpreting an individual prisoner’s 
right to procreate as either a privilege or a right that is ‘suspended’ during their 
incarceration creates legal uncertainty and undermines the case law that states that 
prisoners’ retain all of their rights apart from freedom. Allowing the state to treat 
procreation as a privilege opens the door to treating other rights that prisoners 
possess as a privilege. The second important change after recognising that 
prisoners retain a right to procreate, would be to protect this right by only 
prohibiting individual prisoners from procreating unless there is a compelling 
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reason not to. In England and Wales, procreation is not currently viewed as a 
human right. Whilst the Grand Chamber ruling in Dickson removed the 
requirement for prisoners to have an exceptional reason to request access to AI 
treatment, in practice it seems that the Ministry of Justice will still require specific 
justification as to why individual prisoners should be able to have children. In the 
USA, procreation only appears to be sanctioned when it serves a political need, 
such as in the case of Cuban spy Gerardo Hernandez.1250 It may be that other 
jurisdictions and the Federal Department of Corrections have allowed other 
applications from prisoners to access AI, but would remain unreported unless 
pertinent to the media. Further research would be valuable in this area to highlight 
whether prisoners get permission to procreate without having to take a case to 
court, but in practice gaining access to this information would be extremely 
difficult. Within England and Wales the Freedom of Information Act 2000 would 
provide access to this information.1251  
In all of the jurisdictions studied, the right to marry is respected as an 
important right for prisoners.1252 This demonstrates that the state recognises the 
importance of prisoners creating enduring family relationships. It follows that if 
the right to marry deserves respect, then the right to have children is also 
important and equally deserving of respect. There may be justifications for 
restricting the right of certain prisoners to procreate, such as in the case of 
prisoners convicted of offences against children, or for prisoners convicted of 
                                                
1250 Anonymous, ‘US jail sent Cuban prisoner's sperm to wife in Havana’ (The Telegraph, 23 
December 2014) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/centralamericaandthecaribbean/cuba/11309576/US-
jail-sent-Cuban-prisoners-sperm-to-wife-in-Havana.html accessed 15 July 2015. 
1251 s1 (a), (b). 
1252 The exception to this is New York where prisoners sentenced to live for murder are deprived 
of civil rights and cannot marry. See footnote 579.     
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violent offences that may be at risk of harming a child. Similarly there may be 
justifications for restricting the ability of some prisoners to have sexual 
intercourse due to their convictions. The courts in both England and Wales and 
the USA argue that restricting sexual intercourse for all prisoners can be justified 
because of security concerns. Other jurisdictions manage the security concerns of 
private visits, even for high security prisoners, showing that a blanket ban is 
unjustified.1253 Any necessary restrictions on private visits and procreation should 
be stated at the time of conviction.  
Murray and Farrington argue that one of the quickest and most effective 
ways of reducing the effects of incarceration on children would be to imprison 
fewer parents.1254 In the longer term, this would be the most sensible move, in 
both England and Wales and the USA. If only the most serious offenders were 
incarcerated, then prisoners who request the right to have a child could be 
accommodated more realistically. Considering the current punitive climate that 
affects both the USA and England and Wales, however, this is unlikely to occur 
in the near future. The prison population in both jurisdictions has undergone great 
growth over the last 30 years.1255 Recognising that prisoners retain a right to 
                                                
1253 Most prisoners in Russia not subject to disciplinary measures can apply for private visits with 
family members. Dominique Moran, ‘Between outside and inside? Prison visiting rooms as 
liminal carceral spaces’ (2013) 78 GeoJournal 339, 344. European countries that provide access to 
private visits include Sweden, Denmark and Spain. Wyatt R, ‘Male Rape in US Prisons: Are 
Conjugal Visits the Answer?’ 37 (2005) Case W Res Int’l L 576, 602. 
1254 Joseph Murray, David P Farrington, ‘The Effects of Parental Imprisonment on Children’ 
(2008) 37 Crime & Just 133, 187. 
1255 In the USA the prison population (in both state and federal detention) in 1982 stood at 
400,000, and in 2014 stood at 1,508,636.  The Sentencing Project ‘Fact Sheet: Trends in US 
Corrections’ (The Sentencing Project, November 2015)  
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_Fact_sheet.pdf accessed 
5 January 2015. In England and Wales in 1980, the prison population stood at just over 40,000. 
Ministry of Justice, Story of the Prison Population: 1993-2012 England and Wales (Ministry of 
Justice, 2013) 5.  The overall prison population for England and Wales stands at 86,164 week 
ending 3 July 2015. Howard League for Penal Reform, ‘Weekly Prison Watch: Week Ending 
Friday July 3 2015’ (Howard League for Penal Reform, 3 July 2015) 
<http://www.howardleague.org/weekly-prison-watch/>accessed 4 July 2015. 
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procreate via sexual intercourse (or AI treatment if necessary) would be a radical 
move for all of the jurisdictions studied. Immediate change may be unrealistic, 
but as a first step, prisons in the USA should consider prisoners claims on a case-
by-case basis, rather than dismissing all claims. It may be that some prisoners are 
allowed to procreate, but that these cases are never reported because they do not 
reach court. In England and Wales, the Ministry of Justice should consider 
prisoners claims without applying the exceptional reasons justification. This was 
made a condition of the Grand Chamber in Dickson, however the one successful 
applicant for AI known of shows that little has changed in practice.   
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Future Policy Implications of this Research 
This research highlights that a prisoner’s right to procreate, either by AI or 
sexual intercourse, is given very little respect or protection by either prison 
authorities or the judiciary in England and Wales and the USA This is despite 
having children being of fundamental importance to many prisoners and their 
partners. This thesis has shown that removing a prisoner’s right to procreate 
without considered reasoning is unjustified and has collateral consequences that 
may reach far beyond the actual incarceration of the prison sentence. Further 
qualitative research conducted with prisoners may reveal the extent of the effects 
of enforced childlessness, such as failed relationships, increases in mental health 
issues and loneliness. It would also be valuable to compare prisoners in both the 
USA and in England and Wales with prisoners in other jurisdictions who do have 
access to private visits, and the opportunity to start a family. This could possibly 
demonstrate the value of improved relationships between prisoners and their 
partners, including those who have started families whilst incarcerated. Prisoners 
in the USA who have access to private visits and the ability to procreate could be 
compared with those who do not have access to the same facilities to see whether 
there are positive effects on rates of recidivism and prisoner behaviour. From a 
practical perspective, gaining access to prisons to conduct such research may be 
difficult. Prison authorities may feel that even conducting research would create 
an awareness of fertility options that prisoners themselves may never have 
considered. Such research in future would require careful preparation and ethical 
approval, as there may be the potential to leave research participants upset and 
requiring debriefing after participating. This would not be a reason to avoid 
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conducting research of this type however, as much research conducted with 
prisoners deals with sensitive issues, but has the potential to generate positive 
change within prisons. It is accepted that it may be difficult to gain permission for 
research of this type in England and Wales due to the current administration. Such 
reluctance was recently demonstrated by of the Ministry of Justice who refused 
the Howard League for Penal Reform permission to conduct empirical research 
about the prevalence of sex within prisons with serving prisoners and those 
released on licence. It is probable that a research proposal to question serving 
prisoners about their desire to become parents may also be refused.   
Whilst prisoner procreation may seem a marginal issue compared to other 
problems such as prison voting and conditions of confinement, denying a person 
the ability to procreate goes to the very heart of an individual’s self-expression 
and hopes for the future. In each of the jurisdictions studied, the state often 
removes other important rights from prisoners such as the right to vote and the 
right to maintain close family relationships. These rights are often removed with 
little consideration of whether their removal is justified by either law, or to 
increase the punitiveness of an offender’s punishment. Therefore, a similar 
analysis to that undertaken by this thesis should also be applied to the many rights 
assumed to be withheld from prisoners by virtue of their incarceration. This will 
show whether their continued denial is justified. Furthermore, this research 
highlights the vital importance of immediate reform within the English and Welsh 
and American prison systems, with a focus on removing the enduring legacy of 
less eligibility. Prisoners should be allowed to retain all of their citizenship rights, 
including the right to sexual self-expression and procreation, unless there are 
compelling reasons to the contrary. This would include prisoners within society, 
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helping them to build social capital and so resist reoffending when they are 
released.  
This research also shows that prisoners will continue to litigate to expand 
the recognition of their rights, including the right to procreate. In practical terms, 
this has been made difficult in the USA because of the PLRA and may be difficult 
in England and Wales because of reductions in Legal Aid funding.1256 The current 
climate of punitiveness may continue to stifle these attempts, making it harder for 
prisoners in England and Wales to access the ECtHR. Equally, the case of 
Gerardo Hernandez highlights that the door for reform may have been left slightly 
ajar in the USA, since it has become known that the Federal Department of 
Corrections may make exceptions in certain cases. 
                                                
1256 For details of the PLRA see footnote 54. In England and Wales, Legal Aid for Prison Law 
cases is no longer allowed in certain circumstances, such as challenging the conditions of their 
detention, which can include women prisoners applying to a MBU or Parole Board hearings. See 
The Criminal Legal Aid (General) (Amendment) Regulations 2013 SI 2013/2790 Part 4; HL Deb  
29 January 2014, vol 751 cols 1271-1280. Judicial review should still be available to prisoners, 
but they have to apply to the Special Cases Unit of the Legal Aid Agency, which may potentially 
cause delays. See Legal Aid Agency, VHCC - Prison Law Judicial Review April 2013 v1 (Legal 
Aid Agency, 2013) 3. 
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Appendix Freedom of Information 
Request 
    
 
 Mary Yarwood, 
 
 
 
 
Offender Safety, Rights and Responsibilities 
NOMS 
Room G 20 Abell House 
London  
SW1P 4LH 
Tel  0207 217 8561 
 
 
 
 Our Reference: FOI 70869    29 July 2011 
 
 
Freedom of Information Request  
 
Dear Ms Yarwood, 
 
Thank you for your email of 8 June, in which you asked for the following 
information from the Ministry of Justice (MoJ): 
 
(I have numbered your requests for ease of reply) 
 
1. The amount of requests made by male prisoners in the period 1st January 1990 
and 3rd December 2007 for access to artificial insemination facilities.  
 
2. I would like to know how many of those requests were granted, and when they 
were granted.  
 
3. If at all possible I would like to know the current policy considerations which 
are taken into account by decision makers when making this decision, and a copy 
of the policy, if one exists. 
 
4. In the same period from 1st January 1990 to 3rd December 2007 I would also 
like to know if there were any requests from female prisoners for access to 
reproductive facilities, i.e. to enable them to conceive a child whilst incarcerated. 
This could include direct artificial insemination with donor or their partner's 
sperm, in-vitro fertilisation using either their own or donor gametes and partner or 
donor sperm.  
 
5. I would also like to know this same information for the period 4th December 
2007 to today, the 8th June 2011 to enable me to make any comparisons between 
the two time periods. 
 
6. Finally I would also like to know if any separate policy exists to allow officials 
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to make a decision regarding access to fertility treatment for female prisoners. If 
so, I would be very grateful for some details of the policy, and if possible a copy.  
 
7. I am particularly interested in the factors which decision makers take into 
account when deciding whether or not to allow access to treatment, such as 
relationship considerations, the offence committed by the prisoner, public policy 
issues, Article 8 rights of the prisoner and welfare of the child considerations.  
 
Your request has been handled under the Freedom of Information Act 2000 
(FOIA). 
 
Please note that if a request is made for information and the total figure amounts 
to five people or fewer, the Ministry of Justice (MoJ) must consider whether this 
could lead to the identification of individuals and considers the information in line 
with the Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA).and some information has been 
withheld under Section 40 of the Freedom of Information Act.  
 
It is the general policy of the Ministry of Justice not to disclose, to a third party, 
personal information about another person. This is because the MoJ has 
obligations under the DPA to protect this information.  It has been concluded that 
some of the information you have requested is exempt under Section 40(2) of that 
Act.  Section 40(2) of the FOIA states that personal data relating to third parties 
(i.e. a party other than the person requesting the information) is exempt 
information if one of the conditions in Section 40(3) is satisfied.  It is my view 
that disclosure of the smaller figures requested would breach one or more of the 
Data Protection Principles in the DPA.  For example, disclosure would breach the 
fair processing principle, as it would be unfair on the person who the personal 
data relates to, and they have a reasonable expectation that the Department would 
hold that information in confidence 
 
In answer to your questions: 
 
1. Between 1 January 1990 and 3 December 2007 43 applications were received 
from male prisoners for access to artificial insemination (AI) facilities.  
 
2. As per the above guidance on section 40, it is not our policy to give this 
information as this could enable the individuals to be identified.   
 
3.  There is no policy document which addresses this type of request other than 
Prison Service Instruction 10/2011 and Prison Service Order PSO 2510, 
Prisoners’ Request and Complaints Procedures, chapter 10 which identify this as 
a reserved subject. As such, this is dealt with centrally rather than at prison 
establishment level.  
  
When considering an application of this kind particular attention is paid to the 
following considerations: 
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• The welfare of any child born.  Evidence would need to be produced to 
show that the arrangements for the welfare of the child and the couple’s 
home would be satisfactory. 
 
• Whether both parties want the procedure and medical authorities inside 
and outside the prison are satisfied that both parties are medically fit to 
proceed with treatment. 
•  
• Whether the prisoner’s expected release date is neither so near that delay 
would not be excessive, nor so distant that they would be unable to 
assume the responsibilities of a parent. 
•  
• Information about the prisoner’s offending history, including an 
assessment of the risk of harm they present, as well as other factors which 
might suggest it would not be in the public interest to allow access to AI 
facilities in the particular case. 
•  
• Whether the prisoner and their partner are in a well established and stable 
relationship which is likely to endure after the prisoner’s release. 
•  
• Whether the provision of AI facilities and/or the continuation of assisted 
conception treatment is the only means by which conception is likely to 
occur. 
 
This information is shared with both the prisoner and their partner on receipt of a 
request for access to AI facilities and both parties are asked to comment. This list 
of considerations is not exhaustive and applicants are at the same time encouraged 
to submit any other relevant information which they think may help their 
application. 
 
There is no delegation to officials to approve applications for access by prisoners 
to AI facilities. Any approvals are granted by Ministers. 
 
4. From 1 January 1990 to the present day, according to our records, no 
applications have been received from female prisoners.  
 
5. Since 4 December 2007, 22 applications have been received from male 
prisoners.  
 
6.  The same policy applies to male and female prisoners. 
 
7. As at 3 above. 
 
The Prison Service Instruction 10/2011 and Prison Service Order PSO 2510, 
Prisoners’ Request and Complaints Procedures, chapter 10, referred to above is 
available on the MoJ website at the following address: 
 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/prison-probation-and-
rehabilitation/psipso/psos.htm  
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We hope that you have found this information helpful. 
 
 
You can also find more information by reading the full text of the Act (available 
at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2000/36/contents) and further guidance 
http://www.justice.gov.uk/guidance/freedom-of-information.htm.  
 
You have the right to appeal our decision if you think it is incorrect. Details can 
be found in the ‘How to Appeal’ section attached at the end of this letter. 
 
Yours sincerely 
 
How to Appeal 
 
Internal Review 
If you are not satisfied with this response, you have the right to an internal review. 
The handling of your request will be looked at by someone who was not 
responsible for the original case, and they will make a decision as to whether we 
answered your request correctly. 
 
 
If you would like to request a review, please write or send an email to the Data 
Access and Compliance Unit within two months of the data of this letter, at the  
following address: 
 
 
Data Access and Compliance Unit (6.25), 
Information & Communications Directorate, 
Ministry of Justice, 
102 Petty France, 
London 
SW1H 9AJ 
 
E-mail: data.access@justice.gsi.gov.uk 
 
Information Commissioner’s Office 
If you remain dissatisfied after an internal review decision, you have the right to 
apply to the Information Commissioner’s Office. The Commissioner is an 
independent regulator who has the power to direct us to respond to your request 
differently, if he considers that we have handled it incorrectly. 
 
You can contact the Information Commissioner’s Office at the following address: 
 
Information Commissioner’s Office, 
Wycliffe House, 
Water Lane, 
Wilmslow, 
Cheshire 
SK9 5AF 
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Internet address: https://www.ico.gov.uk/Global/contact_us.aspx 
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